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Writing this dissertation was a daunting, arduous, and emotionally draining expe-
rience. I had an unusually difficult time settling on a topic, and often found myself deep 
in the weeds of researching and writing, only to discover that I had reached a dead end, or 
that I lacked the intellectual creativity to bring a subject to life. The extensive research I 
undertook as I cast about for a focus saw me making many solitary trips to the far corners 
of the U.S.A., where I would rummage around in archival collections chronicling the his-
tory of computing, often without any very clear direction in mind. Archival research is by 
nature a rather lonely enterprise, taking place in quiet, heavily air conditioned rooms 
where one spends hours on end poring over documents, sifting for pieces that can be as-
sembled into some kind of comprehensible tale, and only speaking to others when it is 
time to trade out one box of papers for another. I would often leave a reading room at the 
end of a long day to find that my fingernails had turned blue, and that my powers of 
communication were curiously muddled, making usually simple tasks such as ordering 
food at a restaurant a chancy enterprise. When I did eventually begin to focus on the 
story of Apple, Inc., I was deeply unsettled by the strangely personal connection I felt to 
life at that company, which in many respects resembled my experiences in contemporary 
American universities. As I uncovered more details about how employees coped with Ap-
ple’s darker side, I found myself by turns exasperated with their seeming inability to rec-
ognize or resist their plight and haunted by the peculiar resonances with my own situa-
tion. 
Fortunately, my home at the University of Texas, the Department of American 
Studies, has itself been an altogether warm and supportive environment, something of a 
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sunny island amidst the rough seas of academia, thanks in no small part to the efforts of 
our long-time chair, Steve Hoelscher, who has done more than I will probably ever fully 
know to make life for myself and the other graduate students in American Studies as pro-
ductive, rewarding, and enjoyable as possible. In my seven years at the University of 
Texas, I have also had the great pleasure of working with many talented and friendly fac-
ulty across the campus, especially the members of my committee, Randy Lewis, Craig 
Campbell, Steve Hoelscher, Jeff Meikle, and Sharon Strover. They are all models of intel-
lectual curiosity, and they have given me tons of encouragement, advice, and assistance 
over the years. I must also thank Sally Clarke, without whose unusually intensive and 
stimulating business history seminar I doubt I could have ever written this dissertation. As 
the chair of my committee, Randy deserves special thanks for helping me at every stage of 
this project, giving me much valuable feedback on my ideas and writing, and always push-
ing me to sharpen my arguments and prose. It was likewise Randy’s suggestion that I nar-
row my focus to Apple, a truly brilliant piece of advice. Moreover, Randy has been a good 
friend and mentor to me throughout my graduate studies, always available to help out 
with the various queries and conundrums I’ve faced. I’m incredibly glad to have gotten to 
know him over the last seven years. 
Many other people helped me, directly and indirectly, as I embarked on this pro-
ject, and I will do my best to thank them all here. I benefitted from extensive and far-
ranging conversations with my graduate student colleagues as an intern at the Harry Ran-
som Center, especially Elizabeth Lovero, Jordan Mitchell, Emily Roehl, Jenn Shapland, 
and Natalie Zelt, as well as my friend Julie Conquest, and Josephine Hill, who gave me a 
local’s tour of San Francisco during one of my research stints in California. I also had the 
immensely great fortune to win a fellowship from the Social Sciences Research Council’s 
Dissertation Proposal Development Program, when Susan Lindee and Karen-Sue Taussig 
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selected me to join their “Making the Biotech Body” research area for the summer 2014 
fellowship cycle. Working with Susan and Karen-Sue was immensely rewarding, but I 
count myself especially lucky to have gotten to know the other students in the group, 
Priscilla Bennett, Kerri Brown, Matt Hoffarth, April Hovav, !afak Kılıçtepe, Tess Lan-
zarota, Alka Menon, Caitlin Myers, Felix Reitman, Maxwell Rogoski, and Kimiko Tanita. 
Although this dissertation bears little resemblance to the work I presented to this excep-
tional group of people at workshops in a U.C.-Berkeley basement and a blank hotel in the 
D.C. suburbs, their insightful and generous feedback provided an ideal intellectual com-
munity, and greatly shaped my thinking and writing as I continued to develop my pro-
ject. The times I spent with talking with them over food and drinks about the universal 
ordeals, anxieties, and joys of graduate school were some of the best experiences I had as a 
grad student. 
There is no doubt in my mind that I could not have written this dissertation with-
out the help of archivists. I have to thank Arvid Nelson at the Charles Babbage Institute at 
the University of Minnesota and Sara Lott at the Computer History Museum in Moun-
tain View, California for their generous help locating and accessing archival materials—I 
did not ultimately draw directly upon any of the collections at these centers for this disser-
tation, but I learned a great deal about the history of computers and the technology indus-
try that strongly informed my thinking on these topics. Tim Noakes and the rest of the 
public services staff in the Special Collections & University Archives at the Stanford Uni-
versity Libraries were especially helpful during two lengthy research stays, and Stanford’s 
extensive collection of Apple corporate records provided the backbone of this dissertation. 
I thank them for their assistance navigating the Apple collections, but I would also like to 
mention my appreciation for the Research Library Cooperative Program between the 
University of Texas and Stanford, which allowed me to spend an extended period at the 
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Stanford libraries without having to pay access fees. The Internet Archive likewise proved 
invaluable in my efforts to reconstruct the history of the Ralph Bunche Computer Mini-
School by preserving copies of its old web pages. Finally, I have to thank Rick Watson and 
Richard Workman for giving me the opportunity to work at the Harry Ransom Center, 
where I learned much about the inner workings of archives, which was extremely helpful 
when conducting my own research. 
A number of organizations have also provided financial support for this project. 
The Social Sciences Research Council fellowship allowed me to make a number of pre-
liminary archival visits in 2014, while an informal dissertation research grant from the 
Department of American Studies at the University of Texas allowed me to carry out the 
bulk of my archival research on Apple in California in summer 2016. A Graduate Con-
tinuing Fellowship from the Graduate School at the University of Texas let me devote 
most of my time during the 2016–2017 academic year to writing and revising this disser-
tation. I would also like to thank the Ronald E. McNair Postbaccalaureate Achievement 
Program, which helped me navigate the waters between undergraduate and graduate stud-
ies, and which supported me during my first year of graduate school. 
My family has, without question, been the greatest support and source of inspira-
tion throughout my time as a graduate student, and has helped me in so many ways over 
the course of this demanding and often crazy undertaking. I recognize that the people 
closest to me have born the brunt of the emotional toll exacted by this dissertation, and I 
can only hope that my completion of it is some small repayment of my debt to them. I 
simply cannot imagine finishing this project without Rachel, who has very much lived 
with this dissertation over the last several years. Many of the ideas and arguments were 
worked out in endless, roundabout conversations with her before they finally made it 
onto the page, and I can’t say how much I appreciate all the help she gave me while work-
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ing on this endeavor. She also turned me on to many strange and fascinating aspects of 
computer culture through her own artworks and research—her sharp-witted and mischie-
vous perspectives on computing’s utopian promises really helped me see the issues I’ve 
been thinking about from new angles. Thank you, Rachel, for everything. I was also super 
lucky to attend grad school at the same time and in the same place as my brother, Paul. It 
is no exaggeration to say that I probably learned more from our ongoing conversations 
about books, films, music, art, and the peculiarities of academic life than all my graduate 
seminars combined, and I will forever look back fondly on the many evenings we spent 
jawing while swilling dark beers and chomping on Utz dark russets. There is no overstat-
ing how important it is to have someone else around who really gets what you’re going 
through on a deep, personal level, and who can help pull you back from the brink of your 
frustrations and fury. I am moreover forever indebted to him for going first through 
every major scholastic hoop, proving that it could be done, and serving as evidence that 
there is indeed life after grad school. Mark and Lisa treated me to many free dinners and 
had me over to their house to swim and celebrate holidays, giving me much appreciated 
breaks from work and making me feel at home in Austin. Finally, my parents, Amy and 
Alton, were unwavering in their support of me throughout my eleven-and-a-half year col-
lege career. During my time in Texas, I have talked endlessly with them over the phone 
and by email, not only about this dissertation but about nearly every aspect of my experi-
ences in graduate school, and their wise perspectives on a wide variety of topics have 
helped me through many crises. I am so appreciative of all the feedback they have given 
me on this project, and the encouragement they invariably provided when I felt I could 
not possibly go on with the dissertation. Thank you, Mom and Dad, for having so much 
faith in me over the years. 
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Apple, Inc. is today one of the wealthiest and most powerful corporations in the 
world, with annual revenues that rival the gross domestic products of nations such as New 
Zealand. Over the company’s four-decade history, however, Apple has consistently pre-
sented itself as an emblem of countercultural ideals, and its leaders have insisted that their 
pursuits of profits and influence are fundamentally altruistic, because their ultimate aim is 
to develop technologies that will empower individuals and serve the cause of social pro-
gress. Through an examination of Apple’s first two decades, from 1976 to 1997, this dis-
sertation challenges the argument that Apple’s financial self-interest is synonymous with 
the public good. I conduct case studies of two main aspects of the company’s growth and 
evolution: Apple’s labor policies and the company’s influential role in the computeriza-
tion of U.S. public schools. Through an extensive analysis of popular literature about Ap-
ple and archival materials chronicling labor practices and employee experiences at the 
company, I show that Apple cofounder Steve Jobs helped establish an exploitative and 
frequently abusive working environment at the company, which was designed to extract 
the maximum amount of worker labor at the lowest possible cost. I consider why many 
employees were nevertheless incredibly devoted to the company, and I examine the con-
sequences of Apple employees’ willingness to forego formal labor rights and protections, 
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which left them largely incapable of mounting any collective resistance to executives’ 
most ethically troubling practices and decisions. By turning to Apple’s lobbying efforts, 
business strategies, and charitable initiatives in U.S. public education, I show that the 
company repeatedly prioritized its commercial interests in schools over the needs of 
teachers and students. While Apple successfully turned educational computing into a 
multibillion-dollar business, I contend that the computerization of U.S. schools has 
achieved negligible positive results while draining scarce public resources, and in some in-
stances has increased educational inequalities. Finally, I draw connections between Apple’s 
history, broader trends in Silicon Valley corporate culture, mounting wealth inequalities, 
and the current weakness of U.S. labor rights to challenge the concessions frequently 
made to corporations in contemporary U.S. public and political life. 
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The Business of Technology and the Myth of Social Progress 
 
In November 2016, U.S. president Barack Obama guest-edited a special issue of 
the popular technology magazine, Wired. In his centerpiece editorial, titled “Now Is the 
Greatest Time to Be Alive,” Obama reported that he had been thrilled when the magazine 
asked him to participate. “I know it’s the height of election season,” he wrote, “and I hap-
pen to have a day job that keeps me pretty busy. But given the chance to immerse myself 
in the possibility of interplanetary travel or join a deep-dive conversation on artificial in-
telligence, I’m going to say yes. I love this stuff.”1 As suggested by the title of the edito-
rial, the tenor of the piece was overwhelmingly optimistic, as Obama laid out a hopeful vi-
sion of a future in which Americans would successfully solve many of the world’s most 
pressing problems through technological innovation and scientific exploration. “I believe 
we can work together to do big things that raise the fortunes of people here at home and 
all over the world,” he proclaimed, and “I still believe science and technology is the warp 
drive that accelerates that kind of change for everybody.”2  
Although Obama granted that certain social problems, such as inequality and dis-
crimination, still exist in the United States and across the world, he disclosed an underly-
ing faith that the impetus that drives people to develop new technologies and make scien-
tific discoveries is closely related to the desire to improve human existence. He imagined, 
for example, children at future science fairs tackling social, environmental, and political 
problems head-on, foreseeing a time when organs for transplants would be grown in petri 
dishes, fuels would be made from completely clean sources, and new technologies, perhaps 
developed by a teenager, would make “voting and civic activism as addictive as scrolling 
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through your Twitter feed.”3 Invoking a fundamental link between technological devel-
opment and social progress, Obama concluded, “we must embrace that quintessentially 
American compulsion to race for new frontiers and push the boundaries of what’s possi-
ble.”4 In other words, Obama insisted that pursuing rapid technological progress was a na-
tionalist imperative, with deep connections to U.S. traditions of democratic participation 
and public service. 
Obama’s theme was hardly new. The belief that technology helps drive progressive 
social change has long inflected U.S. cultural thinking. The historian David Nye, for ex-
ample, argues that Americans of many stripes have cultivated an almost religious sense of 
awe for spectacular technological achievements since the early 1800s, when “sublime 
technological objects” such as the Erie Canal began to be seen as “active forces working 
for democracy” by extending communications, travel, and trade across the North Ameri-
can continent.5 Nye contends that an ongoing “enthusiasm for technology” can be wit-
nessed in the large crowds that have gathered throughout U.S. history to “pa[y] homage” 
to engineering feats such as electric light, skyscrapers, and space rockets, mass gatherings 
which he suggests have helped “weld society together,” however momentarily.6 The envi-
ronmental historian Richard White corroborates this assessment, noting that the trans-
continental railroads of the latter nineteenth century “came to epitomize progress, na-
tionalism, and civilization itself” for many in the United States, and the railroads have 
furthermore commonly received credit for inspiring their owners to invent many of the 
features of modern corporate capitalism.7 Turning to the contemporary U.S., the philoso-
pher Langdon Winner likewise comments that “it is usually taken for granted that the 
only reliable sources for improving the human condition stem from new machines, tech-
niques, and chemicals,” and he remarks that even the environmental degradations and 
demonstrable social harms that at times accompany “technological advancement have 
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rarely dented this faith.”8 Perhaps most familiar to contemporary observers is the popular 
connection between computer technologies and the democratization of information and 
communications. As the historian Fred Turner writes of the dawn of the Internet in the 
1990s, “pundits, scholars, and investors alike saw [in the Internet] the image of an ideal 
society: decentralized, egalitarian, harmonious, and free.”9 In short, the hope that new 
technologies will lead us into a brighter future is all too common, but Obama’s particular 
endorsement of the need for more technological development takes on a special tenor in 
light of his presidency’s cordial relations with the business leaders of Silicon Valley. 
Farhad Manjoo incisively outlined the nature of that relationship for New York 
Times readers in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 presidential election. “During the 
Obama years, Silicon Valley came to see itself as the economic and social engine of a new 
digital century,” Manjoo wrote, and he noted that Obama’s “administration broadly de-
ferred to the tech industry in a way that bordered on coziness.”10 For their part, Manjoo 
continues, the executives at powerful high-tech firms such as Apple, Amazon, Google, 
Facebook, and Microsoft spoke “in ambitious, gauzy sentimentalities about a broadly pro-
gressive future,” claiming that “[t]heir goals weren’t simply financial but…philosophical 
and democratic—they wanted to make money, sure, but they also wanted to make the 
world a better place, to offer a kind of social justice through code.”11 A veritable revolving 
door between the tech industry and federal government during the Obama presidency 
suggests that many in his inner circle saw close parallels between their work in public serv-
ice and the aims of Silicon Valley corporations, with top Obama advisers going on to lu-
crative leadership positions at tech companies such as Uber, Amazon, and Apple, while 
former Google and Microsoft executives came to Washington, D.C. to work for the 
president.12 Similarly, when the White House held a Global Entrepreneurship Summit at 
Stanford University in the heart of Silicon Valley in June 2016, Secretary of State John 
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Kerry called on the assembled technology executives to act as proselytes for their breed of 
corporate entrepreneurialism in places such as Syria and Iraq. He argued that such business 
activities could limit the influence of groups such as the Islamic State, saying, “Entrepre-
neurship is a rebuttal to extremism.”13 Another New York Times piece reported that 
Obama’s activities during his final months in office clearly indicated that he would like to 
build on his “close relationship with Silicon Valley,” perhaps by relocating to California to 
take up a position at a technology firm.14 It would not be an altogether novel move—in 
addition to the Obama advisers who have transferred to the tech industry, former vice 
president Al Gore joined Apple’s board of directors in 2003, where he still serves today.15 
The significant linkages between the upper echelons of U.S. politics and the tech-
nology industry suggests that Silicon Valley enjoys considerable influence over policy-
makers’ understandings of how they should serve the public good—particularly among 
politicians who present themselves as progressive or liberal leaders. The classic American 
faith in the socially transformative capacities of new technologies now evidently includes 
a growing enthusiasm for the companies that have led the most recent technological revo-
lution. Silicon Valley firms have actively cultivated this popular enthusiasm by presenting 
themselves and their products as beneficent actors in the world. Google, for example, be-
came well known for its vague yet reassuring corporate slogan, “Don’t Be Evil” (retired in 
2009), while Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg proclaimed in 2008 that his 
company’s social networking site had helped “Lebanese Muslims” connect with people in 
Europe, which he argued had deterred the hold of religious extremism in that country.16 
Given Secretary Kerry’s more recent statements about the need for tech entrepreneurial-
ism in the Middle East, Zuckerberg’s arguments have apparently gained credence in high-
level policy circles. 
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Apple, founded in 1976, has a particularly long tradition of claiming that its tech-
nologies will improve the lives of users and change society, and that its business aims tran-
scend the traditional corporate goal of accumulating capital. For example, when the ven-
erable technology behemoth IBM leapt into the new field of personal computing in 1981, 
which Apple had helped launch in 1977 with the debut of the Apple II computer, Apple 
took out a full-page advertisement in the Wall Street Journal bearing the headline, “Wel-
come, IBM. Seriously.”17 Rather than suggesting that Apple’s products were superior to 
IBM’s, the ad congratulated IBM on “your first personal computer,” and averred that Ap-
ple “appreciate[d] the magnitude of [IBM’s] commitment” to helping “distribute this 
American technology to the world.”18 Boasting that Apple had “invented the first personal 
computer system”—a rather inflated claim—the ad nevertheless affirmed that the personal 
“computer revolution” was more important than any one company, because personal 
computers would ultimately “increas[e] social capital by enhancing individual productiv-
ity,” giving users the ability to “improv[e] the way [they] work, think, learn, communi-
cate and spend their leisure hours.”19 There was, according to this ad, no realm of human 
existence that would be left unimproved by the personal computer industry’s consumer 
products, and Apple presented itself as a magnanimous business leader that was above the 
base self-interest that defined typical corporate competition. Of course, when Apple began 
to see IBM as a serious business threat a few years later, the tone shifted. Apple cofounder 
Steve Jobs began to compare IBM and its products to the dystopian authoritarianism of 
the Party in George Orwell’s 1984, and sententiously proclaimed that Apple was “the only 
force who can ensure [our] future freedom.”20 The famous Ridley Scott-directed television 
commercial marking the debut of Apple’s Macintosh computer reinforced the association. 
It featured a red-clad female athlete flinging a sledgehammer through a massive television 
screen displaying a “Big Brother”-like talking head spewing meaningless propaganda, 
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while the final narration intoned, “On January 24th, Apple Computer will introduce Mac-
intosh. And you’ll see why 1984 won’t be like 1984.”21 George Orwell’s estate did not ap-
preciate Apple’s self-aggrandizing suggestion that the commercial Macintosh computer 
was a force that could stem the tide of political totalitarianism, and sent a cease-and-desist 
letter to Apple for copyright infringement; nevertheless, the commercial resonated with 
the public, and is widely considered one of the most important television ads of all time.22 
Such advertisements helped sustain Apple’s popular image as an unusual company with 
bold social and political aims, and were some of the most important opening volleys in 
Silicon Valley firms’ ongoing campaigns to present themselves as servants of the public 
interest. 
However, a closer look at the internal dynamics of Silicon Valley corporations, as 
well as how those corporations conduct their business throughout the world, raises serious 
doubts whether these private companies are in fact dedicated to serving the common in-
terests of the peoples living in the United States, or indeed across the globe. 
 
SILICON VALLEY: CHANGING THE WORLD, FOR BETTER OR WORSE 
The bulk of this dissertation examines the first two decades of Apple’s history, 
from about 1976 to 1997. However, given prominent, contemporary political figures’ 
profound expressions of faith in the U.S. technology industry and ongoing popular en-
thusiasm for firms such as Amazon, Google, Facebook, Twitter, Uber, or Apple, I want to 
use this introduction to examine some of the serious concerns that currently face compa-
nies in Silicon Valley. Recent reports indicate that many corporations in the U.S. tech in-
dustry are plagued by systemic sexual discrimination; the managerial cultures at eminent 
companies are often abusive and exploitative; Silicon Valley exhibits some of the deepest 
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wealth inequalities of any region in the United States; and powerful industry leaders tend 
to downplay any personal responsibility for ameliorating social problems, instead ascrib-
ing to a species of social Darwinism, in which individual qualities rather than structural 
factors play the decisive role in choosing life’s “winners” and “losers.” Even a cursory ex-
amination of Silicon Valley’s history, however, shows that these are not new problems. A 
number of critical observers chronicled similar complaints about the tech industry in the 
1980s, while the evidence I present about Apple throughout this dissertation indicates that 
Apple displayed many of Silicon Valley’s most troubling traits from its earliest days. It is 
therefore all the more remarkable that Apple and its charismatic leaders continue to be 
celebrated in popular culture for their wealth and innovative prowess. It is my aim in this 
section to outline some of the primary contemporary critiques of Silicon Valley, and to 
connect Apple’s historical development to these problems in the tech industry. By tracing 
out some of these linkages, I hope to illustrate why it is important to resist the seductive 
rhetoric and publicity of firms such as Apple, and to remain skeptical of the underlying 
aims of powerful corporations and their leaders, no matter how attractive their products 
and figureheads may appear.  
One significant set of concerns surrounding the tech industry stems from how 
corporations in Silicon Valley treat their own employees. As I write this introduction in 
spring 2017, recent allegations about the toxic work environment at ride-sharing com-
pany Uber have placed that corporation in the national spotlight, and brought to light 
similar conditions at numerous other high-tech firms. On February 19, 2017, a former 
female engineer at Uber, Susan Fowler, published a blog post that “detailed a history of 
discrimination and sexual harassment by her managers, which she said was shrugged off 
by Uber’s human resources department.”23 Her dispatch quickly went viral, sparking nu-
merous people to speak out about similar experiences at companies throughout the tech 
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industry. A subsequent investigation by The Guardian found that “in the male-dominated 
technology industry, female staffers and workers of color say sexual misconduct, dis-
crimination and retaliation are rampant—and that men in powerful positions are rou-
tinely protected while women are often pushed out of their jobs by harassment.”24 The 
newspaper goes on to cite Apple, Oracle, Google, Twitter, and Tesla as prominent com-
panies that have recently faced serious allegations of sexual discrimination. Moreover, 
women of color in the tech industry report facing additional prejudice and antagonism in 
the workplace. One African American tech employee was told by her manager that “she 
shouldn’t wear her hair naturally in an afro or braids because she appeared ‘too ethnic,’” 
and other women of color said they were repeatedly asked to do menial tasks that did not 
match their expertise or positions in their companies.25 
Several lawyers who have represented worker complaints against technology firms 
contend that “[u]nder the guise of ‘disruption’ and ‘innovation,’ startups and tech corpo-
rations skirt employment laws and reject [human resources] practices,” which often leaves 
women “vulnerable to all kinds of abuse, ranging from lewd comments to unwanted 
propositions to groping to assault.”26 “The scale is sort of breathtaking,” said one attorney, 
pointing to a recent survey of female tech workers in which 60 percent of respondents re-
ported “unwanted sexual advances, often from superiors,” and one third of women “said 
they felt afraid for their personal safety.”27 In fact, technology scholars have noted that 
computer science and related private sector careers have become increasingly hostile to 
women over the past four decades—in the mid-1980s, women earned about 37 percent of 
computer technology degrees, whereas by 2010 that number had dropped to 15 percent, 
where it remains today.28 
The abysmal state of gender equity and pervasive racial biases are not new prob-
lems in Silicon Valley, but tech leaders have long been reticent to acknowledge that such 
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issues exist. In 1987, for example, Apple CEO John Sculley blithely suggested that his 
company was something of a post-gendered, post-racial paradise. He proclaimed that 
gatherings of Apple employees “resembled the bar scene out of Star Wars: you would 
meet people from every nationality and race, varying from Indians in turbans to scruffy, 
bearded kids from New Jersey.” Moreover, Sculley continued, “Gender was a non-issue. It 
wasn’t that Apple was just a good place for women to work, it was that no one gave a 
thought to whether you were male or female. Apple, in fact, boasted as many women 
managers as men.”29 While Sculley’s depiction of race relations at Apple uncomfortably 
compared ethnic diversity to the exotic aliens of a popular sci-fi movie, his suggestion that 
women occupied as many positions of power as men at Apple was demonstrably false. For 
example, when Sculley was filling out his nine-person executive leadership team in 1985, 
only one senior officer was a woman, and his entire executive staff was white.30 Similarly, 
the seventeen-person team that spearheaded the development of the Macintosh personal 
computer—Apple’s signature technology in the 1980s—was overwhelmingly white, and 
included only three women, all in non-senior, non-technical roles where they had little 
direct influence over the computer’s design or features.31 The palpable lack of gender or 
ethnic diversity in Apple’s upper leadership persists to this day. Currently, only three 
members of Apple’s eighteen-person executive staff are women, while Adam Lashinsky’s 
investigative reporting on Apple’s upper management in 2012 revealed that only seven of 
Apple’s thirty-three vice presidents were women.32 And while there is some racial and eth-
nic diversity among Apple’s vice presidential staff, the majority of top leaders are white. 
Thus, far from being a “non-issue,” as Sculley insisted in the late 1980s, it seems clear that 
Apple’s leadership has simply declined to address the persistent fact that there are not sig-
nificant numbers of women or persons of color occupying important leadership roles 
within the company. 
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While recent revelations have brought Silicon Valley’s gender and racial discrimi-
nation problems to the fore, technology corporations’ tendency to flout employment 
laws and conventions raises further worries about broader worker abuses in the industry. 
In 2015, for example, the New York Times conducted extensive interviews with more 
than 100 current and former employees of the online retailing giant Amazon, revealing a 
workplace defined by crushing demands and pervasive hostility. Employees reported that 
full-time jobs for the corporation frequently required upwards of 80 hours of work per 
week—superiors expected instant availability by phone and email on a 24/7 basis, even 
during vacations, and many workers said they routinely continued working from home or 
stayed at the office after hours, sometimes foregoing sleep, to meet Amazon’s relentless 
productivity demands. One Amazon employee’s “fiancé became so concerned about her 
nonstop working night after night that he would drive to the Amazon campus at 10 p.m. 
and dial her cellphone until she agreed to come home.”33 That same employee later said an 
ulcer and other stress-related health problems led her to leave the company. Other Ama-
zon employees described how they had been pushed out of the company when serious ill-
nesses such as cancer or personal traumas such as the deaths of close family members “in-
terfered with fulfilling…work goals.”34 Finally, workers said that the company encouraged 
an antagonistic and aggressive office culture, in which employees were encouraged to 
submit reports on colleagues if they felt they were underperforming, and to “tear apart” 
each other’s ideas in vicious meetings and review sessions, following an official Amazon 
management philosophy that such assaults ensure that only the best ideas—and people—
survive.35 As we will see in chapter 1, Apple cofounder Steve Jobs pioneered many such 
aggressive and abusive managerial tactics during his company’s early years. 
The New York Times report focused on white-collar professional jobs at Amazon 
headquarters in Seattle, but the company has also come under scrutiny for its treatment of 
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blue-collar workers. One of the most notorious incidents occurred at a Pennsylvania ship-
ping center in 2011, where employees were required to work long, grueling shifts in a 
warehouse without air conditioning. In June and July of that year, temperatures in the 
center climbed as high as 110 degrees, and numerous employees, who had to navigate the 
vast complex on foot to pick as many as 1,200 items to ship per day, collapsed from heat 
exhaustion, including two pregnant workers.36 Following a complaint to the U.S. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration from a doctor at a nearby hospital and a searing 
investigative report by a local newspaper, Amazon finally provided “2,000 cooling ban-
danas” for workers in the warehouse, as well as “cooling vests” for those working in the 
loading docks.37 
Such practices are not isolated to Amazon. Due in no small part to Amazon’s fi-
nancial successes, with the company valued at more than $250 billion on the stock market 
and Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos recently named the fifth richest human in the world, the 
company has inspired a number of imitators.38 Uber’s cofounder and CEO, for example, 
explicitly modeled his own management philosophies after Amazon, and Uber employees 
report a similar level of workplace hostility, saying they have been subjected to things such 
as “homophobic slur[s]” and graphic threats of physical violence during heated meetings.39 
But while critical journalists have helped unearth and publicize troubling labor conditions 
at technology worksites in the United States, Fred Turner points out that many U.S. tech 
companies now carry out the bulk of their manufacturing overseas, typically in countries 
with even weaker labor protections and where factories often remain off-limits to the 
press. Drawing an ironic contrast to the dearth of women in engineering and managerial 
roles in the U.S. offices of tech companies, Turner notes that the majority of the employ-
ees who assemble products for those same corporations overseas are women, filling jobs 
which are often “extraordinarily dangerous” because workers must routinely “handle the 
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toxic chemicals required in [the] manufacture” of most computer equipment.40 Moreover, 
due to lax environmental laws and insufficient enforcement in many of the countries 
where assembly takes place, Turner reports that these tech factories have caused further 
harm “to those who live on the land, drink the water, and breathe the air into which those 
chemicals eventually leak.”41 
Apple’s international manufacturing chains exhibit many of the problems Turner 
outlines. These facts came before the public eye in January 2012, when Mike Daisey ap-
peared on the popular radio broadcast This American Life to detail the pervasive abuses and 
unsafe working conditions faced by the Chinese laborers who assembled Apple’s iPhones 
and iPads for the Taiwanese manufacturing contractor Foxconn.42 Although This Ameri-
can Life later retracted Daisey’s story because it came to light that he had not personally 
witnessed some of the things he claimed to have seen in his report, a New York Times in-
vestigation several weeks later revealed that Daisey’s claims about working conditions at 
Foxconn and other Apple subcontractors were substantively accurate. The report detailed 
that assembly workers were sometimes forced to stand so long on the job “that their legs 
swell until they can hardly walk,” and that factories producing Apple products routinely 
employed child laborers.43 Moreover, the Times continued, Apple subcontractors in China 
had “improperly disposed of hazardous waste and falsified records,” exposing workers and 
surrounding populations to dangerous chemicals, while the lack of adequate safety meas-
ures at iPad factories led to two explosions in 2011, killing four and injuring 77. Although 
Apple’s leaders publicly maintained that they were committed to improving safety condi-
tions for assembly workers in China, several executives who had recently left Apple told 
the Times that the corporation had repeatedly stopped short of disciplining manufacturing 
subcontractors when company leaders feared that such measures would delay the delivery 
of new products and potentially cut into corporate profits.44 Thus, while official Apple re-
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ports maintained that the company forced the manufacturers of its products to fix labor 
violations, company insiders revealed that this rhetoric misrepresented actual corporate 
practice.45 
In spite of these well-documented worker abuses, which span all ranks of the U.S. 
technology industry, the staggering value of stock in tech companies and the ubiquity of 
computer products in every realm of business activity have convinced many observers 
that Silicon Valley is an indispensible source of U.S. prosperity. The oft-cited sociologist 
Manuel Castells, for example, argued in 1996 that the innovative business practices and 
novel technologies that began to percolate in the San Francisco Bay region during the 
1970s provided key solutions to the serious economic problems that many developed in-
dustrial economies began to face during that decade, such as rampant currency inflation 
and energy shortages. It was only because corporations—and governments—embraced 
the ideas and products coming out of Silicon Valley, Castells writes, that industrialized 
Western nations were able to embrace a new model of “global capitalism,” and thereby 
head off severe unemployment crises and the deleterious effects of declining government 
commitments to social welfare spending.46 Arguments resembling Castells’s have enjoyed 
a kind of commonsense validity for some time. In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 
banking and mortgage crisis, for example, the editors of The Economist intoned that cor-
porations and industries around the world explicitly needed to emulate Silicon Valley’s 
entrepreneurial business practices in order to restore the health of the global economy.47 
Indeed, the magazine went so far as to suggest that the relative lack of worker protections 
in the U.S. tech industry, especially compared to European counterparts, was an essential 
ingredient in Silicon Valley’s success.48 
However, while The Economist named a handful of Silicon Valley billionaires—
Apple’s Steve Jobs, Microsoft’s Bill Gates, and Google’s Sergey Brin—as proof positive 
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that the U.S. tech industry is something of an economic miracle, the New York Times 
points out that the recent “tech boom has not led to widespread employment,” while 
“[m]uch of the wealth generated by the five biggest American tech companies flows to 
young [professionals] in California and the Pacific Northwest.”49 Yet even top profession-
als within the tech industry—whose high wages place them comfortably in the top 10 per-
cent of earners nationwide—have found that their incomes are rarely sufficient to give 
them access to basic markers of middle class success, such as home ownership or daycare 
for their children. A recent Guardian report discloses that Silicon Valley engineers, whose 
annual salaries routinely exceed six figures, are typically forced to devote between 40 and 
50 percent of their incomes solely to rent unless they are willing to commute multiple 
hours. Moreover, professionals with young children have found that childcare is rarely 
provided or subsidized by employers, and that purchasing childcare independently is an 
exorbitant added expense. Even one tech employee earning $700,000 a year could not af-
ford to purchase a house nearby his office—exasperated with driving a total of five hours 
to and from work every day, he decided to take a significantly lower-paying job in San 
Diego, where the cost of living is not quite as high.50 
The Guardian points out that many of the tech employees interviewed for the arti-
cle “are among the highest 1% of earners,” and that the skyrocketing expense of the San 
Francisco area, due predominantly to the rapid growth of the tech industry in recent dec-
ades, has been even more disastrous for “teachers, city workers, firefighters and other 
members of the middle class, not to mention low-income residents.”51 While tech profes-
sionals have lobbied top executives at companies such as Facebook and Twitter to help 
with their personal housing costs, they also report feelings of profound anguish when 
faced with the plight of the region’s growing working poor and homeless population—the 
New Yorker reports that homelessness in the region spiked by 20 percent just between 
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2011 and 2013.52 As one tech worker told the Guardian, “You are caught in this really un-
comfortable position. You feel very guilty seeing such poverty and helplessness.” Yet fac-
ing a grueling work schedule and her own financial troubles despite an annual salary top-
ping $100,000, this same employee expressed a sense of paralysis about her personal abil-
ity to help solve the deeper problems of affordability, saying, “what are you supposed to 
do? Not make a lot of money? Not advocate for yourself and then not afford to live 
here?”53 
The spiraling housing crisis in the San Francisco Bay region is all the more disturb-
ing because it is almost as old as Silicon Valley. The sociologists Everett Rogers and Judith 
Larsen found in 1984 that even high-paid Silicon Valley professionals often resorted to 
“[h]ouse-sharing” in response to the pervasive “housing crunch,” while the labor historian 
David Noble spoke about unaffordable child care and “the banal horrors of the two-hour 
commute” many tech workers undertook due to “escalating housing costs” in 1989.54 It is 
not yet clear whether the contemporary leaders of Silicon Valley’s powerful tech firms will 
finally take meaningful steps to address the longstanding cost-of-living problems that 
their corporations have caused in the region, but history suggests that executives’ lack of 
action on such problems stems from a deeper lack of concern with the social problems 
that stem from income inequality. As Rogers and Larsen concluded, “Most Silicon Valley 
tycoons are not concerned with issues of social inequality or injustice; to the entrepreneur, 
the poor and weak in society are poor and weak because they are inferior.”55 In other 
words, the tech leaders who arose in the 1980s recapitulated the social Darwinist perspec-
tives of their Gilded Age forebears, excusing themselves from worries about potential 
negative repercussions following from the inequitable distribution of wealth in their in-
dustry. 
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Such tendencies can be seen clearly in Apple’s early leadership. For example, when 
Apple conducted its historic initial public offering of stock in 1980, just three years after 
the company’s incorporation, Apple’s founders, executives, and early investors reaped in-
credible personal gains—Apple CEO Mike Scott found himself in possession of $96 mil-
lion in stock, chairman Mike Markkula’s options were worth $239 million, and the shares 
of cofounders Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs were valued at $136 million and $256 mil-
lion, respectively.56 However, when a number of young engineers at the company—who 
were earning about $20,000 yearly—approached Steve Jobs in early 1981 to complain that 
they had been denied modest, contractually guaranteed raises, even though they had re-
ceived high performance reviews, Jobs tried to brush them off, telling the engineers that 
they “had much more important things to worry about than [their] salaries”—namely, de-
signing new computers for Apple.57 A poignant, anonymous employee letter to Apple 
CEO John Sculley in 1990 suggested that professionals’ relatively modest salaries at the 
company continued to make it difficult for them to raise families or afford housing near 
their jobs, while Adam Lashinsky’s contemporary reporting indicates that Apple wages are 
“competitive with the marketplace—but no better.”58 In other words, workers’ contribu-
tions to Apple’s phenomenal profits and market value—which helped Apple become, in 
2015, the first corporation in history to have a market capitalization of more than $700 
billion—have not translated into substantive financial rewards for the majority of the 
company’s employees.59 
Given brusque dismissals of employees’ financial concerns and workers’ inability 
to enjoy a substantive share of the incredible profits and stock returns posted at compa-
nies such as Apple, it is small wonder that Silicon Valley’s rise has coincided with the vast 
expansion of wealth inequality in the United States. The economist Michael Storper notes 
that between 1979 and 2000—precisely the era when Silicon Valley became a key site of 
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U.S. economic activity—income gains accrued predominantly to the wealthiest 5 percent 
of earners in the U.S., while wages stagnated or declined for most other Americans. For 
example, the wealthiest 5 percent in the U.S. earned ten times as much as the poorest 5 
percent in 1979, whereas in 2000, the wealthiest 5 percent were earning 25 times as much 
as the poorest 5 percent.60 And while the top 1 percent saw their share of total income 
double between 1979 and 2000, the middle 60 percent actually lost 2 percent of their 
wages in real terms.61 In Silicon Valley itself, most tech worker wages declined by between 
3 and 12 percent during the 1990s, while executive pay increased “by over 2,000 percent 
in real terms” during the same time period.62 National income disparities have continued 
to grow—in 2012, the “top 10 percent of earners took more than half of the country’s to-
tal income,” which the federal government reported was the greatest income disparity 
seen since the depths of the Great Depression in the 1930s, and the “top 1 percent took 
more than one-fifth of the income earned by Americans, one of the highest levels since 
1913.”63 The remaining 99 percent of Americans, by contrast, took income cuts of ap-
proximately 12 percent between 2008 and 2012.64 Although Silicon Valley corporations 
are far from the sole driver of U.S. wealth imbalances, the World Bank reported in 2016 
that U.S. “technology firms appear to be exacerbating economic inequality rather than 
improving it,” arguing that due in large part to current labor practices in the industry, the 
activities and technological products of Silicon Valley firms are more likely to depress 
wages and opportunities for the majority of people around the globe than to increase in-
comes and quality of life.65 
With evidence mounting that the U.S. tech industry routinely places the physical 
and emotional wellbeing of workers at risk, whether in manufacturing, service, or profes-
sional positions; that many prominent tech corporations are plagued by systemic levels of 
discrimination and sexual harassment; and that the technology industry has contributed 
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directly to mounting income inequality, it is incredibly troubling that prominent and 
powerful public figures such as Barack Obama and John Kerry would endorse the products 
and business cultures of Silicon Valley as the likeliest solutions to some of the world’s 
most distressing problems. Instead of challenging tech firms to live up to their promises to 
make the world a better place, such politicians appear to have taken Silicon Valley corpo-
rate rhetoric at face value, using their public offices to champion an industry that suffers 
from a number of serious and readily apparent shortcomings. The hold of Silicon Valley 
on the progressive political imagination is especially unsettling because tech industry lead-
ers have frequently made clear that they are only interested in serving society if it also 
serves their financial self-interest. For example, the New Yorker reports that a top Apple 
executive exclaimed in 2012, “We don’t have an obligation to solve America’s problems. 
Our only obligation is making the best product possible.”66 In a thoughtful analysis of 
contemporary intersections between Silicon Valley and U.S. politics, this same New 
Yorker piece argues that such statements exhibit a blind faith in the ability of commercial 
technology products to improve the social condition, and a troubling lack of interest in 
understanding the complex causes and dynamics of social problems or the nuances of the 
political system. 
However, the U.S. political climate of late 2016 and early 2017 has revealed some 
deep cracks in Silicon Valley’s public service edifice. Donald Trump’s rise, in particular, 
has at long last stirred doubts in the minds of some Silicon Valley elites that there may be 
fundamental errors in their longstanding conviction that they can solve social problems 
by doing nothing more than developing and distributing technologies through commer-
cial channels. In the days immediately following Trump’s election on November 8, 2016, 
the New York Times reports that some tech workers and executives even expressed anguish 
that prominent social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, rather than provid-
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ing new forms of “radical connectivity” and promoting “widespread peace and prosper-
ity,” had instead directly “contributed to a rise in the kind of trolling, racism and misog-
yny that characterized so much of…Trump’s campaign.”67 Although I first began research-
ing this dissertation in the spring of 2014, I believe that the events of the current moment 
offer a particularly valuable opportunity to take a closer look at the history of Silicon Val-
ley corporations, in order to understand why these firms, despite frequent public procla-
mations that they are committed to serving the greater good, have largely failed to 
achieve their progressive social aims. 
 
THE CASE OF APPLE, INC. 
My overarching argument in this dissertation is that Silicon Valley corporate lead-
ers have tended to confuse their financial self-interest with the public good: they have 
failed to see meaningful distinctions between the activities they undertake to enrich 
themselves and more altruistic understandings of shared public benefits. In Silicon Valley, 
it has become a commonplace to believe that profiting from the development and sale of 
innovative computer products is synonymous with social progress. Perhaps no company 
better reflects this mentality than Apple, Inc. In many respects, the corporation and its 
charismatic leaders pioneered the rhetoric and philosophies that have underlain Silicon 
Valley’s particular claims to serving the greater good—in particular, Apple’s leaders self-
consciously drew on the rhetoric and ideologies of the 1960s counterculture to describe 
their aspirations for empowering ordinary people through technology, and to shape the 
early mythos of Apple as something of an anti-corporation, an enterprise that tran-
scended base financial self-interest. 
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In this dissertation, I dissect Apple’s history of corporate mythmaking, focusing 
on the first two decades of the company’s existence, from about 1976 to 1997. Apple 
arose at precisely the moment when Silicon Valley was becoming a preeminent site of 
economic activity and technological development, and during the company’s first twenty 
years, Apple and its leaders influentially popularized the notion that the U.S. technology 
industry was more than a collection of moneymaking enterprises. Although Apple’s tech-
nologies are certainly an important part of this story, my primary interest is how Apple 
and its leaders convinced the public and policymakers that the corporation could be 
trusted to solve social problems and turn a profit at the same time. 
Founded in 1976 by Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs, and incorporated in 1977, 
Apple was far and away the most successful example of a new breed of high-tech company 
that began to pop up on the San Francisco peninsula as the Baby Boomers came of age 
and the U.S. economy took a striking turn from an industrial to a post-industrial para-
digm. Prominent technology companies such as Lockheed, Hewlett-Packard, and 
Fairchild Semiconductor had already begun to reshape the predominantly rural region be-
tween San José and San Francisco following World War II, sustained in part by the 
growth of the military industrial complex, but in distinction to these more conservative 
and established firms, Apple emblematized the collision between computers and the 1960s 
counterculture, which had taken hold throughout the region at places such as Berkeley, 
Stanford, and in San Francisco neighborhoods such as the Haight-Ashbury.68 As a busi-
ness, Apple was therefore a peculiar creature. The counterculture’s marked suspicions of 
corporate conformity had directly influenced cofounders Jobs and Wozniak, but Jobs in 
particular was driven to build Apple into a corporation large and powerful enough to rede-
fine the very meaning of computing in the United States.69  
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Wozniak and Jobs’s primary goal for their company was based on the belief that 
computer power was equivalent to social power. Consequently, they aimed to democratize 
access to computers by transforming the historically massive, exorbitantly expensive, and 
intimidating machines into personalized, user-friendly objects that were small enough to 
sit on a kitchen table. In Jobs’s mind, these useful, intuitive technologies should be con-
sumer products—he believed that the commercial market would quickly and efficiently 
distribute the personal computer revolution far and wide.70 Yet even as Jobs, Wozniak, 
and Apple’s other early leaders built their company into a powerful, multinational firm, 
they hoped to avoid what they saw as the pitfalls of traditional business activity—they es-
pecially wished to maintain Apple’s predominant focus on making useful technologies 
that would “empower” users without becoming overly preoccupied with the corporation’s 
need to make money. “Apple was founded on the singular vision of empowering the in-
dividual,” Wozniak would later say. “Although we were too young for the 1960s, we still 
had revolutionary ideas and a belief that individuals can actually make a difference in the 
world.”71 Towards the end of his life in 2011, Jobs similarly reflected, “Sure, it was great to 
make a profit, because that was what allowed you to make great products. But the prod-
ucts, not the profits, were the motivation.”72 In this equation, corporate financial self-
interest was simply a means to a greater end. Accumulating wealth was precisely what al-
lowed Apple to develop life-changing technologies. There is, of course, considerable hubris 
in this argument, as it asserts that Apple inherently knows what is best for society, and 
that consumers would be foolish to resist purchasing the corporation’s products. 
Despite the inherent conflicts of interest in Apple’s mission, over the course of the 
1980s and 1990s, the company successfully pursued rapid corporate growth while consis-
tently cultivating a public image as a novel kind of business—one driven more by the 
public-spirited mission of extending computer power to the masses than the desire to 
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profit. Thus, while Apple expanded from Jobs’s parents’ garage in 1976 to a multinational 
corporate enterprise with $1 billion in sales in 1983, and continued to swell into the mid-
1990s, when Apple was selling some $11 billion of computer products annually, generat-
ing immense personal wealth for investors and corporate officers, Apple enjoyed a seem-
ingly unshakable popular reputation as an emblem of countercultural values.73 Savvy ad-
vertising and publicity campaigns consistently renewed this image. In the early 1980s, for 
example, Jobs and other company leaders determinedly defined Apple and its products as 
“a holy crusade” against the much vaster and more powerful computer firm IBM, which 
had earned the ominous moniker “Big Blue” for ruthlessly decimating its competitors 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s.74 Likening IBM’s formidable mainframes to Big 
Brother’s dystopian tools of social control, Jobs asked in a famous public speech in 1984, 
“Will Big Blue dominate the entire computer industry? The entire information age? Was 
George Orwell right?” He suggested that the United States might indeed fall under the 
sway of this sinister corporate behemoth but for the efforts of Apple, which Jobs presented 
as “the only force [that] can ensure [our] future freedom.”75 In the 1990s, when IBM had 
been reduced to a mere shadow of its former corporate strength, Apple successfully applied 
similar strategies in its competition with software giant Microsoft.76 Although Apple was 
by no means a small or weak corporation during the 1980s or 1990s, accentuating con-
trasts with IBM or Microsoft helped Apple sustain its public image as an alternative kind 
of company, a striking departure from conventional corporate practice. 
Commenting on these corporate rivalries, technology and design historian Kimon 
Keramidas remarks that consumers have proven remarkably willing “to form strong alle-
giances not only to…technologies but also to the corporations that make those technolo-
gies,” and argues that Apple has largely driven “the penetration of [technology] compa-
nies’ corporate identities” into the realm of personal identity.77 In 2004, the journalist Le-
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ander Kahney chronicled consumers’ unusual passions for Apple and its computers in The 
Cult of Mac. A self-described “Mac nut,” Kahney attributes much of the popular obsession 
with Apple to the superior quality of the company’s famous line of Macintosh computers, 
launched in 1984, and he argues that purchasing a Mac offers consumers the opportunity 
to become part of a wonderful community defined by its progressive social values. “Mac 
users can be extremely cool,” Kahney writes. “It’s a lifestyle thing. Mac users tend to be 
liberal, free-thinking, counterculture. They dress well, look good, and have discerning 
taste (in New York, anyway).”78 This statement corroborates the claims of Steve Jobs’s of-
ficial biographer, Walter Isaacson, who writes, “Jobs was able to encourage people to de-
fine themselves as anticorporate, creative, innovative rebels simply by the computer they 
used.”79 But consumer passions run deeper than a connection to products. Kahney also 
collects numerous images of people who have adorned their arms, ankles, necks, chests, 
and even more intimate bodily regions with tattoos of Apple logos and corporate sym-
bols. Says one graphic designer of his tattoo, “I wanted to show my loyalty to Apple.”80 
And when Steve Jobs passed away in October 2011, the outpouring of spontaneous me-
morials online, at corporate headquarters, Apple stores around the globe, and Jobs’s home 
in Palo Alto revealed that many people the world over felt a personal connection to the 
man, his multibillionaire status notwithstanding.81 
Apple’s ardent following is all the more remarkable because it indicates that the 
company’s customers and fans are still capable of believing that Apple exemplifies coun-
tercultural values and nonconformity despite the fact that it has become one of the most 
financially valuable and powerful corporations in the world.82 The lack of popular concern 
about potential conflicts of interest between Apple’s corporate goals and its stated social 
aims emblematizes broader cultural and political failures to interrogate the airy rhetoric 
frequently on display at Silicon Valley tech firms. In part, Apple has been able to sustain 
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its favorable reputation because the corporation’s history and inner workings have largely 
escaped critical examination—not least because Apple (like most large corporations) is in-
credibly difficult to access. Michael Moritz, a Time-journalist–turned–venture-capitalist 
who briefly chronicled Apple’s operations in the early 1980s before Steve Jobs excommu-
nicated him over a minor tiff, vividly describes the frustrations outside observers face. 
“While they remain small,” he writes, “companies are easy enough to describe but once 
they outgrow a garage or an office suite they become increasingly opaque.”83 When Mo-
ritz was invited to cover Apple, the corporation was already large, with extensive overseas 
operations and corporate headquarters dispersed over a sprawling, disjointed campus of 
haphazardly annexed buildings in Cupertino, California. Beyond the problems of scale, 
Moritz likewise notes that the orchestrators of Apple’s finely tuned publicity apparatus 
carefully circumscribed what he was allowed to observe. Alternative perspectives could at 
times “be gleaned from bitter refugees,” Moritz says, “but a closer inspection is more haz-
ardous. It’s difficult to obtain a tourist visa, simple to discover the official line, impossible 
to move around without being followed, and all too easy to get expelled.”84 By all ac-
counts, Apple has only grown more difficult to access over time—business journalist 
Adam Lashinsky recently termed Apple the “most secretive” company in the United 
States, reporting that even the majority of the company’s employees have little knowl-
edge about how the corporation is organized or operates.85 
As a result, most of the first-hand accounts of life at Apple are either written by 
prominent insiders—such as former CEO John Sculley’s memoir or hardware engineer 
Andy Hertzfeld’s chronicle of the invention of the Macintosh—or rely predominantly on 
interviews with a handful of high-level employees, such as Walter Isaacson’s official biog-
raphy of Steve Jobs. These accounts, as Michael Moritz warns, tend to burnish a mythol-
ogy of Apple as a wonderful place to work, populated by creative, passionate, and unusual 
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characters, committed to the unique mission of democratizing access to computers. 
“Myths spring up about life in the good old days,” Moritz writes, “and even the best-
intentioned efforts turn from fact to fiction.”86 Indeed, Moritz’s own book, which aspires 
to offer a more critical perspective on Apple, frequently lapses into hagiographic descrip-
tions of the innovative prowess of Steve Jobs and his inner circle. As a result, the pub-
lished record generally neglects to take a more critical stance on Apple’s official corporate 
rhetoric. Even Ian Bogost’s recent scholarly volume on Apple, The Geek’s Chihuahua 
(2015), indulges in a fair bit of nostalgia, suggesting that Apple’s originally pure inten-
tions have only become perverted over time.87 
Another body of evidence, however, suggests a rather different story. The depart-
ment of Special Collections at the Stanford University Libraries holds a remarkable range 
of materials chronicling the years from Apple’s founding in 1976 up until 1998, and I 
spent several weeks in California in June and July of 2016 sifting through numerous 
memos, letters, emails, voicemail transcripts, corporate publications, financial reports, or-
ganizational charts, brochures, pamphlets, sales manuals, employee recruitment materials, 
corporate values and mission statements, management policies, and employee handbooks, 
as well as a diverse array of employee-produced ephemera, ranging from hand-drawn car-
toons and fake corporate announcements to newsletters and printouts of conversations 
carried out on the company’s online message board. These materials disclose that Apple’s 
leaders were ruthlessly self-interested from the company’s earliest days, and that their 
much-vaunted aspirations to extend computer power to the masses were underlain by ex-
ploitative and abusive labor practices, as well as a hubristic faith in their personal capacity 
to change the world for the better through commercial products. 
The three chapters of this dissertation examine the fundamental contradictions be-
tween Apple’s financial goals and social aims. I focus on two realms where the company 
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promised to make a particularly striking and positive impact: labor relations and educa-
tional reform.  
The first two chapters detail Apple’s labor policies and employee experiences at the 
company during the 1980s and 1990s. In addition to Apple’s widely known marketing 
and publicity campaigns, the company’s unusual managerial structure, workplace envi-
ronments, and employment policies served as some of the most important markers of 
Apple’s sharp divergence from corporate convention, and evidence of the fact that Apple 
was fundamentally committed to improving society. Apple did enjoy an incredible level 
of devotion from its employees, even though the company placed taxing demands on 
workers’ time, energies, mental capacities, and emotional health. Apple sustained employ-
ees’ deep commitments through a mixture of financial incentives, arguments about the 
social impact of the company’s products, and a variety of workplace perks and symbolic 
rewards, such as referring to engineers as artists, permitting casual employee attire, and 
filling office areas with stereos, video games, pianos, ping pong tables, and popcorn carts. 
Yet in receiving these benefits, which often made day-to-day life at Apple more engaging 
and pleasurable, employees largely sacrificed formal labor rights and protections, leaving 
them vulnerable to abusive managers, relentless time commitment and productivity de-
mands, and unscrupulous labor policies that saw many employees sacrificed when execu-
tives made disastrous decisions, or when company leaders simply needed to boost profits 
to please shareholders. Chapter 1 focuses on the exploitative and abusive management 
policies Steve Jobs set in place at Apple in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and contextual-
izes employees’ willingness to suffer workplace maltreatment within the broader devel-
opment of post-industrial labor models. Chapter 2 focuses on the years following Jobs’s 
acrimonious departure from Apple in 1985, up until his return in 1997. I examine the 
business strategies of Apple CEO John Sculley, who sought to preserve Apple’s countercul-
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tural status even as he pursued aggressive yet shortsighted business strategies. Due to Ap-
ple’s entrenched labor practices, employees were largely helpless to resist Sculley’s deci-
sions, even though they led to a number of serious corporate crises and resulted in exten-
sive layoffs in 1990, 1991, 1993, 1996, and 1997. 
Chapter 3 looks further afield to Apple’s extensive involvement with U.S. public 
schools. K–12 education was one of Apple’s most important market segments throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, representing a large share of the company’s total revenues during 
these decades, and expanding to a multi-billion dollar business by the 1990s. Moreover, 
Apple maintained a controlling interest in school computing during these years—by the 
mid-1980s, more than two-thirds of the computers in U.S. schools were Apple products, a 
ratio that remained relatively stable for the next decade. Beyond Apple’s obvious financial 
stakes in education, however, the company frequently promoted its relationships with 
schools as important evidence of Apple’s larger commitments to social progress. The 
company claimed that its products would improve public education in revolutionary ways, 
and through a variety of charitable corporate programs, Apple sought to help teachers 
adapt to shifting student needs in a post-industrial society. However, a closer examination 
of Apple’s attempts to influence national school computerization policies and the impacts 
of its charitable educational programs indicates that corporate financial interests often 
outstripped actual commitments to serving the needs of public schools, teachers, and stu-
dents. Thus, while millions of Apple computers poured into U.S. public schools during the 
1980s and 1990s, these technologies more often proved a drain on scarce public resources 




More than Jobs: Romanticizing Apple’s Rebellious Workplace 
 
During Apple Computer, Inc.’s early years, which spanned the late 1970s and the 
early 1980s, the company gained a reputation as an exceptional place to work. John Scul-
ley, who joined Apple as its CEO in 1983, recalled that he was immediately struck by the 
incredible passion of his new employees, which far exceeded anything he had witnessed in 
his fifteen-year tenure as an executive at Pepsi in upstate New York. “I couldn’t explain 
what was going on when I arrived” at Apple, he said. “It was almost as if there were mag-
netic fields, some spiritual force, mesmerizing people. Their eyes were just dazed. Excite-
ment showed on everyone’s face. It was nearly a cult environment.”1 Sculley’s comments 
suggest that he was rather overwhelmed by his employees’ excitement, which he saw ex-
pressed in deep worker commitments to the company and its products. “Apple was a 
company populated by young people bent on making a difference,” he continued, “or at 
the very least an impression, upon the world. It was not a nine-to-five job for anyone. 
People were willing to work incredible hours to bring out products.”2 But rather than see-
ing Apple employees’ cult-like devotion to work as an unhealthy obsession, Sculley in-
sisted that Apple sustained such intense worker commitments because the company em-
bodied a revolutionary social purpose, not unlike the counterculture of the 1960s. Com-
paring Apple’s young workforce to the hippies who had made the pilgrimage to San Fran-
cisco in the 1960s, Sculley relayed stories of youth who drove “across the country in the 
proverbial Volkswagen bus” to Apple’s parking lot in Cupertino, California, where they 
“just wait[ed] to get in to play a role at the company.”3 
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Such incredible employee devotion to Apple was not, however, a spontaneous oc-
currence. The notion that Apple and its products emblematized countercultural values—
especially a desire to empower individuals and a healthy suspicion of traditional forms of 
authority—was a self-conscious posture adopted by Apple’s cofounders, Steve Wozniak 
and Steve Jobs. Wozniak put it succinctly when he proclaimed, “Although we were too 
young for the 1960s, we still had revolutionary ideas and a belief that individuals can ac-
tually make a difference in the world.”4 Apple’s products, Wozniak continued, were a per-
fect expression of this ethos. He described the Apple II—which was Apple’s first formal 
product and one of the very first personal computers available to consumers when it de-
buted in 1977—as a tool that “pushed technology beyond the limits of conventional wis-
dom” and “ignited the revolution of the individual, using high technology to show new 
ways of doing things.”5 Within Apple itself, company leaders waged a continuous cam-
paign to convince employees that their corporation was committed to a grander social 
cause than mere financial self-interest, and that employees themselves were viewed as dis-
tinct individuals rather than interchangeable units of productive labor. 
To promote these ideas, Apple’s leaders worked to develop and sustain an official 
company culture, which was reflected most clearly in the creation of Apple Values, a set of 
precepts that formed the basis of Apple’s internal corporate rhetoric throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. First drafted in 1981 by a team of employees at the request of the executive 
staff, the Apple Values were particularly concerned to neutralize possible qualms among 
employees that the corporation’s financial interests and business goals might conflict with 
company commitments to empowering consumers or treating workers well. In a memo 
circulated throughout the company, the first Apple Values statement argued, “We are here 
to make a positive difference in society, as well as make a profit,” and suggested that Ap-
ple’s chief contribution to society was “providing the power and usefulness of the com-
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puter to individual people.”6 “With this tool,” the statement continued, “people are im-
proving the way they work, think, learn, communicate and spend their leisure hours.”7 
Based upon these hopeful claims about how personal computing would benefit average 
people, the Apple Values concluded, “Our profits are the result and an important measure 
of how well we succeed in making this contribution” to society.8 By extension, the crea-
tion of profitable, proprietary computer technologies could be framed as a form of posi-
tive civic engagement—employees ostensibly did not have to look any further than their 
jobs at Apple to fulfill their political or humanitarian impulses. The corporation could be 
trusted, the Apple Values implied, to offer elegant technological solutions to social prob-
lems, an arrangement which would equally benefit Apple and society at large. 
As for workers, the Apple Values continued, “[t]he individual worth of each em-
ployee as a person is highly valued.”9 The statement elaborated that Apple’s growth and 
health could only be sustained by “the creativity, craftsmanship, initiative and good work 
of each person,” and the memo promised that Apple leadership would “sup-
port…employees in achieving their personal objectives in line with their contribution at 
Apple.”10 Moreover, the Apple Values proclaimed, the company would strive to avoid in-
stalling a bloated managerial bureaucracy, and would instead maintain a “simple and 
flexible” organization that would allow “ideas and information [to] pass freely among” 
employees and make it easier for everyone in the company to “work…together for a 
common goal.”11 In sum, the Apple Values insisted that friendliness, creativity, personal 
growth, and individual initiative would be prized, while overt forms of managerial author-
ity or corporate politicking would be actively discouraged. Just as Apple’s products osten-
sibly served the cause of individual empowerment, the Apple Values suggested that the 
company’s labor practices placed a premium on the individual value of each employee as a 
human being rather than as a mere laborer. 
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Although the tone of the Apple Values was determinedly positive, and insisted that 
Apple leadership was committed to crafting a corporation that departed from convention, 
the realities at Apple were more complex. When the executives had outlined their personal 
goals for Apple a few years earlier, they made clear that high profits were their main moti-
vation—all other aspirations, however appealing they might sound, were secondary to 
making money. Defining their primary goal with an accountant’s precision, they aimed 
for Apple to “grow to a minimum of $.25 billion in revenue by 1981 while maintaining 
[a] 12% after tax profit margin.”12 “Only if we continue to meet our profit objective,” the 
executives continued, “can we exist to achieve our other corporate objectives.” This execu-
tive memo nevertheless granted that it was imperative for employees to “have faith in the 
motives and integrity of their supervisors and of the company,” and to trust that Apple 
management would never “compromise our ethics or honesty in the name of ‘profit’ or 
‘business.’”13 These two sentiments sat side by side somewhat uneasily. Apple’s leaders rec-
ognized that they might need to compete vigorously, even ruthlessly, to meet their ambi-
tious financial goals, but they also hoped to maintain employees’ faith that Apple pos-
sessed a special purpose that surpassed mere moneymaking. In practice, however, these 
two aims were rarely complementary. As I argue in this chapter, Apple’s leaders’ aggressive 
pursuit of profits frequently led them to manipulate, exploit, and abuse employees, which 
created a number of deeply troubling labor practices at the corporation. 
This chapter and chapter 2 are closely related, as both contrast the mythology of 
work at Apple with critical analyses of employee experiences at the company. This chapter 
focuses on the origins of Apple’s workplace mythos, chronicling the years from Apple’s 
founding in 1976 to the company’s first major crisis in 1985. As such, the company’s 
charismatic leaders and cofounders—especially Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, and John Scul-
ley—loom large in my analysis. It is impossible to separate the reputations of these men 
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from popular understandings of Apple, and indeed, each of them shaped Apple’s labor 
ideologies and practices in distinct ways. For his part, Wozniak eschewed taking on an ex-
ecutive role in the company he cofounded, and he became an idol for many of Apple’s 
young engineers who similarly preferred to see technological tinkering as a calling that 
answered to a higher cause than the pursuit of a paycheck. As I explain in detail below, 
Wozniak’s disposition was emblematic of a larger shift in U.S. labor history, in which a 
new generation of white-collar workers, who began to enter the workforce in the 1970s, 
displayed a marked preference for attaining intangible rewards and pleasures from their 
jobs rather than maintaining the strong worker rights and protections that skilled blue-
collar workers had won from industrial corporations. For his part, Jobs was an adept ma-
nipulator of these changing labor attitudes. Even though he repeatedly treated his em-
ployees with cruelty and derision, he cannily cultivated his self-image as an iconoclastic 
corporate rebel, and many of his coworkers came to see his assaultive style as an essential 
component of his entrepreneurial genius. Finally, although Sculley came to Apple towards 
the end of the period considered in this chapter, he was particularly skillful at translating 
the workplace dynamics he observed at the company into a full-fledged labor ideology, 
and his arguments are extremely useful for understanding the larger stakes of the labor re-
lations that developed at Apple in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The three sections of this chapter each emphasize a distinct argument. The first 
section considers Apple’s official labor ideologies in relation to major developments in 
business history and labor history. I argue that Apple’s particular labor politics, which em-
phasized employee satisfaction and fulfillment over job security and worker rights, were 
representative of the broader erosion of formal worker rights and protections in the 
United States in the 1970s and beyond. I likewise connect the particular characteristics of 
working life at Apple to larger trends in the U.S. technology industry, and I argue that 
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tech workers’ individualistic dispositions and antipathy for collective bargaining are em-
blematic of the labor arrangements that have contributed to the increasingly unequal dis-
tribution of wealth in the United States over the past four decades. The second section 
turns to Apple’s origins, as I examine the dynamics of the relationship between cofound-
ers Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak. I argue that through Jobs’s early interactions and col-
laborations with Wozniak, he learned a number of valuable lessons about extracting pro-
ductive labor from technicians with unconventional motivations, which decisively shaped 
Jobs’s managerial style as Apple grew from a garage-based enterprise into a multinational 
corporation. The third section details Jobs’s management of the Macintosh project, one of 
the most heavily mythologized episodes in Apple’s early history. As Jobs oversaw the crea-
tion of the Macintosh personal computer, his most arrogant, abusive, and manipulative 
tendencies were on full display, yet the employees from the Macintosh team have been 
some of Jobs’s most faithful apologists. I consider why these workers were so willing to 
submit to Jobs’s cruelties, and I argue that their defenses of Jobs have helped defray 
broader criticisms of labor abuses in the tech industry. 
To tell this story, I draw on a variety of published sources and archival sources 
from the collection of Apple materials at the Stanford University Libraries. While I did 
find many illuminating documents at Stanford, the records for the period considered in 
this chapter, 1976 to 1985, consist chiefly of official corporate publications that do not 
shed much light on day-to-day life at Apple. Thus, although I rely on these documents to 
illustrate, for example, where official company policies diverged from more optimistic 
rhetoric about work at Apple, to describe actual employee experiences, I draw largely on 
the popular literature about the company, especially Walter Isaacson’s official biography 
of Steve Jobs; Michael Moritz’s journalistic account of Apple’s early years, Return to the 
Little Kingdom; Apple software engineer Andy Hertzfeld’s chronicle of the creation of the 
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Macintosh, Revolution in the Valley; and John Sculley’s memoir of his years at Apple.14 
These popular texts almost universally represent work at Apple in a positive light, and de-
scribe Apple’s cofounders and leaders as brilliant innovators. Some do offer criticisms of 
Jobs’s abusive tendencies and the darker aspects of life at Apple, but these brief passages 
are largely muted by the extensive praise the authors heap on Jobs and the company he 
cofounded. None of these texts analyzes the working environments that emerged at Ap-
ple from a critical labor history perspective, and none of them raises concerns about the 
systemic labor abuses journalists and scholars have uncovered in Silicon Valley over the 
last four decades. I therefore treat these popular works as co-constructors of Apple’s popu-
lar mythology, and I read them skeptically and critically with the explicit aim of challeng-
ing Apple’s status as a laudable emblem of corporate success. 
Nevertheless, the stories told in Hertzfeld, Isaacson, Moritz, and Sculley’s books 
are complex and compelling. Although I contend that the labor dynamics that developed 
at Apple were disastrous because they expressly eroded formal labor rights and led to the 
inequitable concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a tiny class of corporate 
leaders, many people found Apple to be an incredibly seductive place to work. Numerous 
employees proved willing to devote extraordinary amounts of time and energy to their 
jobs, often to the exclusion of activities or attachments beyond the confines of Apple. By 
extension, many began to believe that they could fulfill their personal aspirations, identi-
ties, and social responsibilities through work, which made employees markedly less critical 
of how Apple’s leaders’ aggressive productivity and corporate profitability goals undercut 
their rights and well-being as laborers or created troubling conflicts of interests with the 
company’s stated commitments to altruistic social causes. In my estimation, the best way 
to communicate the conflicted seductions of work at Apple is by letting employees’ expe-
riences unfold in longer, narrative passages, aspiring, as best I can with the materials at 
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my disposal, to something like the anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s method of “thick de-
scription.”15 It is only through extended considerations of employees’ descriptions of their 
working lives that some of the most interesting, enlightening, and contradictory aspects 
of life at Apple become visible. Apple’s holding power over the popular imagination has 
endured in large part, I contend, because Apple employees have admitted to feeling a 
nearly religious devotion to the corporation. It is incredibly important to understand how 
that devotion takes hold of employees and plays out in their daily experiences of work if 
we are to effectively comprehend—and challenge—the full scope of Apple’s sway in 
American life. 
 
APPLE TO THE CORE: A POST-INDUSTRIAL LABOR CONTRACT CONGEALS 
John Sculley, who served as Apple’s CEO from 1983 to 1993, was one of the chief 
proselytes of Apple’s managerial and labor practices. In his 1987 memoir, Sculley argued 
that Apple was at the forefront of establishing a new “social contract” between workers 
and employers in post-industrial corporate America. For Sculley, the key difference be-
tween industrial-era corporations and the “third wave” companies of the post-industrial or 
information age hinged on the kind of loyalty firms demanded from their employees. 
Borrowing William Whyte’s snide moniker for the faceless drones who ostensibly popu-
lated the post-World War II U.S. white-collar workforce, Sculley argued that in an indus-
trial corporation, “the Organization Man traded his loyalty for security and lifetime em-
ployment.”16 Although Sculley granted that the “trappings of loyalty,” especially the 
promise of a “pension [and] cradle-to-grave employment,” had appealed to many Ameri-
can workers in the middle of the twentieth century, he insisted that this arrangement was 
actually “a Faustian bargain, which seemed to offer the job holder limitless wishes while 
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robbing him of his freedom, his motivation, his creativity.”17 Sculley suggested that the 
executives of industrial firms reduced individual employees to “cog[s] in the wheel of a 
systematized corporation” because they possessed a mechanical understanding of em-
ployee efficiency and productivity; as a result, industrial leaders saw strict managerial hier-
archies and narrowly defined employee roles as the best methods to keep their companies 
running like well-oiled machines.18 
Sculley believed, however, that industrial business structures were no longer rele-
vant in a post-industrial society. The new, post-industrial economy specifically needed 
creative individuals who were continuously capable of developing innovative ideas and 
products—freed from bureaucratic constraints, these individuals would underwrite a new 
model of corporate productivity. “Third-wave people,” Sculley wrote, “are motivated by 
commitment to an ideology, by the chance to personally change the world, the chance to 
grow as a person.”19 Apple, he insisted, provided an ideal working environment for these 
“third-wave” workers: “People tend to look at joining a company like Apple as getting a 
graduate degree at a university. You select Apple because you think it can offer you an in-
credible, life-growing experience.”20 In exchange for these individual growth opportuni-
ties, Apple demanded greater personal responsibility from employees for the company’s 
financial growth. As an official statement of Apple Values from 1987 asserted, “We ex-
pect individual commitment and performance above the standard for our industry. Only 
thus will we make the profits that permit us to seek our other corporate objectives.”21 In 
Sculley’s estimation, this was a fair bargain. Apple employees faced intense demands for 
individual productivity and received no guarantees to lifelong employment or a retire-
ment package, but they were more than welcome to use their time at the company to gain 
skills that served their individual aspirations or to develop products that spoke to their per-
sonal visions of a better society. 
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Apple’s particular labor politics, with their emphasis on personal growth and 
heightened individual responsibility for the financial health of the firm, were indicative of 
the contradictory impulses that reshaped middle class employment in the United States 
between the 1970s and 1990s. During this era, white-collar professional work in a variety 
of fields—especially technology, medicine, finance, and education—increasingly displaced 
blue-collar production labor as the predominant sector of middle class employment.22 But 
these macro economic transformations entailed more than a simple shift in the fields that 
undergirded the U.S. economy. The growing importance of corporations such as Apple—
and the attendant expansion of white-collar employment—also heralded a striking revi-
sion of the labor policies, practices, expectations, and rights that defined work in the 
United States. As Sculley’s comments indicated, Apple promised to give its employees a 
variety of workplace freedoms and to connect their labor to a grander social cause, but at 
the same time, Apple employees occupied a relatively precarious position. They had little 
job security and few formal labor rights, which, as we will later see, left them vulnerable to 
excessive managerial demands and the abusive and exploitative tendencies of company 
leaders. The subsequent sections of this chapter chronicle how Apple employees’ fears of 
corporate conformity led them to forego strong worker rights and protections as they 
conducted a more nebulous search for workplace pleasures and self-fulfillment; this sec-
tion contextualizes these developments within the broader contours of post-World War II 
U.S. labor history. First, I chart how the pressures of deindustrialization contributed to the 
decline of skilled blue-collar labor, undermined political commitments to strong labor 
protections, and diminished the power of unions and collective bargaining. I then turn to 
the characteristics of white-collar professional work that shaped the new models of em-
ployee-employer relations that emerged at Silicon Valley corporations such as Apple in the 
late 1970s, and I connect these labor and management practices to the mounting ine-
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qualities of the U.S. economy. My aim is to establish a critical framework that can help 
illuminate the more troubling consequences of Apple employees’ capitulation to the new 
corporate “social contract” articulated by John Sculley, Steve Jobs, and other Apple leaders 
between the 1970s and the 1990s. 
There is no question that Apple arose during a particularly tumultuous period of 
U.S. business history. The industrial base that had underwritten American prosperity in 
the decades following World War II began to collapse in the early 1970s, as many estab-
lished U.S. corporations, especially manufacturers, lost significant ground to foreign 
competitors that were able to provide goods and services more cheaply.23 In response, 
Jackson Lears points out, American firms “eliminated many high-paying jobs and ex-
ported others overseas,” while placing incredible demands for increased productivity and 
efficiency on remaining U.S. workers.24 These upheavals were initially most pronounced 
in industrial production, and the outsourcing and labor speed-up tactics Lears describes 
particularly decimated the ranks of skilled blue-collar employment. Along with the imme-
diate trauma of large-scale job losses, however, this era saw significant structural changes 
in the rights and protections enjoyed by American workers. 
In Arne Kalleberg’s extensive study of U.S. labor since the 1970s, he explains that 
during the decades immediately following World War II, the relatively large and prosper-
ous middle class was undergirded by the collective bargaining power of unions—
concentrated in skilled blue-collar professions—and strong federal enforcement of worker 
rights and protections.25 In the 1970s, however, acute anxieties about declining corporate 
profits and the concomitant destabilization of the U.S. economy witnessed the rise of 
“coordinated anti-union business strategies,” coupled with laxer governmental enforce-
ment of labor laws, which Kalleberg argues shifted the “balance of power…heavily away 
from workers and toward employers.”26 Once again, the deterioration of collective bar-
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gaining initially left blue-collar workers most vulnerable to a newly antagonistic labor 
climate, but the decline of unions had broader implications for the character of U.S. labor 
relations. Kalleberg explains that at the height of U.S. industrialism after the Second 
World War, the specter of proliferating labor unions had “led nonunion employers to 
provide similar benefits to their workers,” which meant that the kinds of rights and pro-
tections secured by unions extended to some degree to the U.S. workforce at large.27 
By contrast, the white-collar professions that became more important in the post-
industrial era emphasized individualism and lacked strong traditions of collective bargain-
ing, and these professions’ marked failure to advocate for robust labor rights in the 1970s 
and beyond exacerbated the overall deterioration of formal worker protections in the 
United States. White-collar professionals’ relative lack of concern for formal labor protec-
tions and unions reflected, in large measure, an alternative set of responses to the princi-
pal labor struggles of the twentieth century. During the late 1800s and early 1900s, as 
corporations began to grow into vast enterprises, sometimes employing many thousands 
of workers, business leaders and managers had become obsessed with maximizing labor 
productivity and efficiency in order to maximize their profits. The concept of “scientific 
management,” most famously outlined and promoted by the industrialist Frederick Win-
slow Taylor, was particularly influential at the turn of the twentieth century.28 Following 
Taylor’s ideas, scientific managers at firms across the U.S. began to look at work as a me-
chanical process that could be broken down into simpler component tasks, which individ-
ual workers could then perform much more quickly. Although the mechanized assembly 
line, applied at Ford and other manufacturers, is perhaps the best-known application of 
scientific management, similar ideas also reshaped office labor in the early twentieth cen-
tury, creating what historian Graham Lowe has called “paper-generating assembly lines.”29 
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Despite Taylor’s contention that scientific management would ultimately give 
both laborers and capitalists what they most wanted—high wages and low labor costs—the 
working arrangements installed by scientific managers generated many worker com-
plaints.30 The fragmented and simplified tasks workers had to perform quickly became te-
dious, while managers installed rigid, punitive bureaucracies to enforce their rationalistic 
work schemes and to gain more direct control over laborers.31 As Nikil Saval writes in his 
popular history of office work, scientific managers were “little interested in their workers 
as human beings,” and their treatment of employees as unthinking, unfeeling pieces 
within a larger labor machine could lead to feelings of profound alienation among a com-
pany’s workforce.32 Union activity, which was concentrated among skilled blue-collar 
production workers, mounted a two-fold resistance to the excesses of scientific manage-
ment. On the one hand, unions fought for strong employee rights and clear contractual 
obligations that would give them more autonomy on the job and modulate the tedium of 
scientific management’s most extreme applications, while on the other hand, union 
workers agreed to submit to some managerial demands for higher productivity and effi-
ciency in exchange for better compensation and more job security.33 White-collar work-
ers, by contrast, demanded more sociable modes of work that could provide greater men-
tal and emotional satisfactions.34 Rather than emphasizing collective worker rights or bu-
reaucratically defined seniority and promotion guidelines, white-collar professionals advo-
cated for workplaces where individual skills and efforts would define success. 
By the late 1950s, white-collar demands for more creative, fulfilling, and autono-
mous modes of work began to have a significant impact on professional work in the U.S. 
As Thomas Frank argues in his reappraisal of the relationship between corporate America 
and the counterculture, broad cultural fears of conformity and anxieties about the stagna-
tion of U.S. business in the late 1950s and early 1960s led a number of corporate leaders, 
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especially in the fields of advertising and fashion, to openly repudiate scientific manage-
ment regimes. These corporate leaders, Frank writes, feared the ills of a homogenous 
“mass society” and “deplored conformity, distrusted routine, and encouraged resistance to 
established power.”35 At the same time, however, these business executives had not entirely 
abandoned scientific management’s obsessions with worker productivity—they simply be-
lieved that stimulating their employees’ creative capacities was a more effective tactic for 
enhancing the productive output of their industries. At leading ad agencies and menswear 
companies, Frank elaborates, employees therefore enjoyed considerable feelings of auton-
omy as their employers encouraged them to think of themselves as rule-breaking “artists,” 
and to see their work more as a matter of personal expression and exploration than disen-
chanted, formulaic labor for pay.36 The enlightened attitudes of such business leaders and 
the growing pleasures and satisfactions of white-collar work further reduced professionals’ 
interest in collective measures such as unionization, as executives’ aims already appeared 
to be aligning with professionals’ workplace aspirations. 
The 1960s counterculture helped popularize these more creative and fulfilling 
styles of work, especially among younger, college-educated workers, who expressed a keen 
desire to derive more from their jobs than just a dependable paycheck and a pension. In 
his cultural history of Silicon Valley, Fred Turner suggests that aspiring professionals’ 
growing emphasis on job quality as opposed to job security stemmed from ongoing anxie-
ties about the evils of corporate conformism and scientific management. These younger 
workers, Turner writes, believed that older professionals “had found themselves locked 
into rigid roles” within vast, bureaucratic firms, where “[t]heir hands ached from years on 
the corporate ladder, and their souls had begun to wither beneath their suits.”37 Fearing 
that they would likewise be trapped in a “hierarchical world of cold war corporate adult-
hood” that would crush their “whole and authentic” individuality, the youth of the 1970s 
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searched for work experiences that they hoped would free them from subservience to more 
overt forms of corporate authority.38 Yet both Turner and Frank suggest that there was 
considerable irony in the youth counterculture’s anti-corporate pretensions, as the soul-
crushing workplace conformism they feared had already begun to fade in many white-
collar professions by the 1970s. Numerous corporate leaders in fact “welcomed the youth-
led cultural revolution,” Frank argues, “because they perceived in it a comrade in their 
own struggles to revitalize American business and the consumer order generally.”39 The 
business scholar Shoshana Zuboff agrees that corporate employers were largely receptive to 
the tastes of this “new generation of better-educated professionals and workers,” which 
demanded “[s]elf-fulfillment and satisfaction” in the workplace.40 Many corporations in 
the 1960s and beyond, Zuboff continues, enthusiastically worked “to provide psychologi-
cally more enhancing, and economically more productive, work experiences.”41 In other 
words, the white-collar professionals who embraced more engaging and pleasurable modes 
of work in the 1970s were a good fit for mainstream management ideologies of that era, 
and their abandonment of collective worker movements in favor of workplace individual-
ism was less a triumph of anti-corporate counterculture sentiments than the culmination 
of a longer rearrangement of white-collar labor relations. 
John Sculley represented this transformation of corporate labor as a mutually 
beneficial development for businesses and employees alike. In particular, he suggested that 
corporations’ increasing focus on the fulfillment and personal growth of employees made 
companies more responsive to the social and political commitments of their workers. 
Sculley held up Apple and its workforce as sterling examples of this new labor arrange-
ment. Apple employees, Sculley wrote, 
were mesmerized, possessed almost, by what they were doing; they were univer-
sally young, passionate, idealistic, and brilliant. They wanted to change the world. 
 43 
If they had been born a decade or so earlier, they would have been part of the six-
ties culture that lived in communes and protested the Vietnam War. They didn’t 
have a cause in a war or a president, however. Instead, they focused their energies 
on changing the world through products. [They] demonstrated a cultlike dedica-
tion to working, sometimes through the night, to solve a technical problem.42 
These employee attitudes, Sculley continued, gave Apple “the intellectual feel of a univer-
sity, not a corporation,” while company management, following Steve Jobs’s example, 
officially referred to workers as “artists, not engineers.”43 
These particular comments about Apple are noteworthy for several reasons. For 
one, Sculley suggested that work at Apple did not adhere to conventional understandings 
of corporate labor, where employees would be expected to hold regular working hours and 
would perform tasks largely according to managerial directives. At Apple, work called on a 
different range of aptitudes—the creative expression associated with artistry, the intellec-
tual curiosity associated with higher education, and a degree of psychological absorption 
that verged on religious devotion. Yet Sculley’s depictions of his employees’ political ori-
entations were even more remarkable. He explicitly aligned Apple’s youthful workforce 
with the counterculture of the previous generation, but rather than pursuing social change 
by organizing political groups, engaging in protest movements, or living in alternative 
communities, Apple employees apparently believed they could more effectively achieve 
their aims by designing consumer technologies for a Fortune 500 company. Although 
Sculley took his employees’ devotion to technological development as evidence of Apple’s 
transcendent social mission, the implication that corporate labor could simply replace 
other modes of civic or social responsibility was more disconcerting. Apple’s leaders and 
employees had not, after all, abandoned their intention of reaping considerable financial 
rewards from the production and sale of computer technologies, and U.S. history suggests 
that the aggressive pursuit of corporate profits rarely correlates with broadly shared social 
benefits.44 
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Indeed, a number of scholars have expressed significant concerns about the grow-
ing tendency of middle-class professionals to align their personal goals and identities with 
corporate employers such as Apple. As employees become less capable of maintaining dis-
tinctions between their personal and professional lives, they lose some of their critical ca-
pacities to recognize that corporate financial goals and associated demands for high 
worker productivity often run counter to their own self-interest. Shoshanna Zuboff, for 
example, remarks that most blue-collar industrial workers “could give of their labor with-
out giving of their selves,” which implied that the “human being as wage earner and the 
human being as subjective actor could remain separate.”45 By contrast, Zuboff continues, 
it is more difficult to disentangle personal identity from corporate mission in professional 
jobs at companies like Apple, where employees need “to sustain…high levels of internal 
commitment and motivation” to meet their employers’ intense productivity expecta-
tions.46 In a recent study of how white-collar workers cope with mounting demands from 
their employers, Melissa Gregg argues that “middle-class professionals [have] been en-
couraged to see work as the most significant demonstration of their success and identity,” 
and she suggests that many have come to believe that “paid employment is the most 
compelling demonstration of virtue, accomplishment, and self-identity that society 
makes available.”47 She worries that such intense personal investments in work have con-
tributed to troubling trends in contemporary corporate labor, such as “professional work-
ers’ willingness to engage in work outside paid hours” and their tendency to “withdraw 
from a range of more complex human relationships to focus on a proven source of per-
sonal esteem—their job.”48 Gregg highlights the rising propensity of professionals to re-
treat even from robust interactions with workplace colleagues, which further undermines 
employees’ collective abilities to modulate or resist unreasonable or exploitative employer 
dictates. Instead, she argues, professional laborers come to believe that managing the pace 
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and intensity of work is a matter of personal responsibility and adaptability.49 As Zuboff 
puts it, professionals in the more fractured, competitive, and individualistic American 
corporations of the post-industrial era have lost much of the “the clarity of rights and ob-
ligations that…offer[ed] an important sense of personal control” within the more collec-
tivist workplaces of the mature industrial economy; in turn, these working expectations 
have made it more difficult for professionals “to manage the extent of one’s own exer-
tion.”50 
Thus, while business leaders such as John Sculley made airy proclamations about a 
new “social contract” that would make work more fulfilling and corporations more so-
cially responsible, the lack of emphasis in Silicon Valley on job security, collective bar-
gaining, or worker rights produced a number of troubling dynamics in the tech industry. 
Dennis Hayes, who worked as a journalist and itinerant software programmer in Silicon 
Valley during the 1980s, developed a thoroughly jaundiced view of the business rhetoric 
churned out by companies such as Apple. “The warm corporate promise of ‘providing a 
setting conducive to personal growth,’” he wrote, “was finally about ‘raising productiv-
ity,’” and Hayes argued that “corporate concern for the individual” was little more than 
an appealing fiction designed to disguise the relentless pressure Silicon Valley companies 
placed on employees to produce more value for the corporation.51 Meaningful resistance 
to the exploitative characteristics of work in Silicon Valley, such as managerial demands 
for unpaid overtime to meet unreasonable deadlines, Hayes continued, was persistently 
undermined by the instability of employment and the individualistic convictions of 
workers in the tech industry. High rates of employee turnover at most tech companies, 
Hayes argued, had engendered an “itinerant perspective [among] a large and growing 
proportion of workers,” which minimized their ability to organize collective campaigns to 
push “firms to correct problems, to invest in and implement safety procedures, or to chas-
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tise or remove offensive managers.”52 Moreover, because tech workers tended to see suc-
cess as a matter personal skill and effort, they rejected unionization or other cooperative 
labor groups as a means to realize improvements in their working situations. The most 
common response to workplace antagonisms, Hayes reported, was simply to jump to an-
other company in the hopes that it would prove more agreeable.53 The pronounced lack of 
collective labor efforts has been an enduring feature of the U.S. tech industry. As the labor 
scholar Christoph Hermann recently noted, “If there is an overarching characteristic of 
Silicon Valley, it is the absence of unions or other forms of organized social resistance.”54 
Despite the paucity of worker rights and growing experiences of employee exploi-
tation in Silicon Valley in the 1980s, workers in the tech industry revealed remarkable 
commitments to their jobs. Everett Rogers and Judith Larsen—whose 1984 sociological 
survey of rising tech corporations, Silicon Valley Fever, largely corroborates Dennis 
Hayes’s firsthand accounts of workplace abuses—discovered that tech industry employees 
were eager to believe that their working experiences represented a radical departure from 
corporate convention, leading them to view hectic schedules and intense pressures as a 
marker of their field’s dynamic thrills rather than unreasonable demands on their time 
and energies. “Some Silicon Valley people simply like to work,” Rogers and Larsen noted. 
“They put in long hours and cope with the job-related stress because they like microelec-
tronics better than working in an established industry where they feel most people are 
bored clock-watchers.”55 Andy Hertzfeld, a software engineer who helped develop Apple’s 
original Macintosh personal computer in the early 1980s, perfectly encapsulated the will-
ingness of tech employees to give over most of their time and energy to designing com-
puters. “Most Macintosh software team members were between 20 and 30 years old,” 
Hertzfeld explained in his memoir, “and with few family obligations to distract us, we 
were used to working long hours. We were passionate about the project and willing to 
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more or less subordinate to it the rest of our lives.”56 Although Hertzfeld suggested that the 
excitement of building a new computer was ample compensation for the fact that his 
work at Apple displaced other aspects of his life, Rogers and Larsen were less sanguine. 
They worried that “work-obsessed technocrats” dominated the professional ranks of Sili-
con Valley, and that tech employees’ lack of interests or relationships beyond the work-
place left them “with a limited life experience and a stunted human understanding.”57 
Although Silicon Valley professionals willingly poured themselves into their work, 
fueling the rapid expansion of tech firms and underwriting the region’s growing eco-
nomic importance in the 1980s and 1990s, the distribution of wealth in the industry was 
incredibly skewed, with executives and high-level managers reaping most of the rewards 
through lucrative stock options, while professionals’ salaries and compensation stagnated. 
Once again, Apple offers an emblematic example. The journalist Michael Moritz—who 
briefly served as Apple’s official historian in the early 1980s—reports that as Apple grew 
from a tiny start-up into a fully-fledged corporation, the company filled out its ranks with 
seasoned professionals from corporations such as Hewlett-Packard and National Semicon-
ductor.58 These new hires lobbied aggressively—and often successfully—for high-level 
managerial roles and valuable stock options during their interviews, while many employ-
ees who had been with Apple from the earliest days were passed over. In an interview with 
Moritz, one indignant employee—who began working at Apple as a high school student 
in the late 1970s—described a pervasive sense of competitive individualism and distinct 
lack of employee solidarity. Speaking on behalf of the younger employees who felt be-
trayed by Apple’s stock distribution and promotion policies, he said, “We missed out on 
the American dream because we were too nice…. We weren’t obnoxious enough to make 
ourselves millionaires.”59 These comments indicated the darker side of tech employees’ in-
dividualistic proclivities—rather than fighting for broader compensation increases to re-
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ward employees’ collective contributions to Apple’s expanding wealth, workers advocated 
chiefly for themselves, exhibiting little concern for the deepening inequalities at the com-
pany. For his part, Moritz contends that the wealth disparities between white-collar work-
ers and company leaders that began to develop at Apple in the 1980s “were far larger than 
those that separate the chairman from the janitor in mature companies like General Mo-
tors and Exxon.”60 
More comprehensive studies of wealth disparities in Silicon Valley substantiate 
these anecdotal observations at Apple. The economic geographer Chris Benner, for exam-
ple, argues that the “success of [Silicon Valley’s] economy” has diverged sharply from “ca-
reer success for workers in the regional labor market,” as professionals and other “workers 
in the region face high levels of uncertainty in their employment opportunities and career 
paths.”61 The compensation data Benner cites vividly illustrate how few individuals have 
truly shared in the tech industry’s phenomenal growth. “Between 1991 and 2000,” Ben-
ner writes, “the average compensation of the top 100 executives in Silicon Valley’s largest 
companies grew by over 2,000 percent in real terms, while the average annual income for 
production workers in the electronics industry declined by 7 percent.”62 Or, put another 
way, top tech executives were paid about forty times as much as their average employee in 
1991, whereas in 2000, executives were making almost 1,000 times more than average 
workers.63 Silicon Valley therefore exemplifies Arne Kalleberg’s arguments about the 
broader transformation of the U.S. economy since the 1970s. As worker protections have 
deteriorated and professional fields have “deemphasized collective solutions” in favor of 
“personal responsibility” for labor disputes, Kalleberg writes, “workers’ situations have 
worsened while many companies have prospered.”64 These policies and trends, Kalleberg 
concludes, have made it increasingly common for the financial rewards of corporate activ-
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ity to accrue to executives and shareholders rather than being shared in a more egalitarian 
fashion with employees.65 
Thus, from a labor history perspective, Silicon Valley’s rise during the 1980s and 
1990s is fraught with ironies and problems. While industry leaders such as John Sculley 
promised to give employees greater autonomy and to fashion their corporations into 
more socially responsible entities, thereby progressively extending the creative work revo-
lution that had begun in fashion and advertising in the 1950s, in reality, Silicon Valley 
technology firms had tightened their grip on employees’ lives and had pervasively under-
mined formal worker rights and protections. Moreover, as white-collar professionals in the 
tech industry fell prey to the seductions of competitive individualism, self-fulfillment, and 
the belief that tech companies diverged sharply from the authoritarianism of other indus-
tries, they lost interest in collective worker organizations, and poured themselves heart 
and soul into their jobs while a privileged corporate elite reaped most of the rewards for 
their labor. As I argue in the remainder of this chapter and in chapter 2, these dominant 
labor structures and dispositions undergirded Silicon Valley’s phenomenal financial 
growth during the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the incredibly unequal distribution of that 
wealth.  
The subsequent sections of this chapter turn to the mythology of Steve Jobs. 
Popular interpretations of Jobs have emphasized his entrepreneurial genius and astute 
technological vision as the key factors in his remarkable ascendance as a business leader, 
but I argue that it was in fact the shifting priorities and beliefs of professional workers in 
the 1970s and beyond that subsidized Jobs’s quest to become an emblem of success in the 
post-industrial United States. As Apple’s cofounder and one of the company’s most influ-
ential leaders during its early years, Jobs was unrepentantly manipulative and abusive. He 
avidly exploited employees to extract the maximum amount of value from their labor, 
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and he made a number of disastrous business decisions that brought Apple to the brink of 
destruction in 1985, which cost many employees their jobs. Although Apple’s board 
forced Jobs out of the company in 1985, the wealth he had accrued from Apple stock op-
tions allowed him to pursue a number of other lucrative business ventures until he re-
turned to Apple in 1997 as a multibillionaire—in other words, Apple employees suffered 
the brunt of Jobs’s abuses and mistakes, yet those who worked with Jobs have consistently 
downplayed the negative consequences of his actions and behaviors. As I examine the ori-
gins and evolution of Jobs’s managerial tactics at Apple from 1976 to 1985, I consider 
why employees were so willing to submit to his aggressive and selfish impulses, and I ar-
gue that tech workers’ unwillingness to stand up to business leaders such as Jobs has mark-
edly contributed to the ongoing invisibility of labor problems in Silicon Valley. 
 
ORIGIN MYTHS: STEVE JOBS, STEVE WOZNIAK, AND THE FOUNDING OF APPLE 
My aim in this section is to map out the origins of the complex labor and man-
agement relationships that defined Apple during the 1980s and 1990s. As a point of de-
parture, I examine the conflicted friendship between cofounders Steve Jobs and Steve 
Wozniak, both of whom served as important figureheads for key aspects of Apple’s corpo-
rate culture. I argue that through his early interactions and collaborations with Wozniak, 
Jobs began to sketch out a framework for corporate labor–management relations that de-
cisively shaped the first two decades of Apple’s existence. In dealing with Wozniak, Jobs 
learned how to appeal to some of the key desires shared by many young professionals of 
the era. Jobs would later use these techniques to great effect when he led the development 
of the Macintosh personal computer between 1981 and 1985, which is the focus of the 
next section of this chapter. 
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Although Apple grew quickly from a garage-based enterprise in 1976 to a multina-
tional corporation by the early 1980s, adding thousands of employees across the globe and 
entering the Fortune 500 after just seven years in business, the conflicted friendship be-
tween cofounders Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak was curiously indicative of the larger la-
bor patterns that would come to define the corporation’s character.66 Jobs and Wozniak 
both grew up during the 1950s and 1960s amidst the sprawling towns and suburbs that 
stretch along the bayside coast between San Francisco and San José, California. The re-
gion was already densely populated with high-tech corporations and government installa-
tions, giving Wozniak and Jobs many opportunities from a young age to observe and in-
teract with neighbors and family members employed in the technology industry, who 
tinkered endlessly in their spare time with the novel technological tools and components 
that were becoming increasingly accessible to consumers. In 1971, when Wozniak was 
twenty years old and Jobs just fifteen, the journalist Donald Hoefler somewhat unwit-
tingly heralded the rising economic, cultural, and political importance of the metropolitan 
hub when he coined the moniker “Silicon Valley” in a series of articles for the trade maga-
zine Electronic News.67 Jobs and Wozniak thus came of age at a time of profound flux in 
both technological development and the economic fortunes of the United States, in the 
very place where countless high-tech businesses would arise to shape many of the key fea-
tures of post-industrial corporate activity. 
An important strand of Apple’s popular mythology, however, rests upon the con-
tention that neither Jobs nor Wozniak was a likely candidate for founding what would 
become one of the most important and influential corporations in recent history. A 1982 
California Magazine profile of Apple’s cofounders, for example, described Wozniak as “a 
naive, almost innocent” man who simply “couldn’t conform to the corporate agenda,” 
and remarked that Jobs “was just another kid with long hair and scruffy jeans” who had 
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traveled “to India in search of a guru” and had returned instead determined to start a suc-
cessful company.68 In other words, the pair of bearded college dropouts did not look like 
the clean-cut, gray-flannel–clad managers who had dominated the American imagination 
of business leadership in the 1950s and 1960s. But as I argued in the previous section, the 
conventional measures and markers of U.S. corporate success had been shifting since the 
late 1950s, and by the time Jobs and Wozniak arrived on the scene in the mid-1970s, they 
were both ideally positioned, in their own ways, to become emblems of the new, suppos-
edly cooler and more creative corporate America of the late twentieth century. As we will 
see in this section, Wozniak was a perfect example of a white-collar professional who was 
motivated more by the artistry of his work than by money or a desire for managerial 
authority, while Jobs’s abrasive iconoclasm ironically gave him the ability to motivate—
and manipulate—a new generation of professionals who had grown suspicious of tradi-
tional corporations. But even though Jobs and Wozniak’s looks and behaviors differed 
from the classic image of corporate leadership, the company they built still possessed a 
conventional need for profits, and as Jobs assumed a dominant leadership role during Ap-
ple’s early years, he betrayed a canny ability to extract labor from friends and employees 
under questionable circumstances. If Jobs’s managerial tactics were unconventional, they 
were not entirely commendable, and his troubling treatment of his friend and business 
partner Wozniak displayed some of the key features that would define Jobs’s career as a 
corporate executive. 
In analyzing the relationship between Jobs and Wozniak and detailing Apple’s 
founding and early growth, I rely in large part on Walter Isaacson’s biography of Steve 
Jobs and Michael Moritz’s extensive journalistic account of life at Apple in the early 
1980s. The archival record for these years is surprisingly thin, which gives the accounts of 
popular authors such as Isaacson and Moritz greater authority. However, as I contended at 
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the beginning of this chapter, these popular texts tend to mythologize Apple’s founders as 
singular geniuses rather than offering a sustained, critical analysis of how Apple fits into a 
broader—and often troubling—transformation of U.S. corporate activity. Although my 
ability to tell this story is clearly indebted to the extensive interviews Moritz and Isaacson 
undertook in their own research, I am particularly concerned in this section to challenge 
Moritz and Isaacson’s tendencies to minimize the implications of Jobs’s manipulation and 
exploitation of Wozniak as they worked together to found Apple, and to consider some of 
the consequences of Wozniak’s own reticence to criticize his former business partner. My 
chief contention is that popular texts such as Moritz and Isaacson’s books and the diffi-
dent public statements of Apple employees like Wozniak have polished the mainstream 
mythos of Jobs as a brilliant entrepreneur while dissimulating the problematic labor condi-
tions that existed behind the scenes at Apple, and which continue to shape Silicon Valley 
today. 
The task of deconstructing the mythologies surrounding Apple, Jobs, and 
Wozniak is made all the more difficult by the fact that the two cofounders are intriguing 
characters, and their path to founding Apple easily takes the form of an exciting adven-
ture story. For one, both Wozniak and Jobs were fairly undisciplined youth, and displayed 
a marked disdain for traditional forms of authority. In high school, Wozniak gained noto-
riety both for his technological prowess in electronics classes as well as his pranks, two pur-
suits which he most notably combined in the construction of a fake bomb, an exploit that 
earned him a night at the juvenile detention center. There, Wozniak claims he and his fel-
low inmates rewired the ceiling fans to the cell bars to shock anyone who touched them.69 
As a first-year undergraduate at the University of Colorado in Boulder in 1969, Wozniak 
continued in a similar vein, neglecting his coursework in favor of pursuits such as hacking 
a university-owned mainframe computer and developing a device that allowed him to in-
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terfere with professors’ attempts to use televisions in the classroom. When a dean took 
formal disciplinary action against Wozniak, Michael Moritz reports that Wozniak re-
sponded “by hiring a lawyer to write a threatening letter,” a maneuver that accelerated the 
demise of his academic career in Colorado.70 Despite his lack of formal training, a friend 
helped Wozniak secure a position as a midlevel engineer at Hewlett-Packard soon after he 
returned to California. The desktop calculators Wozniak helped design at the company 
did not particularly inspire his imagination, and his superiors denied his repeated requests 
for transfers to more interesting projects because he had failed to finish his degree. For a 
while, however, Wozniak appeared content with his steady paycheck, using his spare time 
to design and build computers and other electronic devices.71 He also entertained himself 
by running a “dial-a-joke” service from his home phone, reading Polish one-liners to call-
ers until a spate of irate correspondence from the Polish American Congress prompted 
him to switch to jokes about Italians.72 
Jobs’s adolescent biography reveals similar proclivities. In elementary school, Jobs 
also gained a reputation as a troublemaker for pulling such stunts as setting off fireworks 
indoors and learning all his classmates’ bike lock combinations so he and a friend could 
switch them all around.73 When he started college in 1972, Jobs discovered his own frus-
trations with the rigors of university life. Impatient with the number of required courses 
he encountered at Reed College in Portland, Oregon, Jobs dropped out but convinced a 
dean to allow him to attend the classes of his choosing for no credit. This arrangement 
gave Jobs the selective opportunity to study things he found interesting while staying in-
volved with the fringier edges of campus culture, where he picked up strange dietary ob-
sessions, stopped wearing shoes, ceased bathing regularly, and engaged in considerable 
recreational drug use.74 After a few years, Jobs drifted away from his rather directionless 
existence in Oregon back to California, where he managed to land a job designing video 
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games for Atari in 1974. Here, Jobs quickly gained a reputation for his arrogance and 
acute lack of social skills. Jobs’s intensity charmed Atari’s founder, Nolan Bushnell, but his 
coworkers found his behavior and questionable personal hygiene insufferable. To defray 
tensions, Bushnell decided to let Jobs work by himself in the office late at night when 
there was no one around to insult or irritate.75 
Jobs and Wozniak’s personalities made them misfits in traditional institutions, so 
when a mutual friend introduced them in 1971 it was not surprising that they clicked on 
the basis of their shared love of pranks and their interest in electronics. Yet from the very 
beginning of their friendship, Wozniak and Jobs differed in their ultimate goals of work-
ing with technology. Wozniak emblematized the hacker culture that emerged around 
computing in the 1970s, which combined a love of technological experimentation with 
the thrills of challenging authority. Jobs, by contrast, possessed an overriding concern for 
how technologies could be turned to economically rewarding ends. The interplay between 
Wozniak and Jobs’s impulses emerged during their first collaboration, the construction of 
“blue boxes,” electronic devices which allowed users to hack AT&T’s infrastructure to 
make free telephone calls anywhere in the world. In the 1960s and 1970s, a dispersed sub-
culture of “phone phreaks” across the United States figured out how to manipulate 
AT&T’s switching system by artificially generating the sonic tones that governed how 
calls were patched through the global telephone network. After Wozniak’s mother showed 
him a lengthy Esquire article about phone phreaking in 1971, Wozniak and Jobs became 
obsessed with building their own blue boxes to hack into the telephone network. In early 
1972, Wozniak designed a miniature digital computer circuit that could produce the nec-
essary tones.76 Among their more infamous stunts with the device, Jobs and Wozniak 
managed to dial through to the Vatican, requesting a conversation with the Pope while 
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posing as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—they spoke to a bishop, but never got the 
Pope on the line.77 
The basic appeal of phone phreaking for Wozniak and Jobs was obvious. It com-
bined technological skill along with the thrills of defrauding a mighty corporation and the 
possibilities of speaking to powerful—and otherwise inaccessible—figures. At the time, 
Jobs was still in high school and Wozniak was taking another stab at college at Berkeley, 
but Jobs became convinced that they could start an underground business manufacturing 
and selling the devices. Wozniak would assemble the blue boxes for about $40 in parts, 
and then he and Jobs would lurk around the Berkeley dorms performing demonstrations 
of the boxes, selling them to interested parties for $150.78 Jobs was eventually spooked by 
the potential legal repercussions of making and selling the blue boxes, and after being 
robbed at gunpoint while trying to sell one in a parking lot, he dropped out of the busi-
ness.79 Wozniak, however, was hooked, and continued making and selling the boxes to 
the detriment of his grades, which became a contributing factor in his decision to once 
again abandon his college career. He eventually amassed about $6,000 from selling the 
devices, and even though Jobs had stopped being involved in the enterprise, Wozniak 
split the proceeds with him. “It was my business and Steve got half of it,” Wozniak later 
commented, foreshadowing the problematic division of labor that would continue to 
shape their business relationships.80 
Three years later, after Jobs had returned from Oregon to work at Atari and 
Wozniak was building calculators at Hewlett-Packard, another collaboration between the 
pair arose when Jobs’s boss, Nolan Bushnell, asked him to design the hardware for a single-
player version of the video game Pong, called Breakout. Bushnell told Jobs that in addi-
tion to a base fee, he would offer a bonus if Jobs could construct the game using fewer 
than fifty computer chips. Bushnell reportedly did not believe that Jobs was capable of ac-
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tually designing the hardware, but he knew Jobs was friends with Wozniak, and had little 
doubt that Jobs would convince Wozniak to help him design Breakout. Jobs did indeed 
induce Wozniak to build the hardware, offering to split the base fee but leaving out the 
details about the bonus. Although Bushnell gave Jobs a month to complete the game, Jobs 
wanted to travel to a friend’s farm in Oregon in a few days, so he simply told Wozniak 
that “it had to be done in four days and with the fewest chips possible.”81 
Jobs’s imposed time constraints were mostly self-serving, but they also cannily 
spoke to Wozniak’s ingrained love of technical challenges. As Wozniak claimed, “A game 
like this might take most engineers a few months,” and at first he balked at the tight dead-
line.82 Yet Jobs proved a talented persuader. As the leader of the Macintosh project at Ap-
ple, Jobs would later become known for his so-called “reality distortion field,” which 
Wozniak described as such: “His reality distortion is when he has an illogical vision of the 
future, such as telling me that I could design the Breakout game in just a few days. You 
realize that it can’t be true, but he somehow makes it true.”83 With Jobs consistently ap-
pealing to Wozniak’s pride, telling him that he was indeed capable of performing such a 
remarkable feat of engineering, Wozniak embarked on a sleepless, dizzying, four-day ad-
venture, sketching out circuit designs by day at Hewlett-Packard and then driving to 
Atari after a rushed dinner to build the game by night. He made the deadline and used 
only forty-five chips, earning Jobs a healthy bonus that remained a secret from Wozniak 
for a decade. When a friend enlightened Wozniak about Jobs’s omission, he was under-
standably hurt. As he later told Isaacson, “I think that Steve needed the money, and he 
just didn’t tell me the truth…. I wish he had just been honest. If he had told me he needed 
the money, he should have known I would have just given it to him. He was a friend. You 
help your friends.”84 But Wozniak was also hesitant to push the point further, telling Isaac-
son that “being manipulative is just the darker facet of the traits that [made Jobs] success-
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ful.”85 Isaacson likewise fails to plumb the implications of Jobs’s behavior, casting such in-
stances as evidence of a personality flaw which may have periodically made life difficult 
for Jobs’s closest associates, but which Isaacson ultimately agrees defined Jobs’s particular 
success. “Polite and velvety leaders,” Isaacson intones, “who take care to avoid bruising 
others, are generally not as effective at forcing change.”86 
Such comments display a disturbing capitulation to Jobs’s authoritarian tenden-
cies, suggesting that the value of Jobs’s individual vision outweighed the need for his col-
leagues or employees to resist his manipulations, even though Jobs had clearly placed his 
self-interest before the value of friendship or basic ethics during the Atari episode, raising 
serious questions about Jobs’s ultimate motivations as an business leader. In reality, I ar-
gue, Jobs’s interactions with Wozniak encouraged him to see management as a game 
where manipulation and outright deceit could lead to personal rewards, and the lack of 
pushback from Wozniak would embolden Jobs to employ similar tactics with his employ-
ees at Apple. Indeed, Wozniak exhibited—often to the extreme—many of the salient 
traits of the rising cadre of young professionals who would enter the U.S. workforce in the 
1970s. As Arne Kalleberg argues, this generation of professionals tended to be more in-
spired by “intrinsic rewards” than “extrinsic rewards.” “Intrinsic rewards,” he explains, “re-
flect people’s ability to utilize their skills, knowledge, and abilities in their jobs. Some peo-
ple obtain satisfaction from their jobs primarily because they have the opportunity to de-
velop their abilities and to have interesting, meaningful, and challenging work over which 
they can exercise responsibility.”87 By contrast, Kalleberg continues, older generations of 
workers, who valued extrinsic rewards such as stable salaries, good benefits, and job secu-
rity, tended to put less stock in finding pleasure or fulfillment through their work. Jobs 
had found that the promise of friendship and the excitement of a difficult technological 
challenge could be used to make Wozniak work productively and creatively. These realiza-
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tions formed the basis of the managerial style Jobs would later employ to inspire Wozniak 
and many others like him to design Apple’s innovative computer products. 
Jobs and Wozniak’s early collaborations therefore contained the seeds of the labor 
dynamic that would evolve at Apple, with Jobs and other executives serving as “impresa-
rios” who could “cleverly deal with the creative temperaments of artists,” as John Sculley 
later put it.88 In this respect, Jobs’s own dissonant relationships with institutions and 
authority gave him important personal insights into the approaches that could stimulate 
educated youngsters who were similarly resistant to traditional forms of motivation. Un-
like Wozniak and many later employees, however, Jobs aimed to attain the authority that 
many young professionals began to spurn in the 1970s. Wielding this power within a 
large corporation without alienating workers was a complex undertaking, and as Jobs ex-
trapolated from his more informal working relationships with Wozniak to build a full-
fledged corporate culture, he consistently expanded, tested, and revised his leadership tac-
tics to discover the most effective combinations. 
The founding of Apple brought the odd balance of power between Jobs and 
Wozniak into sharper relief. Wozniak had first tried to build a home computer with an-
other friend in 1971, but he and Jobs’s mutual interest in small computers was piqued 
again in 1975 with the inauguration of the Homebrew Computer Club in Menlo Park, 
California. The club brought together numerous hobbyists—mostly engineers and scien-
tists working at area corporations and universities—who were interested in the novel 
computing possibilities offered by the rapidly shrinking size and falling cost of computer 
components. Many members of the club were especially enchanted with the notion that 
average people could soon own and operate computers out of their homes. This repre-
sented a striking departure from computing in the 1950s and 1960s, when computers had 
been technological monstrosities. Far from being a single object, computers of this earlier 
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era were often vast complexes of devices, consisting of mainframes, filing-cabinet–sized 
tape and disk drives, display monitors, programming consoles, and units that allowed re-
mote computer access via telephone. In their largest configurations, these computers 
could take up entire rooms. Such computers were also fabulously expensive. One model of 
IBM’s System/360, which became an industry standard in the 1960s, retailed for $253,000 
in 1968—about $1.7 million in 2016 dollars.89 Clearly, only very large institutions could 
afford or justify computerization in this era, and it was rare to find computers outside 
large corporations, universities, hospitals, or the government until the 1970s. 
However, the Altair 8800, released in 1975 by Micro Instrumentation and Te-
lemetry Systems (MITS), indicated the rapidly shifting direction of computer technolo-
gies. The Altair was one of the very first—and one of the most popular—computers de-
signed for home use and sold directly to consumers through catalogs and electronics 
stores. Wozniak first observed the Altair at a Homebrew meeting, but he was not terribly 
impressed. Like other home computers of the same generation, the Altair 8800 came as a 
kit that required considerable skill to assemble, as well as significant knowledge of one or 
more abstruse programming languages to operate. Moritz writes that constructing and 
running the Altair required the owner “to plow through pages of arcane instructions, sort 
components from plastic bags, test the chips, wield a soldering iron, and deal with prob-
lems like a chunky power supply that was prone to overheat.”90 Even once these obstacles 
were surmounted, Moritz concludes, the Altair “didn’t do much” besides sit “on a table 
with its lights flashing.”91 
Wozniak was thrilled by the idea that regular people could have their own self-
contained computers, but he believed home computers should be more exciting, useful, 
and fun, and much easier to use. Wozniak was predictably inspired by the technical chal-
lenges of designing just such a computer, and he began spending his nights at Hewlett-
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Packard testing components, assembling hardware, and writing software. His designs cen-
tered around a recently developed computer component, the microprocessor chip, a rela-
tively compact and inexpensive circuit that Wozniak believed could run an entire com-
puter system, including a keyboard and monitor. Even so, the entire system would still be 
small enough to sit on a desk and affordable enough for an average consumer to buy.92 
When he showed a prototype to Jobs in the summer of 1975, Jobs quickly became preoc-
cupied with the business possibilities represented by a self-contained desktop computer 
that would not require consumers to wire together circuit boards. Wozniak had unsurpris-
ingly neglected to consider the business prospects of his computer design, which would 
become the Apple I, the first device manufactured and sold by the Apple Computer Com-
pany. “I designed the Apple I because I wanted to give it away for free to other people,” 
Wozniak said, and he made good on his word by passing out schematics at Homebrew 
Computer Club meetings.93 
Jobs, however, was able to convince Wozniak that they should go into business 
together. At first, Wozniak was dubious whether they could make money, but Jobs em-
ployed another strategy, suggesting that it would be incredible just to own and run a 
business together as friends, an argument that appealed directly to Wozniak’s sensibilities. 
“I was excited to think about it like that,” he later told Isaacson. “To be two best friends 
starting a company. Wow. I knew right then that I’d do it. How could I not?”94 On an-
other level, the idea of putting computer power in the hands of average people appealed to 
the friends’ desires to thumb their noses at the status quo. As John Sculley would later say, 
Jobs began to see himself as “a passionate folk hero whose enduring dream was to allow 
individuals the power that only large corporations and institutions were able to wield,” a 
feat he and Wozniak would accomplish “by personalizing the computer, once a distant, 
nearly ominous abstraction in the form of large mainframes, and bringing it down to 
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scale so it could rest on a person’s desktop.”95 Possessed with visions of owning their own 
company and shaking up the social distribution of computer power, Jobs and Wozniak 
formally entered into a business partnership in April 1976. They began assembling the 
Apple I with help from friends and relatives at Jobs’s parents’ kitchen table, testing the 
soldered circuit boards in the garage.96 
From Wozniak’s perspective, the business side of his early collaborations with Jobs 
was relatively straightforward. “Every time I’d design something great,” Wozniak recalled, 
“Steve would find a way to make money for us.”97 Their prior collaborations on the blue 
boxes and Breakout, however, revealed two key complications that would speak to Jobs’s 
later efforts to maintain managerial control over a much larger number of engineers at 
Apple. First, Jobs had revealed himself to be much more financially self-interested than 
Wozniak, and Jobs had at times found ways to manipulate Wozniak to do the things he 
wanted. However, Jobs was by no stretch of the imagination an engineer or technological 
wizard. Although he had been able to capitalize financially on his friendship with 
Wozniak, it was also clear that Apple’s early success would be almost solely dependent 
upon Wozniak’s ability to deliver innovative technological designs. For a while, though, 
their productive symbiosis continued. After Jobs and Wozniak managed to clear a profit 
on the Apple I, which they sold as an assembled circuit board in electronics shops 
throughout Silicon Valley, the pair moved on to a more ambitious project—a prepackaged 
desktop computer that consumers could truly plug in and use as soon as they brought it 
home from the store. 
Jobs’s compelling vision of a commercially marketed consumer computer and 
Wozniak’s brilliant design for the device impressed some key financial backers, so the pair 
dissolved their partnership to reform as Apple Computer, Inc., in January 1977 under 
Mike Markulla’s guidance.98 Markulla was a thirty-three-year-old former Intel executive 
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who came out of early retirement to serve as the new corporation’s chairman of the 
board.99 Once again, however, it had been difficult to convince Wozniak that moving 
Apple in a more ambitious business direction was a good idea. He bemoaned leaving his 
stable job at Hewlett-Packard, where he clearly understood his responsibilities. “I felt very 
insecure in starting a company where I would be expected to push people around and con-
trol what they did,” he commented, revealing a distinct personal distaste for managerial 
duties.100 He finally agreed to join Apple as an engineer in much the same official capacity 
he held at Hewlett-Packard, but just as he disdained becoming a manager, he would prove 
incredibly difficult to manage. 
At first, everything went swimmingly. Wozniak delivered the design for the Apple 
II, which debuted in 1977 as part of the first class of full-fledged personal computers, 
alongside the Commodore PET (Personal Electronic Transactor) and the TRS-80, manu-
factured by Tandy–Radio Shack. These were the first commercially available computers to 
include the core features that came to define personal computing: customers purchased 
them fully assembled and contained within an enclosed case; each included a standard 
QWERTY keyboard; users interacted with the computer through a text- and graphics-
based visual interface, displayed on a conventional television or special monitor; and the 
computers could run either commercial software or the user’s own programs out of the 
box.101 The Apple II was the only member of the trinity able to produce color graphics, 
and it benefited from a strong contingent of third-party software as well as a reputation 
among consumers for usability and reliability.102 The computer was undeniably the core of 
Apple’s growth and profitability well into the 1980s. Indeed, the Apple II initiated a line 
of computers that would endure almost seventeen years, surviving the tenures of four 
CEOs and many company crises before it was finally discontinued at the end of 1993.103 
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But after designing the first Apple II, Wozniak’s dependable and creative produc-
tivity suddenly dissipated. When the Apple II first shipped, programs had to be loaded us-
ing a cassette tape drive, a clunky and imprecise technology. IBM had created a much 
faster and more dependable alternative, the floppy disk drive, but Apple needed Wozniak 
to engineer a proprietary version. Although Apple promised the drive to customers before 
the end of 1977, Wozniak took a cavalier attitude toward the project, and did not begin 
designing the device until the very final weeks of the year. Recalling his earlier push to 
finish Breakout, Wozniak completed the project over a few sleepless weeks. Rob Holt, a 
new executive at Apple, commented that Wozniak was revealing an unhealthy relation-
ship to motivation: “It was…as if he needed the adrenaline spike of almost being late in 
order to really create.”104 Although engineers at Apple and beyond were very impressed 
with the design, the lateness of Wozniak’s delivery was not ideal for business. The subcon-
tractor that Apple hired to manufacture the drives turned out a slipshod product, but Ap-
ple still needed to rush the drives to market to satisfy anxious consumers. Apple’s own en-
gineers therefore “cannibalized parts” from the malfunctioning drives to cobble together 
functional units, which took up all the time they had intended to use to write a full set of 
instructions for the device.105 Lacking proper documentation, many customers were un-
able to operate the drives. A letter from one particularly furious Apple II owner who could 
not use his drive suggested that Wozniak’s undependability could be profoundly detri-
mental to customer relations. “You fucking bastards. I bought an Apple with floppy and 
nobody, I mean nobody, in L.A. or San Diego knows how to use the sonuvabitch [sic],” 
the letter read. “Everybody talks about this great manual in the sky that is coming out 
soon??? Shit! Shit! Shit! I need this computer now in my business not next year. Fuck 
you. I hope your dog dies.”106 
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Wozniak’s lack of interest in business and financial matters, which had at times 
worked to Jobs’s advantage in the past, became much more problematic in a corporate set-
ting, where consistently productive employees were at the heart of the company’s profit-
ability. Jobs’s frustrations mounted when he found he could no longer induce his friend to 
do his bidding, a matter which came to a head when Jobs could not get Wozniak to write 
a key piece of software needed to make Apple’s operating systems more sophisticated. 
Wozniak, meanwhile, became more cognizant of Jobs’s aggressive ambitions and his will-
ingness to step on toes and to abuse employees and coworkers to get what he wanted. 
“Steve was too tough on people,” Wozniak later told Isaacson. “I wanted our company to 
feel like a family where we all had fun and shared whatever we made.”107 It was an alto-
gether thorny situation, with implications that extended well beyond the status of Jobs 
and Wozniak’s friendship. As a technician at Atari, Jobs had revealed his own scorn for 
the traditional trappings of managerial power and coworker sociability, and he thrived on 
creative collaborations with people who possessed a similar antiauthoritarian streak. Yet 
Jobs was implacable in his determination to make Apple into a powerful and wealthy cor-
poration. To do so he needed to find more dependable ways to motivate engineers like 
Wozniak—who tended to express more interest in playing around with technology than 
Apple’s financial health—without alienating them. 
Jobs hit a number of speed bumps in his quest for control over Apple’s fast-
growing workforce. Some of his struggles stemmed from his unique position within the 
company. Jobs was just shy of twenty-two when Apple incorporated in 1977, and al-
though Mike Markkula, Apple’s new chairman, was impressed with the young cofounder’s 
business drive and his astute understanding of the emerging consumer market for per-
sonal computers, he worried about Jobs’s unpredictable temperament and lack of experi-
ence. Isaacson, for example, reports that Jobs continued to refuse to wear shoes or bathe 
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regularly, sometimes relaxed by soaking his feet in the toilet at work, frequently mocked 
potential business associates at other companies, and would routinely walk up to people at 
Apple and tell them that what they were working on looked like “shit.”108 Markkula there-
fore brought on a thirty-two-year-old former colleague and a high-level manufacturing 
manager at National Semiconductor, Mike Scott, to serve as Apple’s president, while con-
vincing Jobs to take the role of vice-chairman of the board.109 In this role, Jobs had two 
primary responsibilities—to serve as the main public face of the company and to manage 
new product development—yet he lacked the absolute authority of the CEO or chairman 
of the board. 
Jobs’s lack of authority proved particularly problematic when the Apple II’s success 
began to fuel a period of rapid growth. Once the other engineers on the Apple II team 
helped put the floppy disk drive fiasco in the past, and after the executive team and their 
advertising firm, Regis McKenna, settled on an effective marketing scheme, the Apple II 
took off. Between 1978 and 1979, Apple II sales more than quadrupled; largely on the ba-
sis of these skyrocketing sales, Apple held an initial public offering of stock in 1980, which 
was the largest IPO since Ford had gone public in 1956.110 Within a few weeks, the market 
valued Apple at nearly $1.8 billion, which Moritz reports “was about twice as much as the 
combined market value of United Airlines, American Airlines, and Pan American World 
Airways.”111 It was an astounding expression of investor confidence in a company which 
effectively sold only one product, the Apple II, but it also placed incredible pressure on the 
corporation to bring a more diverse and robust product line to market. This was particu-
larly true as investors and technologists began to sense a gold rush in personal comput-
ing—riding a wave of investor speculation, personal-computer–focused startups and pro-
jects within established corporations popped up like mushrooms after rain to compete for 
a share of the brand new market.112 
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To help Apple meet its obligations to hungry shareholders, the company began 
hiring employees at a fantastic rate to fill out the ranks of new product development 
teams. Over the course of twelve weeks in 1980, for example, Apple doubled in size from 
600 to 1,200 employees.113 Many of the new hires were seasoned engineers from estab-
lished corporations where the executives and cofounders had personal ties, especially Hew-
lett-Packard, Intel, and National Semiconductor.114 Although these professionals brought 
considerable experience to the table, they tended to be older than Jobs or Wozniak, and 
they had grown accustomed to the more conservative conventions of corporate labor and 
managerial authority. It was likewise clear that more than a few new employees had joined 
Apple at least as much out of financial self-interest as out of a sense of excitement for the 
company’s mission to bring computer power the masses—Apple’s stock was hot property, 
and Moritz reports that many recruits brought a mercenary attitude to the bargaining ta-
ble, securing lucrative stock options as part of their hiring packages.115 These hiring prac-
tices sowed the seeds of a serious culture clash at Apple. Like Wozniak and Jobs, many of 
the company’s early employees lacked formal degrees or extensive employment experi-
ence at larger corporations, and Wozniak had personally recruited a number of hackers 
from the Homebrew Computer Club, such as programmer Chris Espinosa, who started 
working at Apple as its eighth employee in 1976 when he was only fourteen years old.116 
Espinosa and other members of Apple’s younger cohort were angry and offended when 
older professionals poached from other companies took up management roles and began 
treating the youngsters as undisciplined upstarts. Espinosa colorfully complained that the 
suit-wearing new hires were like “extras in Cary Grant movies,” shallow corporate opera-
tors who were only interested in how much money they could make.117 Another early em-
ployee grumbled, “We started getting people who were trying to make Apple sound and 
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smell like IBM,” the ultra-conservative corporate behemoth that had dominated the U.S. 
computing market since the 1950s.118 
Not surprisingly, Jobs himself soon ran afoul of this new cadre of more practiced, 
hard-nosed engineers. Unlike Wozniak or Apple’s early hires, these professionals were not 
easily wowed by Jobs’s rhetoric about making computing more accessible and enticing to 
average people, and given Jobs’s distinct lack of engineering or programming know-how, 
they had little interest in seeking his approval or friendship. Matters came to a head on a 
product development team that was designing a computer the company hoped would ap-
peal to deep-pocketed corporate customers. Jobs moved into a leadership role on the pro-
ject and named the computer Lisa, but the engineers responsible for the technical architec-
ture of the machine saw Jobs as an immature and arrogant dreamer. Growing tired of 
constant fights with Jobs, they went above his head to CEO Mike Scott and Apple chair-
man Mike Markkula, asking for permission to kick him off the project. Scott and Mark-
kula sided with the Lisa managers and removed Jobs from the team, but they determined 
Jobs needed an even sterner message about his behavior. In September 1980 they reorgan-
ized the company, demoting Jobs to a non-executive position which, in Isaacson’s words, 
“allowed him to remain Apple’s public face, but it meant that he had no operating con-
trol.”119 
Although Scott and Markkula’s decision to downgrade Jobs’s authority stemmed, 
at least in part, from their perception that Jobs’s conduct was causing significant opera-
tional problems, Michael Moritz and Walter Isaacson both interpret Jobs’s demotion as a 
sign that Apple was moving in the wrong direction. Moritz contends that Scott and 
Markkula believed that Jobs “needed adult supervision,” but Moritz retorts that “[t]his is 
the very last thing that rare and wonderful founders need.”120 In Moritz’s estimation, Jobs 
should have been given free rein to run Apple as he saw fit, because company founders 
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such as Jobs tend to possess a “determination and ferocity” that makes them uniquely 
qualified to lead their companies with “an owner’s instincts.”121 Isaacson takes a somewhat 
more philosophical tack, suggesting that the anxieties and pressures of Apple’s wealth had 
started to turn the heads of some of the company’s leadership team, while Jobs was search-
ing for ways to avoid the “materialistic and careerist” attitudes he believed were taking 
hold at his fast-growing corporation.122 Both Moritz and Isaacson therefore ascribe a cer-
tain purity of spirit to Jobs, contending that Apple’s other leaders failed to appreciate the 
unyieldingly idealistic aspirations Jobs possessed for his company. But the years following 
Jobs’s dismissal from the Lisa team belie these hagiographic interpretations of Jobs’s pecu-
liar brilliance. 
Jobs’s bitterness at being ejected from the Lisa project and stripped of an official 
managerial role in the company he had cofounded—following hot on the heels of his fal-
ling out with Wozniak—honed Jobs’s sense that he needed to have more complete control 
over his employees and the working environment. He took the lesson to heart that there 
were certain kinds of people who were not pliable to his managerial style—after being 
forced out of the Lisa project, Jobs therefore set his sights on the Macintosh project, a 
much smaller research team that was developing a computer intended for the general con-
sumer. As the leader of the Macintosh project, Jobs would possess precisely the kind of ab-
solute authority that Moritz and Isaacson argue he should have been given by Scott and 
Markkula in the first place. Jobs was able to build up the Macintosh team almost from 
scratch, filling it with people who were closer in temperament to Wozniak and himself, 
and due to subsequent upheavals in Apple’s executive ranks, the constraints Scott and 
Markkula placed on Jobs in September 1980 would rapidly evaporate. Yet rather than 
leading Apple into a golden age of success, Jobs would turn the Macintosh into a direct 
competitor with the Lisa, a vindictive maneuver that would nearly tear Apple apart. 
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Within the Macintosh project, Jobs did inspire incredible commitments from his employ-
ees, but his managerial tactics were determinedly abusive, manipulative, and exploitative. 
Finally, despite the ambitious pretentions of the Macintosh computer, the first version 
was a technical and commercial flop, exacerbating Apple’s business problems and leading 
to the company’s first serious layoff, costing one-fifth of Apple’s workforce their jobs. 
Nevertheless, Jobs’s management of the Macintosh project solidified his mythos as a bril-
liant innovator and business leader and profoundly influenced the overall character of la-
bor relations at Apple throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The remainder of this chapter ex-
amines these problems in detail. 
 
THE CREATION OF THE MACINTOSH AS AN ACT OF CORPORATE REBELLION 
Jobs’s leadership of the Macintosh team from 1981 to 1985 decisively shaped Ap-
ple’s company culture for a number of reasons. Under Jobs’s direction, the Macintosh 
project became a haven for engineers who venerated Wozniak and Jobs’s rebellious 
streaks, and who outwardly ascribed to the belief that designing technologies to thrill and 
empower the average person was more important than maneuvering through the ranks of 
a corporate bureaucracy or making millions off of stock options. This was therefore the 
group at Apple that most clearly emblematized the generational divide that emerged 
among white-collar professionals in the 1970s, with Macintosh team members explicitly 
exhibiting desires to achieve personal fulfillment and impact society through their work. 
Yet even though Macintosh employees tended to scorn the conventional trappings of 
corporate employment, Jobs proved canny in his ability to capitalize on their sense of dis-
affection from business concerns to fuel intense feelings of devotion to the Macintosh 
project and inspire astonishing levels of worker productivity. When John Sculley joined 
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Apple in 1983, the Macintosh team’s legendary dedication to their work encapsulated 
what he believed made Apple a unique departure from traditional corporations. After Jobs 
left Apple in 1985 in the midst of a serious company crisis, Sculley tapped key people 
from the Macintosh project to fill important leadership roles as he reorganized the corpo-
ration, and extracted a number of important management and labor relations lessons 
from the Macintosh team to guide his efforts to reinvigorate Apple’s workforce.123 Ulti-
mately, what Sculley learned from his observations of the Macintosh team shaped his no-
tions of what post-industrial professional labor should look like, and formed the basis of 
his vaunted new “social contract” between labor and management at Apple, which I ex-
amine in more detail in chapter 2. For the remainder of this chapter, however, I want to 
focus on the evolution of Jobs’s managerial tactics as the leader of the Macintosh project, 
to examine how employees responded to his aggressive and manipulative tactics, and to 
consider how employees’ defenses of Jobs have helped normalize workplace abuses within 
the technology industry. 
Once again, the key problem that motivates my analysis in this section is the my-
thology that surrounds Steve Jobs, which casts him as a business leader who bucked corpo-
rate convention to forge an innovative and unusual company. As I have argued, popular 
writers such as Isaacson and Moritz have repeatedly presented this mythology to a public 
audience, but Apple employees have also actively constructed such depictions of Jobs and 
their company. In this section, I continue to draw on Isaacson and Moritz’s interviews 
with Apple employees for worker perspectives on Jobs, but I also rely on software engineer 
Andy Hertzfeld’s comprehensive account of the Macintosh’s creation, Revolution in the 
Valley.124 These sources detail Jobs’s pervasive manipulation and abuse of employees, but 
they also normalize his behaviors—much like Steve Wozniak, the workers Jobs hired for 
the Macintosh project have consistently downplayed the seriousness of Jobs’s managerial 
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offenses. I contend that employees’ ongoing reticence to condemn Jobs’s abusive and ex-
ploitative behaviors has helped disguise his failings as a business leader, and more seriously, 
has masked many of the serious labor problems at Apple and in Silicon Valley. To chal-
lenge these relatively uncritical employee perspectives, I draw on corporate documents 
uncovered through original archival research that indicate that Job’s major managerial de-
cisions on the Macintosh project ultimately hewed to conventional corporate profit objec-
tives and labor productivity targets. I therefore argue that the seemingly unorthodox fea-
tures of Jobs’s management style were in fact superficial gestures designed to serve Apple’s 
financial interests rather than the needs or desires of employees. 
In Jobs’s own telling, he possessed several aims when he gravitated toward the 
Macintosh group after being kicked off the Lisa team and stripped of some of his execu-
tive privileges. Jobs explicitly framed his leadership style on the Macintosh project as an 
attempt to return to Apple’s feisty, iconoclastic roots. “It was like going back to the ga-
rage for me,” he later reflected. “I had my own ragtag team and I was in control.”125 At a 
Macintosh division retreat in fall 1982, he appealed directly to Apple’s start-up days to in-
spire his employees, telling them, “You know, this is the nicest place in Apple to work. It’s 
just like Apple was three years ago. If we keep this kind of pure and hire the right people, 
it’ll still be a great place to work.”126 And in many respects, the Macintosh itself was the 
Apple product that best spoke to the mission of making computer power available to the 
widest number of people. Jef Raskin, a former University of California San Diego profes-
sor, had initiated the Macintosh project in 1979 with the goal of making a personal com-
puter that would be more like an appliance, “extremely inexpensive and radically easy to 
use.”127 Isaacson writes, “Raskin’s manifestos about an inexpensive machine for the 
masses, with a simple graphic interface and clean design, stirred [Jobs’s] soul.”128  
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Another motive, however, colored Jobs’s approach to the Macintosh. He aimed to 
build a computer that could compete directly with the Lisa—Isaacson suggests that Jobs 
“wanted to beat it” as revenge for being kicked out of the project.129 The inexpensive 
computer of Raskin’s dreams could hardly outshine the powerful, business-oriented Lisa, 
so Jobs began pushing to make the Macintosh a more ambitious machine. When Raskin 
resisted, he and Jobs fought bitterly, and Raskin received the brunt of Jobs’s most abusive 
and aggressive tendencies. Raskin became so angry in early 1981 that he wrote a lengthy 
memo to the executive staff outlining his frustrations, enumerating such concerns as the 
fact that “Jobs regularly misses appointments,” “he acts without thinking and with bad 
judgment,” “he makes absurd and wasteful decisions,” “he does not keep promises or meet 
commitments,” and he “is often irresponsible and inconsiderate.”130 If Raskin hoped that 
Scott and Markkula would take his side as they had with the Lisa’s managers, he miscalcu-
lated. Raskin and his Macintosh project did not, in the executives’ eyes, hold much imme-
diate importance to Apple’s corporate objectives, and perhaps out of a desire to distract 
and console Jobs, they gave him official control of the project. Raskin soon after resigned 
from Apple. 
Jobs’s forceful takeover of the Macintosh revealed an indomitable desire for con-
trol, and indicated that he would not brook concerted challenges to his authority. Yet his 
ability to dispatch Raskin also emblematized an aspect of Jobs’s personality that the Mac-
intosh group would come to revere, even if it did inspire some fear. Jobs’s employees saw 
him as something of a corporate rebel, an individual who could stand up for what he 
wanted in the face of executives who failed to understand the true importance of the 
Macintosh. In reality, Jobs’s truly oppositional relationship to Apple leadership 
disappeared shortly after he engineered Raskin’s removal from Macintosh. Mike Scott, 
Apple’s CEO, had long ruffled feathers due to his own abrasive tendencies. Scott was, for 
example, so dependably abusive during staff meetings that the human resources 
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dependably abusive during staff meetings that the human resources department developed 
tongue-in-cheek awards “For valor and courage in the face of fire.”131 At times he would 
also terrorize random employees around the Apple campus, looming suddenly over their 
cubicle walls to bark, “Are you working your ass off?”132 By 1981, resentment toward 
Scott had grown so acute that Apple’s board asked Markkula to secure Scott’s resignation. 
For all his caustic intensity, Scott was deeply devoted to Apple, and his letter captured his 
profound sense of distress at being kicked out of the company he had helped build from 
the ground up. “I quit,” he wrote on July 17, 1981, “not resign to join a new company or 
retire for personal reasons…. This is not done for those who fear my opinions and style, 
but for the loyal ones who may be given false hope…. I have always loved and cared for 
those at Apple. That responsibility will never end.”133 
In part to disguise from investors the acrimonious nature of Scott’s sudden dis-
missal, Markkula took over Apple’s presidency, while Jobs assumed Markkula’s former po-
sition as chairman of the board, a shift that returned Jobs to the kind of powerful senior 
executive role that he had lost a mere ten months prior as retribution for his poor behavior 
on the Lisa project. Jobs’s newfound authority was particularly enhanced, Isaacson notes, 
because Markkula was a “rather passive president.”134 As Moritz assesses Scott’s departure, 
“he took with him the thread of discipline that had run through the company…and a 
rough relish for strapping Jobs into a corporate straitjacket.”135 It is a testament to Jobs’s 
charisma that the Macintosh group would continue to buy in to his persona as a rebellious 
corporate outsider when there were in fact few meaningful checks on his authority. In-
deed, as chairman, Jobs had remarkably free rein to shape the character of the Macintosh 
group as he saw fit, and to pit the project more aggressively against the Lisa computer and 
other teams at Apple. 
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Although Jobs’s personality inflected almost every aspect of daily life on the Mac-
intosh project, employees on the team were also inspired by Wozniak’s approaches to 
work and computer design. The Macintosh software engineer Andy Hertzfeld offers 
many insights into how these attitudes and aspirations intersected with Jobs’s ambitions 
to inspire worker productivity and to build a commercially successful computer. For 
Hertzfeld personally, the decisive factor in his decision to work for Apple stemmed from 
the ostensible purity of spirit with which Wozniak approached computer design, an aura 
which Hertzfeld deduced from his first encounter with an Apple II. “The best purchase of 
my life occurred in January 1978,” Hertzfeld recalled, “when I spent $1295 plus tax, most 
of my life savings at the time, on an Apple II microcomputer (serial number 1703) with 
16K bytes of RAM.” For Hertzfeld, Wozniak’s hand was palpable in the machine, which 
he said possessed “an ineffable quality that went beyond mere [technical] features.” The 
more Hertzfeld used the computer, the more it seemed full of “magic”: “it became clear to 
me this was no ordinary product: the coding style was crazy, whimsical, and outrageous, 
just like every other part of the design—especially the hi-res color graphic screen. It was 
clearly the work of a passionate artist.” This computer, Hertzfeld averred, transcended the 
status of mere consumer object. “Even though the Apple II was overflowing with both 
technical and marketing genius, the best thing about it was the spirit of its creation,” 
Hertzfeld claimed. “It was not conceived or designed as a commercial product in the usual 
sense.” In the end, Hertzfeld felt an insatiable urge to experience firsthand the source of 
the magic. “I became so obsessed with the Apple II,” he professed, “that I had to go to 
work at the place that created it. I abandoned graduate school and started work as a sys-
tems programmer at Apple in August 1979.”136 
According to Hertzfeld, he wanted to work for Apple not only because he was so 
impressed by the computers the company designed, but because he believed that the work-
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ing environment at the corporation was not completely beholden to traditional business 
concerns. Upon arrival, however, Hertzfeld sensed that something was amiss. Although 
Apple only employed about 250 people when he took up his job in 1979—a mere two 
years after the debut of the magical Apple II—the company seemed to be evolving in 
ways that contravened the values that Hertzfeld had perceived in his Apple II computer. 
He noted that the teams that had been put together to develop two new computer systems 
for Apple “were organized in a conventional fashion, with seasoned computer industry 
veterans recruited from companies like Hewlett-Packard coordinating dozens of engineers 
and marketing folks across multiple layers of management.”137 Hertzfeld, along with 
many of his young colleagues, found this kind of bureaucracy distasteful, and he began to 
worry that “Apple’s original freewheeling style was waning.”138 
Hertzfeld became particularly disenchanted in February 1981, when then-CEO 
Mike Scott suddenly terminated a number of employees in an event that came to be 
known as “Black Wednesday,” justifying the layoffs with the argument that “the com-
pany had grown much too fast over the last year and had made a few key bad hires, who 
themselves had hired even worse people.”139 Yet Hertzfeld thought the firings were scatter-
shot, which included his only colleague on an important coding project, whom Hertzfeld 
maintained was talented and dependable. Another worker recounted Scott’s bizarre be-
havior at the post-layoff company debrief in an office basement. Scott stood next to a keg 
with a plastic cup of beer in hand and opened the meeting by quipping, “I used to say that 
when being CEO at Apple wasn’t fun any more, I’d quit. But now I’ve changed my 
mind—when it isn’t fun any more, I’ll fire people until it’s fun again.”140 Hertzfeld com-
plained to a senior manager that “a Stalin-like purge was not a valid way to run a com-
pany,” and suggested that it had shaken his faith in the corporation’s mission to the point 
where he “wasn’t so sure about Apple’s values anymore.”141 Hertzfeld said that he might 
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quit, a threat that earned him a personal meeting with Scott the next day, where Hertzfeld 
indicated he would be much happier if he could move from the Apple II division to the 
Macintosh project. After a very brief interview with Jobs, Hertzfeld was added to team. 
Hertzfeld had first heard about the Macintosh project in 1979, when it was “a tiny 
research effort to design an easy-to-use, low-cost, consumer oriented computer.”142 This 
was the kind of undertaking that thrilled Hertzfeld. He was enamored with the Apple II, 
but admitted that “it was still much too hard for most non-technical people to master.”143 
With the Macintosh, Hertzfeld said, “We thought we had a chance to create a product that 
could make computers useful to ordinary people and thereby truly change the world.”144 In 
Hertzfeld’s estimation, then, the original motivation behind the Macintosh was not mak-
ing money. Instead, the goal was to give people who were intimidated by technology an 
opportunity to share in the wonders and power of computing, which Hertzfeld (and oth-
ers like him) found so personally transformative. In a reciprocal gesture, Steve Wozniak 
credits Hertzfeld and his colleagues from the Macintosh project with preserving the values 
that he wanted to be at the heart of Apple: “It’s chilling to recall how this cast of young 
and inexperienced people who cared more than anything about doing great things created 
what is perhaps the key technology of our lives…. [They] take me back to those rare days 
when the rules of innovation were guided by internal rewards, and not by money.”145 
These kinds of comments polish the mythology that passionate engineers inside 
Apple possessed pure intentions, however aggressively company managers pushed for 
worker productivity or Apple competed with other corporations for shares of the lucrative 
personal computer market. In this strand of corporate folklore, technologists such as 
Hertzfeld and Wozniak merely hoped to create enchanting and useful technologies. An 
Apple employee orientation manual indicated that the love of technology and the belief 
that computers could revolutionize society were important components of official com-
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pany culture: “Our vision and products make us the number one inspirational force in the 
romance between people and computers. This is what most of us came here to do. It’s the 
key to changing the world.”146 Of course, even the starriest-eyed employees recognized the 
business implications of designing a computer that would inspire the passions of average 
consumers. As Wozniak himself told an interviewer in 1981, “most people aren’t pro-
grammers at all—nor inclined to become them. And yet, these nonprogrammers com-
prise the real market that the personal computer industry must reach and serve.”147 
Thus, although rhetoric about a higher social purpose helped underwrite Hertzfeld’s 
and others’ faith in Apple and the Macintosh project, the notion that he or his colleagues 
were entirely dispassionate about money matters has to be taken with a grain of salt. By 
all accounts, employee obsessions with Apple’s corporate wealth were an almost inescap-
able feature of company life in the early 1980s. When Sculley arrived at Apple in 1983, he 
perceived that workers at Apple and in the high-tech industry more broadly were such en-
thusiastic laborers because they hoped to achieve the luxurious lifestyles of their wealthier 
bosses and colleagues. “Young people lived high,” he observed, “on their pay and stock 
options and especially their mounting debt.”148 Despite Sculley’s professed reservations 
about the sustainability of Apple’s early growth, Apple management reinforced employee 
preoccupations with corporate finances by hanging bulletin boards in every Apple build-
ing that posted the latest stock price every hour.149 Although the inequitable distribution of 
stock to employees had irked many during Apple’s earliest years, once the company went 
public, all employees working more than twenty hours per week were given the option to 
purchase stock through paycheck deductions, linking their personal aspirations ever more 
closely to the company’s market valuation.150 As one worker avowed, “I learned as much 
about stock and taxes at Apple as I did about computers.”151 An employee recruitment 
brochure likewise indicated that no matter how excited workers might be about Apple’s 
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products and company mission, the value of their compensation was never far from their 
minds. Speaking to employee motivation and retention, the brochure proclaimed, “It All 
Begins With Money,” reasoning that “Apple Employees are special people,” and needed 
to be rewarded with “the industry’s most aggressive benefits and compensation pro-
gram.”152 And despite Hertzfeld’s protestations that he and his colleagues were initially 
paid modestly and had to fight hard for raises to reflect their actual responsibilities on the 
Macintosh project, members of the team later ruffled feathers throughout the company 
when it came to light that they were receiving special bonuses, perks, and fringe benefits 
as compensation for their work on the project.153  
Yet Hertzfeld’s insistence that love rather than money inspired his devotion to the 
Macintosh indicated an important dynamic of his relationship to Apple Computer, Inc. 
Arne Kalleberg writes that in the 1970s, young professionals’ mounting demands for 
more satisfying modes of labor and scornful attitudes toward anything that smacked of 
corporate conformity raised “fears among the media, social scientists, and managers about 
possible widespread ‘alienation’ from work.”154 Some of Hertzfeld’s early experiences at 
Apple, such as the company’s growing bureaucracy and the Black Wednesday layoffs, cer-
tainly threatened to alienate him from the corporation. That is not to say that Hertzfeld 
and others who shared his dispositions lacked financial aspirations, but they were much 
more conflicted about understanding their motivations through a monetary lens, and 
thus constantly sought confirmation that their work was more socially meaningful than 
the kind of labor that simply enriched a corporation. For example, when Bill Atkinson, 
another key programmer on the Macintosh project, described his motivations for writing 
software at Apple, he said, “This is coming from inside me. It’s not coming for fame and 
glory. It’s not coming from money. I’ve got enough of that.”155 “I use computer code as 
my artistic medium to express myself, to leave my mark on the world,” he elaborated, “to 
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steer the world in ways that I will be able to tell my grandchildren I made a small contri-
bution.”156 
In the early 1980s, however, Hertzfeld revealed a deeper sense of confusion about 
the nature of work at Apple. He told Moritz that when he was in graduate school he had 
possessed a hacker’s ethos and never considered programming for pay, but he had been 
surprised to learn what kind of salary he could earn by switching to private industry. 
“Now I’ve been corrupted by money,” he mused, “and by thinking how much I can 
make.”157 Jobs cannily recognized Hertzfeld’s conflicted motivations. As Jobs told Moritz, 
Hertzfeld “is struggling with himself. He wants to make some money and he wants to be 
famous.”158 Beyond seeing himself as the kind of wealthy, Silicon Valley celebrity 
Hertzfeld supposedly wanted to emulate, Jobs also found other kinds of psychological 
wages which spoke more directly to the anti-corporate suspicions of Hertzfeld and the rest 
of the Macintosh team. 
Jobs’s personality and background made his psychological appeals more convinc-
ing to Hertzfeld and the rest of the Macintosh group. For one, Jobs had long harbored his 
own suspicions about traditional corporate life. “I didn’t want to be a businessman,” he 
told Moritz, “because all the businessmen I knew I didn’t want to be like,” and he report-
edly sorted through his reservations about founding a company with Kobin Chino, a 
monk at the San Francisco Zen Center.159 From the beginning Jobs therefore knew he did 
not want Apple to be a stereotypical, button-down firm—he did not want to work with 
suit-wearing corporate climbers, nor did he want to become such a creature himself. The 
offices that housed the Macintosh most obviously reflected this sensibility, as did the 
working culture that grew up among the group. Hertzfeld recalled that remote controlled 
vehicles were constantly whizzing around underfoot, and that spontaneous Nerf gun bat-
tles would often break out among coworkers, leading a number of employees to augment 
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their cubicles with cardboard extensions to offer a tactical advantage during the fights.160 A 
photograph of the project’s common area likewise shows employees engaged in a vigorous 
game of ping-pong, huddled around an arcade console, and playing on a grand piano.161 
Despite such diversions, one afternoon Jobs found himself worrying that the “offices 
didn’t seem lively enough,” so he shelled out for the group to buy a stereo system so they 
could listen to music while working.162 Other Macintosh rituals became company-wide 
traditions, such as the Friday afternoon “beer busts,” when everyone would put down their 
work to relax and carouse around the Apple campus—this kind of environment, Jobs told 
Sculley, “intentionally attracted the dissidents who wouldn’t fit into corporate Amer-
ica.”163 
These comments implied that Apple, despite its inclusion in the Fortune 500, was 
a breed apart from other powerful companies during the 1980s, and a 1987 version of the 
Apple Values enshrined Jobs’s management philosophies and the Macintosh project’s 
playful workplace traditions as key aspects of Apple’s official culture: “We recognize also 
that rewards must be psychological as well as financial, and strive for an atmosphere where 
each individual can share the adventure and excitement of working at Apple.”164 But re-
searchers such as Fred Turner and Thomas Frank have demonstrated that established cor-
porations and even some ranks of the federal military research bureaucracy had begun 
recognizing the importance of more creative modes of work decades before Apple was 
founded, and in reality, much of the impetus for insisting that Apple was a unique corpo-
ration simply stemmed from a realization that employees like Andy Hertzfeld wanted to 
believe that their company flouted corporate traditions.165 As we will soon see, however, 
Apple’s corporate rhetoric and managerial tactics were explicitly designed to achieve the 
conventional corporate goals of heightening employee loyalty to the company and en-
hancing their productive output. Sustaining employees’ perceptions that they were valued 
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beyond their contributions to Apple’s bottom line was therefore a complex and ongoing 
effort. 
Within the Macintosh group, Jobs found several effective personal ways to suggest 
that the team’s efforts went well beyond the normal dimensions of corporate labor. He 
created an especially symbolic moment for the project in February 1982, when the group 
finalized the design of the Macintosh’s case, an important milestone for the computer. 
Demonstrating a flair for theatrics, Jobs convened the team for a special celebration where 
he declared, “Real artists sign their work.”166 Calling each member of the group individu-
ally by name, he collected their signatures so they could be etched into the molding cast 
and imprinted inside the Macintosh case. “Though most customers would never see them 
because a special tool was required to open the case,” Hertzfeld noted, “we would take 
pride in knowing our names were in there.”167 After Jobs signed last, the team uncorked a 
few bottles of champagne. The whole affair impressed upon Hertzfeld that the overarching 
“goal was never to beat the competition or to make a lot of money; it was to do the great-
est thing possible, or even a little greater.”168 Bill Atkinson, another senior software engi-
neer on the project, similarly remarked, “With moments like this, [Jobs] got us seeing our 
work as art.”169 Hertzfeld evidently took the artist label so seriously that his title on his Ap-
ple business cards read “Software Artist,” while Burrell Smith, the chief hardware engineer 
on the Macintosh, took the more whimsical title, “Hardware Wizard.”170 
Jobs also imparted the playful and artistic pretentions of the Macintosh group with 
a more subversive, rebellious edge. This stemmed in part from Jobs’s personal vendetta 
against the Lisa project. Soon after seizing control of the Macintosh, Jobs publicly bet 
John Couch, the leader of the Lisa group, that Macintosh would ship before the Lisa.171 It 
was a brazen wager, given that the Lisa had been in development for two years under the 
direction of experienced engineers and managers, while the Macintosh had been the re-
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sponsibility of a miniscule research group and was rapidly changing tack to fit Jobs’s de-
sires for a much more ambitious machine. Yet the maneuver indicated Jobs’s willingness 
to compete with—and even undermine—people within Apple who upset him or got in his 
way. Despite the egotistical overtones of Jobs’s wager (and the Macintosh group’s clear 
recognition that they could never finish their computer before the Lisa), competition with 
the Lisa project resonated strongly with many Macintosh employees—they saw the Lisa as 
a somewhat debased departure from the kind of computer Apple should be designing.172 
The Lisa was explicitly conceived as a gambit to win customers in corporate America, at 
banks, financial firms, insurance companies—the very kinds of business environments 
Macintosh employees despised. As Moritz reports, the attention lavished on the Lisa pro-
ject in the late 1970s and early 1980s made many of Apple’s younger employees feel like 
“an underclass,” left to grumble “that if they had wanted to make business computers they 
would have joined IBM.”173 The Macintosh’s open competition with the Lisa served as an 
effective rallying cry, inspiring Macintosh group members to see their work as a return to 
Apple’s original values of serving regular people rather than powerful, conservative com-
panies. 
There was more than a hint of elitism in Jobs’s cultivation of antagonistic and re-
bellious orientations for the Macintosh group. The way he handled Hertzfeld’s transfer to 
the team was illustrative. After a brief interview, Jobs asked a few colleagues for their opin-
ions on Hertzfeld and decided he was good enough to join the Macintosh project. He 
dropped by Hertzfeld’s cubicle late on a Thursday afternoon to tell him he was now a 
member of the Macintosh team. Hertzfeld was thrilled, and said he just needed the rest of 
Thursday and Friday to tie up a few loose ends and pass his current project off to another 
member of the Apple II team. “What’s more important than working on the Macintosh?” 
Jobs scoffed. He continued, “you’re just wasting your time with that! Who cares about the 
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Apple II? The Apple II will be dead in a few years…. The Macintosh is the future of Apple, 
and you’re going to start on it now!”174 To Hertzfeld’s surprise, Jobs yanked his Apple II’s 
power cord straight out of the socket, erasing the code he had been writing. Jobs quickly 
bundled up the computer and monitor and started carrying them away, telling Hertzfeld 
to follow him to his new workspace. They drove a few blocks in Jobs’s car to the Macin-
tosh headquarters, where Jobs set down Hertzfeld’s computer on a desk and welcomed him 
to the team before disappearing. As Hertzfeld settled in, he “was surprised to see [the desk] 
was still full of someone else’s stuff.”175 It turned out Hertzfeld had taken over Jef Raskin’s 
old space—Raskin had just been ejected from the Macintosh project, and had not yet 
cleared out his belongings. 
Although Jobs’s single-minded belief that only the Macintosh mattered revealed 
an egotistical bent to his pursuits, his recruitment strategies were also carefully calculated 
to build a team that would be amenable to his particular management style. Having failed 
to dominate the Lisa team’s more conservative corporate operatives, Jobs explicitly 
searched for candidates whom he felt would respond to the Macintosh project’s anti-
corporate look and feel. After joining the team, Hertzfeld sat in on several interviews with 
potential Macintosh recruits, and remembered Jobs’s pointed attempts to feel out whether 
interviewees would be comfortable in an unconventional working environment. In one 
particularly memorable interview with an “extremely straight-laced and uptight” prospect, 
who, Hertzfeld said, “dressed more like an insurance salesman than a technologist,” Jobs 
seemed to take a particular delight in the candidate’s discomfort.176 Among the inquiries 
Jobs floated were, “How old were you when you lost your virginity?” and “How many 
times have you taken LSD?”177 The candidate blanched, and fell back on lengthy descrip-
tions of his technological expertise in an attempt to redirect the session. But Jobs had 
made up his mind, and cut off the interviewee by gobbling like a turkey. For Hertzfeld, 
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the lesson was clear. Technological prowess was not enough to make the cut on the Mac-
intosh project. Thus, while Everett Rogers and Judith Larsen cite the tech industry maxim 
that “[m]eritocracy reigns supreme in Silicon Valley,” the elitism of the Macintosh project 
went even further—Jobs’s palpable derision for non-Macintosh members gave the team 
the impression that they were part of an elect cadre of professionals, each possessing some 
unique trait of personality or attitude that made them fit to work on such a groundbreak-
ing project.178 In other words, being chosen to work on the Macintosh project was more 
than a recognition of expertise and hard work—it marked each team member as a person 
who did not cow to corporate convention. 
Jobs stunned and impressed the Macintosh group with other well-staged floutings 
of business etiquette. When, for example, Adam Osborne, the head of a competing per-
sonal computer company, made some flippant criticisms about Jobs and the Macintosh, 
Jobs called Osborne’s office in front of an audience of several Macintosh employees. Os-
borne’s secretary informed Jobs that her boss was unavailable, but she asked if she could 
take a message. Jobs said she could. “Here’s my message,” he announced. “Tell Adam he’s 
an asshole.” Pausing for effect, Jobs continued, “Tell him the Macintosh is so good that 
he’s probably going to buy a few for his children even though it put his company out of 
business!”179 The phone call caused the Macintosh team endless amusement, and spurred 
their desire to make their computer as incredible as possible in order to subdue naysayers 
like Osborne. As the Macintosh group continued to grow over the years, old hands would 
ask Jobs to repeat the story to new hires, transforming the anecdote into an important 
thread in the project’s folklore.180 
The Macintosh group as a whole readily took on Jobs’s maverick coloring, avidly 
creating their own symbols to thumb their noses at the corporate establishment that was 
ostensibly taking root throughout the rest of Apple. In 1983, as the team moved to larger 
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offices to accommodate the growing scope of the project, they fabricated a black skull-
and-crossbones flag, replete with a rainbow-colored, apple-shaped eye patch, and hoisted it 
over their new building.181 The idea for the flag evidently stemmed from one of the “Say-
ings from Chairman Jobs,” Jobs’s own tongue-in-cheek title for his oft-repeated apho-
risms: “It’s better to be a pirate than join the navy.”182 For his part, Hertzfeld gleefully re-
membered a workplace scuffle when a few members of the Macintosh team had to make a 
foray into the Lisa building to recover the flag from some thieves on the competing pro-
ject.183 
Under Jobs’s direction, the Macintosh project thus became an environment that 
spoke directly and intimately to employee desires to escape the trappings of conventional 
corporate life, yet the overarching outcomes of Jobs’s managerial style were intensified 
employee commitments to work, decreased resistance to excessive managerial demands, 
increased personal identifications with Jobs, and a decline in worker solidarity across Ap-
ple. In other words, by appealing to anti-corporate sentiment, Jobs was rather ironically 
able to transform the Macintosh team into devoted corporate warriors, ready to pour 
themselves heart and soul into developing the computer, and to jump to Jobs’s exacting 
demands. The group proudly embraced emblems of work as the most fulfilling and impor-
tant aspect of their lives, notoriously donning T-shirts emblazoned with the declaration, 
“Working ninety hours a week and loving it!”184 
The labor productivity implications of such deep identifications with work were 
not lost upon John Sculley when he joined Apple, nor did they escape the notice of Ap-
ple’s human resources department. Towards the end of 1983, Sculley’s first year as CEO, 
Apple’s runaway growth hiccupped during the first serious contraction of the personal 
computer market. As a result, Sculley found himself fighting fires on multiple fronts, but 
he continually drew solace and inspiration from Macintosh team’s energy. After hours, he 
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and Jobs would wander through the building, which Sculley described as “a stimulating 
respite from some of my other administrative tasks.”185 “No matter how problematic the 
competition or our internal troubles,” he continued, “my spirit rebounded when I strolled 
into the Macintosh building.”186 Drawing again on comparisons to the 1960s countercul-
ture, Sculley found “the peace and love sentiments these kids had absorbed” endlessly in-
vigorating, as he watched them build a computer that reflected “[t]heir abiding faith…in 
the power of tools made available to everyone.”187 In Sculley’s eyes, the Macintosh “was 
the collective personification of a small group of pioneers who were about to open a new 
frontier for individuals. The product changed their lives, and we believed it would start to 
change the lives of others as soon as it debuted at our shareholders’ meeting on January 
23,” 1984.188 The relationship between the Macintosh group’s passion for the product and 
their compulsive productivity was never far from Sculley’s mind. “Even at midnight,” he 
observed, the Macintosh building “was a place that burst alive with activity.”189 “For this 
team,” he averred, “work became…the ultimate seduction,” a reflection of how effectively 
“Steve made the Macintosh their product.”190 For Sculley, his early experiences watching 
the Macintosh group work passionately through the night epitomized Apple’s special rela-
tionship to its workforce. 
What Jobs intrinsically recognized—and what Sculley and Apple’s other leaders 
came to appreciate—was that by blurring the boundaries between work, fun, and play, 
and by inspiring a sense of social mission around computer technologies, Apple could 
push its employees to work much harder than most companies. Again, Jobs’s insights were 
not exactly novel, but his managerial style did speak incredibly effectively to the social 
commitments and professional aspirations of white-collar workers in the latter decades of 
the twentieth century. Yet underneath the excitement of the Macintosh project, Jobs’s 
aims were far from revolutionary. His ultimate goal was to build a devoted workforce that 
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was willing to more or less give over their entire lives to work at Apple, and internal cor-
porate documents suggest that Jobs was very successful at extracting productive labor 
from his employees. 
For example, a 1984 company publication, Inside Apple, asserted that the corpora-
tion’s remarkable financial success derived from a loose organizational structure of “en-
trepreneurial team[s], in which each person makes a difference.” The document contin-
ued, “To have achieved annual sales of $1 billion with fewer than 5,000 employees dem-
onstrates the importance of each individual’s contributions. Most billion dollar companies 
have twice as many employees and are proud of adding more. But at Apple, we believe 
that small teams are more effective—and more fun.”191 A 1985 follow-up, Welcome to the 
World of Apple, described even more impressive figures. Reporting that Apple employed 
about 6,000 people worldwide, the document stated that “this relatively small group of 
people has built a $2 billion enterprise that’s growing by the minute,” which the publica-
tion claimed gave Apple “the highest productivity ratio in the personal computer indus-
try.”192 Thus, while Jobs seemed eager to cater to the anti-authoritarian and unconven-
tional tastes of the Macintosh group, an all too conventional corporate goal inspired his 
managerial tactics: extracting the maximum amount of labor from each employee for the 
lowest possible cost. When certain strategies failed to inspire higher productivity, Jobs sus-
pended them. Moritz writes, for example, that Jobs had originally allowed members of the 
Macintosh team to work from home, but when this policy “failed to achieve the necessary 
results,” he sent out a memo that read, “When I agreed to totally flexible hours it was with 
the stated assumption that it was the most efficient way to get a very professional quality 
of work done. This group has not demonstrated that quality in the last 60 days.”193 The 
very next day, Jobs snapped, everyone needed to return to a regular workday schedule at 
the office. 
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To an outside observer like Moritz, such moments revealed the darker edges to 
Jobs’s managerial style and the Macintosh group’s remarkable commitments to the pro-
ject. When Moritz would drop by the offices on the weekend, he often discovered various 
members of the team laboring away, typically with little or no sleep, on the more intrac-
table or complex aspects of computer design and programming. Sudden ultimatums from 
Jobs frequently inspired these after-hours sessions, such as the Friday afternoon that Jobs 
announced he wanted to get rid of the Macintosh’s sound chips unless all the bugs were 
worked by Monday. The engineers who saw the ability to produce sound as an essential 
feature of the computer devoted the entire weekend to troubleshooting so they could pre-
serve their vision of the machine.194 Several members of the group, Moritz wrote, “had 
suspended the rest of their lives until they completed Macintosh,” forgoing romantic rela-
tionships, family life, time off, and in some cases, even the basic pleasures of friendship. 
The hardware engineer Burrell Smith told Moritz, “Having friends is orthogonal to de-
signing computers. When they call, I find myself hanging up on them.”195 
Donn Denmann, a programmer for the Macintosh, likewise revealed how the 
team used the many diversions throughout the office to fuel maniacal levels of productiv-
ity and to manage stress and exhaustion. “Working 90 hours a week,” he wrote, “requires 
frequent and highly effective work breaks.”196 The Defender video game console in the 
group’s common area, he recalled, became a particularly important focus of attention for 
many members of the team. When employees found their attention drifting, they would 
frequently challenge coworkers to head-to-head matches on the machine, as they “found 
that competitive play gave us a jolt of adrenaline and a refreshed mindset when we re-
sumed work.”197 At other times, group members would use the game to assess “current 
mental capacity”—if a player could not progress past level two, Denman remarked, this 
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provided a clear indication that it was finally time to give in to bodily demands and sleep 
for at least a few hours.198 
Along with pushing themselves to meet the productivity expectations of their ex-
acting superior, employees in the Macintosh group enforced their own status hierarchy 
based on perceived commitments to the project. These tacit notions about relative status 
rose to the surface in Hertzfeld’s tense relationship with Bob Bellville, who was hired in 
May 1982 to manage the Macintosh software team. Belleville had previously worked as a 
hardware engineer at Xerox, and he brought a much more traditional sense of managerial 
hierarchies to his role at Apple. On a team where Jobs encouraged employees to see them-
selves as artists and rebellious pirates, Belleville’s style was an awkward fit. During a per-
formance review in early 1983, Belleville personally attacked Hertzfeld for challenging his 
rank. “You are consistently insubordinate,” Belleville told Hertzfeld, “and you don’t have 
any respect for lines of authority. I think you are undermining everybody else on the 
software team. You are too big for your britches.”199 Hertzfeld began crying, but he 
pressed Belleville to explain himself. It soon became apparent that the root of the problem 
was Jobs. “Whenever there’s something you don’t like,” Belleville said, “even little things, 
you go running straight to Steve, and he interferes…. It’s making it so I can’t do my 
job.”200 Hertzfeld retorted, “I can’t stop Steve from coming around,” and explained that it 
was common for Jobs to drop by after regular working hours to chat and check up on the 
progress of the Macintosh, when many of the younger engineers were still in the office. 
While Hertzfeld felt he was heroically performing the work of at least two people, he 
noted rather snidely that Belleville was never around for the late-night sessions “because 
he had to get home to his wife and two young daughters.”201 
Hertzfeld ultimately attributed the friction to a difference in style, saying, “I wor-
shiped at the altar of the Apple II and romanticized my work, seeing it more as a calling 
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than a job,” whereas Belleville was simply “determined to instill a modicum of order and 
predictability” into the organization as it grew.202 Yet even though Hertzfeld saw his resis-
tance to Belleville as a sure marker of his inability to exist within a conventional corporate 
environment, he was in fact deeply entangled in a different kind of corporate power. Un-
der the seductive, seemingly anti-corporate sway of Jobs and the Macintosh group, 
Hertzfeld had become thoroughly convinced that his work was more than labor for mere 
pay. This belief underwrote Hertzfeld’s enthusiasm about spending nearly every waking 
hour at Apple, as well as his scorn for coworkers who treated their jobs as a traditional 9-
to-5 engagement. While Hertzfeld had hoped to escape the clutches of corporate servi-
tude, his strong personal identification with his job had in fact made him intimately be-
holden to an expanded range of workplace demands. 
Indeed, the Macintosh group’s compulsive overwork only scratched the surface of 
the more troubling labor politics that took hold on the project. Jobs’s motivational tactics 
were not all playful or inspirational—he frequently revealed a cruel and abusive side, espe-
cially when his demands were particularly unreasonable. Yet members of the Macintosh 
group consistently downplayed the seriousness of Jobs’s verbal and emotional assaults on 
employees. When Hertzfeld first joined the Macintosh team, another software engineer, 
Bud Tribble, warned him about Jobs’s tendency to attack employees’ work with merciless 
criticism or to lavish praise upon it, and then to switch positions rapidly. “[J]ust because 
[Jobs] tells you something is awful or great,” Tribble said, “it doesn’t necessarily mean 
he’ll feel that way tomorrow.”203 Tribble also warned Hertzfeld that Jobs was “really funny 
about ideas,” usually responding to new employee proposals for the Macintosh by calling 
them “stupid.” “But then,” Tribble revealed, “if he actually likes it, exactly one week later, 
he’ll come back to you and propose your idea to you, as if he thought of it.”204  
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Taking credit for employee ideas was just one mechanism that Jobs used to assert 
his total control over the project. Debi Coleman, who managed the finances of the pro-
ject, suggested it was almost impossible to resist Jobs’s dizzying ability to switch sides or 
distort reality, even once the Macintosh team had recognized the phenomena. “It didn’t 
matter if [Jobs] was serving purple Kool-Aid,” she remarked. “You drank it.”205 Joanna 
Hoffman, who did technical writing for the Macintosh project and oversaw international 
marketing efforts, offered an even more sinister account of Jobs’s ability to manipulate 
people to get what he wanted. “He had the uncanny capacity to know exactly what your 
weak point is,” she said. “Knowing that he can crush you makes you feel weakened and 
eager for his approval, so then he can elevate you and put you on a pedestal and own 
you.”206 Even members of the group who usually found themselves in Jobs’s good graces 
lived in constant fear that they would fall out of favor. As Bill Atkinson put it, “there was 
great polarity between gods and shitheads…. Those of us who were considered to be gods, 
as I was, knew that we were actually mortal and made bad engineering decisions and 
farted like any person, so we were always afraid that we would get knocked off our pedes-
tal.”207 By contrast, Atkinson said, the people Jobs considered “shitheads, who were bril-
liant engineers working very hard, felt there was no way they could get appreciated and 
rise above their status.”208 
The relationships between Jobs and his employees were clearly prickly. However, as 
demoralizing as Jobs’s ruthless criticisms could be, the Macintosh group came to see sur-
viving Jobs’s abuse as a mark of honor. Joanna Hoffman put it bluntly: “His behavior can 
be emotionally draining, but if you survive, it works.”209 In other words, they interpreted 
Jobs’s relentless attacks on their ideas and efforts as a factor that pushed them to do their 
best work—indeed, several framed Jobs’s derisive and acerbic treatment as the key driving 
force behind the computer. As Atkinson revealed, “We learned to interpret ‘This is shit’ to 
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actually be a question that means ‘Tell me why this is the best way to do it.’”210 Even em-
ployees who stood up to Jobs and managed to convince him that their work was solid usu-
ally ended up revising it, and believed that the computer was better for it. “[Y]ou can push 
back on [Jobs],” Atkinson reasoned, “but should also listen, for he’s usually right.”211 
Hertzfeld offered a similar perspective, saying, “You might think that impossible schedules 
and uncompromising perfectionism would lead to an oppressive work environment. But 
most of the time, the ambiance of the Mac team was spontaneous, enthusiastic, and irrev-
erent.”212 As for Jobs himself, Hertzfeld termed him the “father of the Macintosh”: 
“Steve’s vision, passion for excellence and sheer strength of will, not to mention his awe-
some powers of persuasion, drove the team to meet or exceed the impossible standards we 
set for ourselves.”213 Jobs’s consistent attacks on employees evidently formed some intense 
emotional bonds. As Debi Coleman reminisced, “He would shout at a meeting, ‘You 
asshole, you never do anything right.’ It was like an hourly occurrence. Yet I consider my-
self the absolute luckiest person in the world to have worked with him.”214 Thus, rather 
than overtly resisting Jobs’s abuse, the Macintosh group found other ways to cope, such as 
giving out an award every year to the person who most successfully weathered Jobs’s in-
sults and craziest demands.215 
Jobs’s capacity to control workers could extend even beyond their formal em-
ployment for Apple. After the Macintosh was completed in early 1984, Hertzfeld decided 
that he needed to step away from Apple, so he applied for a six-month leave of absence to 
begin in March of that year. After his final day, Jobs and much of the Macintosh team 
went out to dinner together, which Hertzfeld described as an emotionally charged affair, 
with many members of the group congratulating Hertzfeld on all his hard work and ex-
pressing hope that he would be back at Apple soon. Then Jobs closed out the evening with 
a startling comment: “The thing I like best about Andy is that it’s so easy to make him 
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cry.”216 Hertzfeld professed that he did not know how to interpret Jobs’s statement, but it 
suggested Jobs’s delight in his ability to manipulate Hertzfeld. Due in part to Hertzfeld’s 
confusions about the nature of his relationship with Jobs, he ultimately decided to resign 
in September 1984. 
Quitting Apple, however, did not diminish Hertzfeld’s belief in the social impor-
tance of the Macintosh project, and he continued writing software for the machine. One 
of the first programs he developed after quitting Apple was called Switcher, an application 
that allowed Macintosh users to run multiple programs simultaneously and switch easily 
between them using a simple keystroke. In January 1985, Hertzfeld got a call from Apple 
telling him that Steve Jobs wanted a demo. Hertzfeld remembered approaching the meet-
ing “with a bit of trepidation because I thought Switcher was worth at least a quarter of a 
million dollars to Apple, but I was sure Steve would never want to pay me that much.”217 
Jobs was impressed with the program and wanted to include it with every Macintosh, but 
he also told Hertzfeld, “There’s no way you could have written that program without con-
fidential information you learned working at Apple. You don’t have the right to charge 
whatever you like for it.”218 Jobs continued, “I’m not going to allow you to take advantage 
of Apple.”219 Hertzfeld was upset by Jobs’s aggressive tactics and angry that he flatly re-
fused to pay more than $100,000 for the program, but eventually agreed to the figure. “I 
didn’t seem to have any alternative but to capitulate to Steve’s price fixing,” Hertzfeld 
reasoned, “since he was difficult to argue with and I really wanted Switcher bundled with 
the Mac.”220 The application switching function is still a key part of Apple’s computer op-
erating system, which suggests that the monetary value of the idea Hertzfeld first worked 
out in code is almost impossible to quantify. Yet it was all too easy for Jobs to exploit 
Hertzfeld’s faith in the social importance of the Macintosh. 
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Despite such instances of brazen manipulation, Jobs’s abuse and perfectionism ul-
timately made the Macintosh team feel that they were Apple’s elite, and to see the com-
puter they were building as an earth-shattering revelation. In a sense, Jobs’s cruelty raised 
the stakes of the project to an emotional pitch that ultimately exhilarated the group’s core 
members. The team’s intense personal identifications with the Macintosh computer made 
them increasingly scornful of Apple colleagues working on other projects, whom the Mac-
intosh group started calling “bozos.”221 This sense of superiority was an important psycho-
logical wage that made their round-the-clock schedules and Jobs’s attacks more bearable, 
even desirable. “In both [Jobs’s] personal and his professional life over the years,” Isaacson 
contends, “his inner circle tended to include many more strong people than toadies. The 
Mac team knew that.”222 In comparison to the rest of the Apple workforce, which was or-
ganized along more traditional managerial lines, it was easy for the Macintosh group to 
see themselves as rebels who had traded formal corporate bureaucracy for a much more 
personalized—and personally rewarding—environment that called on group members to 
defend and refine their work constantly, and to push beyond their own perceived limita-
tions. As Isaacson concludes his assessment of Jobs’s worst managerial traits, “Dozens of 
the colleagues whom Jobs most abused ended their litany of horror stories by saying that 
he got them to do things they never dreamed possible.”223 In other words, Isaacson im-
plies, Jobs might have displayed some monstrous tendencies in his interactions with other 
people, but the wonderful things he drove other people to create overshadow those nega-
tive behaviors. 
However, there are several serious problems with Isaacson’s conclusion that the 
employees who put up with Jobs’s abuses demonstrated a laudable degree of fortitude. For 
one, this assessment skates over the fact that the Macintosh team’s overwhelming loyalty 
to Jobs made them profoundly uncritical of Jobs’s disastrous positioning of the Macintosh 
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project within Apple as a whole. In particular, while the Macintosh group saw their rivalry 
with the business-oriented Lisa project as a series of somewhat playful workplace contre-
temps, in reality, Jobs was working aggressively to undermine the Lisa. As we will soon 
see, this spiteful maneuver effectively destroyed the commercial viability of the Lisa and 
caused numerous engineers on that project to lose their jobs, and set in motion a much 
graver company crisis. This turn of events sparked no outrage or criticism on the part of 
the Macintosh group, betraying a distinct lack of worker solidarity in the face of damag-
ing managerial decisions, and which spoke directly to the absence of meaningful em-
ployee rights or protections at Apple. Moreover, although Macintosh team members pro-
fessed that Jobs’s assaults on their work made them improve their efforts, in actuality, 
their inability to push back effectively on Jobs’s authoritarian visions for the Macintosh 
resulted in a machine with serious technical flaws that struggled to win commercial cus-
tomers, deepening the corporate crisis initiated by the Lisa’s failure and leading to a mass 
layoff at Apple in 1985. Finally, the Macintosh team’s defenses of Jobs’s managerial 
abuses have helped normalize such workplace behaviors in the technology industry, mak-
ing aggressive management styles and compulsive overwork less subject to criticism or 
worker resistance. The remainder of this section elaborates on these contentions. 
The Macintosh project’s open competition with the Lisa was the first crisis to come 
to a head, and indicated that the Macintosh team was largely incapable of perceiving 
shared interests with other employees at Apple. As I detailed above, the expensive and so-
phisticated Lisa was expressly designed for corporate customers, whereas Jobs described the 
Macintosh as a tool for the average person, which gave many Macintosh team members 
the sense that their machine spoke to the more meaningful social mission of extending 
computer power to the masses. The different orientations of the two projects, spurred by 
Jobs’s open antagonism of the Lisa group, had contributed to a heated rivalry between the 
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teams, but some members of the Lisa project expressed a desire to make the two projects’ 
aims more complementary. In early 1982, a manager from the Lisa group made a formal 
effort to broker peace between the camps, and invited Burrell Smith and Andy Hertzfeld 
to give a demonstration of the Macintosh system to Lisa engineers. However, one of the 
Lisa’s main designers, Rich Page, could not contain his frustrations. He burst into the 
room to interrupt the meeting, yelling, “The Macintosh is going to destroy the Lisa! The 
Macintosh is going to ruin Apple!”224 Page’s anger stemmed from the fact that the Lisa 
and Macintosh, despite their different target audiences, in fact shared many technological 
features, yet their designs made them almost entirely incompatible. Page believed that this 
would create a disastrously competitive situation between the Lisa and Macintosh—he 
predicted that many customers would simply wait to purchase the cheaper Macintosh, 
frustrating the Lisa’s chances for success. Unsurprisingly, he saw Jobs as the fly in the 
ointment. Turning to Smith and Hertzfeld, Page said, “I know it’s not your fault. Steve 
Jobs is the problem. Tell Steve that I think he’s destroying Apple!”225 Although Hertzfeld 
and Smith were unnerved by the encounter, they were so wrapped up in the design of 
their own machine—which they did believe would be superior to the Lisa—that they could 
hardly be concerned about the broader implications for Apple if the Lisa failed. After all, 
they saw themselves as iconoclastic rebels, and they could not muster much loyalty to a 
pricey computer intended for corporate customers. 
Rich Page’s misgivings about Jobs, however, turned out to be well founded. Isaac-
son reports that when Jobs went to New York in January 1983 to help publicize the Lisa at 
its debut, he persistently undermined the computer by hinting at the Macintosh and sug-
gesting that it would be a much better and more affordable product. “It was like launching 
the Lisa with the kiss of death,” Isaacson writes, “[b]ut there was a silver lining for Jobs: 
Within months of Lisa’s launch, it became clear the Apple had to pin its hopes on the 
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Macintosh instead.”226 Jobs’s silver lining, however, equaled termination for a number of 
people who had worked on the Lisa. In February 1984, Apple stopped supporting the 
foundering system and merged the Lisa team into Macintosh, cutting some seventy posi-
tions in the process. Hertzfeld remembers Jobs gleefully sticking the knife into the people 
losing their jobs, telling them “they had screwed up and were B or C players.”227 Jobs re-
portedly quipped to the Lisa team members who remained, “[T]oday we are releasing 
some of your fellow employees to give them the opportunity to work at our sister compa-
nies here in the valley.”228 There were no notable murmurs of dissent from the Macintosh 
group about the dismissal of their coworkers, perhaps because they shared Jobs’s pleasure in 
the Lisa’s failure, or perhaps because they found themselves promoted to more powerful 
managerial roles as the surviving Lisa members were folded into the Macintosh project. In 
the long term, however, the failure of the Lisa had even more serious repercussions than 
the immediate loss of seventy jobs. After IBM entered the personal computer market in 
1981, Apple struggled to court corporate customers, as IBM had a lengthy history and 
sterling reputation as the preeminent supplier of business computers. The Lisa was very 
different from the spare, serious offerings of IBM—during an early demonstration for a 
bank, one of the executives had remarked, “We’ll have managers at the bank playing with 
this all day. It’s a video game.”229 Jobs’s undermining of the Lisa only heightened percep-
tions that Apple was not dependable or mature enough to serve the needs of corporate 
America. 
Despite mounting evidence that the Lisa’s failure was causing serious financial 
problems for Apple and indications that Jobs was more than willing to sacrifice dozens of 
employees simply to satisfy a personal vendetta, the shuttering of the Lisa division buoyed 
the Macintosh group’s belief that they were the chosen emissaries of Apple’s future. As 
1984 progressed, the group’s relationships with other Apple employees became incredibly 
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tense. John Sculley noted, for example, that employees had termed the street between the 
Apple II and Macintosh teams’ main buildings “the DMZ.”230 Jobs and “his Macintosh co-
hort,” Sculley said, “began to openly call everyone else in the company ‘bozos’” while en-
joying such perks as free organic fruit juice and a masseuse on call “to work [their] tense 
backs.”231 The hostile culture was a managerial nightmare—as Sculley described the situa-
tion, “The anger was poisonous: hardly a day would pass when I wouldn’t hear of another 
key manager or engineer who had resigned” from the Apple II team.232 The climate was so 
bad that even Steve Wozniak quit the company he had helped found, frustrated by the 
poor treatment of the Apple II division despite the fact that their computer still accounted 
for 70 percent of Apple’s sales.233 
Although the Macintosh group’s persistent elitism revealed that they were much 
more loyal to Jobs than their colleagues in other departments, one piece of Apple ephem-
era—an anonymous, fake memo published in August 1983—does provide an inkling of 
broader employee opposition to Jobs. Sent out through Apple’s official communications 
channel, Apple Bulletin, the fake memo openly mocked Jobs’s infamous practice of park-
ing in the handicapped spaces around the Apple buildings: “Apple Computer Inc. today 
announced that effective immediately, all handicapped parking spaces have been con-
verted for the exclusive use of the executive staff.” Deriding Jobs’s hubristic self-
importance, the memo continued, “This innovative approach was summarized in a recent 
statement by Apple’s Chairman of the Board, Steve Jobs: ‘Macintosh will not be delayed 
because I can’t find a parking spot.’” Perhaps meant as a jab at workers who saw them-
selves as part of Jobs’s inner circle, the memo displayed an equal disdain for sycophantic 
employees, concluding with a quote from “Mac Chelslolly III, Apple’s only handicapped 
employee, [who] remarked: ‘It’s OK with me…. Steve explained that it’s an honor to 
work for Apple and I shouldn’t mind having to crawl on the concrete a little.’”234 Em-
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ployee reactions to Jobs’s insensitivities were not all so jocular—Hertzfeld reports that Jobs 
often removed the license plates from his Mercedes because a number of unknown work-
ers had the habit of scratching the car’s paint with their keys when they found it parked in 
handicapped spaces.235 Defacing one of Jobs’s more expensive possessions was doubtlessly 
cathartic, and the ability of employees to hijack Apple’s official memo service to make fun 
of the chairman of the board spoke to company’s rebellious self-image, but the anony-
mous, individualized nature of these outbursts indicates employees’ collective inability to 
resist Jobs in a meaningful fashion. Employees were left to fend for themselves, with little 
assistance from other executives or even their coworkers. 
While other employees found small, individualistic ways to express their frustra-
tions with Jobs and the Macintosh group, the Macintosh’s debut in January 1984 quickly 
belied the team’s belief that Jobs’s relentless demands had pushed them to make an earth-
shattering computer. The design historian Kimon Keramidas points out that the Macin-
tosh quickly achieved iconic status when it came to market due to a massive advertising 
blitz and the computer’s groundbreaking design, but he notes that “the first version of the 
Mac…was notable more for promise than for actual performance” because the hardware 
simply could not handle the machine’s ambitious software.236 Among the Macintosh’s 
many problems were its lack of a cooling fan, which Jobs had forced the team to leave out 
because it did not agree with his aesthetic vision for the machine, as well as its insufficient 
memory, which Jobs had kept to a minimum in order to reduce the spiraling costs of the 
increasingly ambitious computer.237 As a result, the Macintosh easily overheated, which 
frequently destroyed the machine’s circuitry, and the computer struggled to run the pro-
grams that took full advantage of its unique graphical capabilities. In other words, many 
of the features that Jobs insisted the team omit or build into the computer made it func-
tionally impaired for many users. As Keramidas writes, “the whole interface experience of 
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the Macintosh…was tangled, ponderous, and frustrating,” and its problems were not fully 
addressed for more than two years, with the release of the Macintosh Plus.238 Indeed, the 
first Macintosh was such a commercial flop that Apple began to spiral into a financial cri-
ses that nearly destroyed the corporation. 
Apple’s board ultimately blamed Jobs for many of the Macintosh’s failings, and he 
was once again stripped of his managerial role in the company, a drawn-out and acrimo-
nious process that stretched from the beginning of April until the end of May 1985. Few 
episodes in Apple’s history are more controversial, and Jobs’s supporters invariably insist 
that Apple’s board made a serious mistake in disciplining Jobs.239 For example, even 
though Walter Isaacson highlights some of Jobs’s poor design decisions on the Macintosh, 
he makes the counterintuitive argument that Apple’s board of directors simply did not 
appreciate “Jobs’s passion for tiny technical tweaks and design details,” and failed to share 
his obsession with making groundbreaking products.240 It is a bizarre conclusion—from a 
technical standpoint, Jobs’s intuitive sense of computer aesthetics was entirely misguided. 
Certain pieces of his vision for the Macintosh were inspired, but his lack of engineering 
know-how and his inability to listen to the concerns of experienced technicians resulted 
in a thoroughly flawed machine that was a commercial disaster and harmed Apple’s sales 
and reputation. Moreover, Jobs’s managerial style became even less effectual as the Mac-
intosh stalled in its intended consumer market. Specifically, Jobs’s dissolution of the Lisa 
project meant that Apple now needed to market Macintoshes to business customers, even 
thought the Macintosh team had never imagined their machine in corporate offices. To 
stimulate business sales, Apple’s board needed Jobs and the Macintosh group to produce a 
software suite called Macintosh Office. Jobs, however, was not terribly inspired to work on 
business programs, and the team failed to deliver the product on time, which further poi-
soned Apple’s relations with potential corporate clients.241 Isaacson’s account omits this 
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episode in Jobs’s career at Apple, focusing instead on the personal anguish Jobs experi-
enced as Apple’s board became increasingly critical of his failings, which culminated in 
Jobs’s decision to resign from Apple in September 1985 to found a competing computer 
company, NeXT.242 
While Jobs chose to make a clean break from Apple, his poor leadership left the 
company reeling. The failure of the Lisa and sluggish sales of the shoddy first-generation 
Macintosh cut deeply into Apple’s profits and reputation, and the executive staff deter-
mined that they desperately needed to slash costs to maintain investor confidence in the 
company. They decided the most effective measure was to undertake a mass layoff. On 
June 14, 1985, John Sculley informed 1,200 employees, just over a fifth of Apple’s 
workforce, that they would be losing their jobs.243 Although Jobs had also lost his position 
as a result of his missteps, it is instructive to consider the deeply divergent prospects he 
and the 1,200 other employees faced upon exiting Apple. Jobs owned more than $100 
million in Apple stock, and he soon sold all but a single share, using his considerable per-
sonal wealth to finance a variety of other ventures.244 In the 1990s, Jobs most famously 
used his assets and influence to underwrite the computer animation film studio Pixar, and 
in 1996 he managed to sell NeXT—then a failing company—to Apple for $400 million, a 
scheme that allowed him to return as Apple’s CEO and consolidate his power over the 
company.245 The 1,200 others who lost their jobs at Apple in 1985 were mostly salaried 
employees in non-senior roles—the kinds of people Jobs and his inner circle derisively 
termed “bozos.” Any Apple stock they might have owned they would have purchased out 
of their own salaries, and its value would have amounted to much more modest sums than 
Jobs’s multimillion dollar stakes. As befits a large corporation, most of these former em-
ployees are anonymous, and their specific stories are difficult to track. Many probably 
tried to find other jobs in the increasingly competitive and volatile tech industry, which 
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was experiencing broader convulsions in 1985 as a national recession set in.246 The com-
puter industry’s downturn persisted into 1987, which hardly spoke well for the opportuni-
ties of the laid off workers to find comparable employment.247 
In short, Steve Jobs and his Macintosh group had wreaked havoc on Apple. Yet the 
disastrous outcomes produced by Jobs’s arrogant and aggressive management style have 
failed to dim popular enthusiasm for Jobs. Indeed, some of Jobs’s most troubling features 
are today held up as exemplars for corporate leadership, and his managerial tactics are visi-
ble throughout the U.S. tech industry. For example, in a 2011 New York magazine obitu-
ary for Jobs, John Heilemann argues that the Apple cofounder’s most “culturally signifi-
cant” achievement was the creation of an “image of the businessman as freewheeling re-
bel, as swashbuckling artist.”248 “More than most corporate chiefs,” Heilemann continues, 
“and certainly any high-tech CEO before then or to this day, [Jobs] understood the im-
portance not merely of image but narrative: of framing and controlling the stories told 
about (and by) himself and Apple.”249 The subsequent heads of tech giants including Ama-
zon, Facebook, and Google, Heilemann insists, have all self-consciously modeled their 
public personas and entrepreneurial identities after Jobs, casting themselves as iconoclasts 
with unusual ideas about how to run their businesses. 
The chief lesson other corporate leaders have derived from Jobs’s life, writes busi-
ness journalist Adam Lashinsky, is that “he was an effective asshole.”250 Reviewing the pro-
fessional management literature written about Jobs, Lashinsky notes that business profes-
sors and other executives in the tech industry have been particularly inspired by Jobs’s 
ability to impose his vision of the future on others around him, whether or not they 
agreed with the particulars of his aspirations. But rather than expressing concerns about 
Jobs’s pronounced authoritarianism, Lashinsky insists that Jobs’s cruelties and obsessive 
managerial style built one of the most successful business enterprises in U.S. history, and 
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are, in many respects, worth emulating.251 Such assessments clarify Ian Bogost’s cryptic 
and provocative statement that “Steve Jobs was a fascist. That’s what everybody loved 
about him.”252 In other words, far from inspiring revulsion, Jobs’s abusive proclivities are 
taken as key ingredients in his success, a conclusion reinforced by employees and col-
leagues’ dependable apologias for Jobs’s very worst personality traits. 
Pop culture interpretations of Jobs follow in much the same vein. For example, in 
a New York Times review of Danny Boyle’s 2015 biopic, Steve Jobs—which is based pri-
marily on Isaacson’s official biography—Farhad Manjoo concludes that the U.S. technol-
ogy industry’s economic growth and innovative breakthroughs have depended primarily 
upon “unpleasant visionaries” like Jobs. Although Manjoo suggests that the film “is not 
very kind to Steve Jobs,” he also argues that the “ultimate importance of the personal 
computer hangs over every conflict in the film.”253 Recounting the movie’s numerous de-
pictions of Jobs brutalizing his staff, betraying friends and colleagues, and mistreating his 
family, Manjoo writes, “Sure, [Jobs] may have been terrible to be around, but in the end, 
wasn’t he right about the importance of [making a] dent in the universe? And if he hadn’t 
been as obnoxious about his aims, would the dent have been as large?”254 In fact, Manjoo 
extrapolates, Jobs’s abuse of laborers is a small price to pay for Apple’s consumer tech-
nologies, which Manjoo believes have greatly benefitted consumers. In Manjoo’s estima-
tion, this makes Jobs’s managerial tactics a tolerable—and even an advantageous—feature 
of the high-tech field at large. “The tech industry may be peopled by many petty, ruthless, 
self-important weirdos,” Manjoo grants. “But look at the products, not the people. In the 
future, only the products will matter.”255  
The argument that products are more valuable and important than people is dis-
concerting, especially if one looks to the treatment of workers at other powerful high-tech 
firms that have followed in Apple’s footsteps. For example, the New York Times’s exten-
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sive 2015 report on working conditions at Amazon reveals some of the troubling conse-
quences of applying Jobs’s tactics from the Macintosh project across an entire corpora-
tion. “At Amazon,” the Times reports, “workers are encouraged to tear apart one another’s 
ideas in meetings, toil long and late (emails arrive past midnight, followed by text mes-
sages asking why they were not answered), and held to standards that the company boasts 
are ‘unreasonably high.’”256 Despite detailing instances of employees being pushed out of 
Amazon when “cancer, miscarriages and other personal crises” decreased their productiv-
ity, grueling meetings and performance reviews that routinely reduced workers to tears, 
and inhumanly long workweeks that destroyed families and caused chronic health prob-
lems, the authors remark that even many of the most terrorized ex-Amazon employees 
still possessed strong attachments to the corporation.257 These employees, they write, “de-
scribed how they tried to reconcile the sometimes-punishing aspects of their workplace 
with what many called its thrilling power to create.”258 In a remarkable echo of Macintosh 
employees’ comments about working with Jobs, the authors report that a number of em-
ployees they interviewed “said they thrived at Amazon precisely because it pushed them 
past what they thought were their limits.”259 Amazon’s core motivational techniques 
closely resemble Jobs’s. Amazon employees live in constant fear of failing to live up to 
their employer’s excessive expectations—new hires are bluntly told many of them will not 
last, and Amazon has made an annual tradition of eliminating employees who are deemed 
less than fully committed. Unsurprisingly, those who survive come to see themselves in 
elitist terms, much as the Macintosh group began to scorn Apple employees outside the 
project. However, Amazon’s overarching concern—again, much like Apple—is with 
maximizing employee productivity, and the article details that heightened worker com-
mitments have helped make Amazon the most valuable retail corporation in the United 
States, and Jeff Bezos, Amazon’s founder and leader, the fifth richest person in the 
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world.260 Yet just as Jobs was able to convince the Macintosh team that their incredible 
commitments to the project flew in the face of corporate conformity, Amazon awards a 
badge that reads “I’m peculiar” to employees who perfectly memorize the company’s four-
teen “leadership principles,” informing employees who know the rules by heart that they 
are “overturning workplace conventions.”261 
Employee buy-in to these labor dynamics, and indeed, employee claims that they 
derive satisfaction and even pleasure from such working environments, has helped quell 
meaningful resistance to the tech industry’s exploitative tendencies, and has discouraged 
mainstream concern for labor rights or protections at such corporations. In the immediate 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, for example, the editors of The Economist com-
posed a paean to the leaders of the U.S. high-tech industry, suggesting that the bold, in-
novative workplace dynamics they had pioneered within their corporate empires repre-
sented the best hope for revitalizing the global economy. The article celebrated U.S. tech-
nology corporations’ “unusual freedom to hire and fire workers,” which the editors argued 
was one of the key reasons that companies such as Apple and Amazon were able to de-
mand a higher degree of performance from their employees.262 Betraying an utter lack of 
concern that the absence of labor protections could help underwrite troubling or exploita-
tive workplace dynamics, the editors opined, “People like Bill Gates and Steve Jobs have 
all the upsides of [Andrew] Carnegie and [Henry] Ford without the downsides—the useful 
products and the open-handed philanthropy without the sweatshops and the massacres.”263 
This statement is all the more bizarre given that Isaacson classifies Jobs as “not particularly 
philanthropic.”264 
Thus, even though the editors of the Economist suggest that Silicon Valley has 
transcended the problems historically associated with the corporate concentration of 
power, the experiences of the Macintosh group, and their reverberations at Amazon in the 
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twenty-first century, merely suggest that the exercise of corporate power has become 
more sophisticated and less visible, operating on a more individualized, psychological 
plane rather than through mass, physical confrontations between laborers and the overse-
ers, guards, and police who enforced the authority of early industrial corporate leaders. 
This is much the perspective offered by Gilles Deleuze in his 1992 essay, “Postscript on the 
Societies of Control,” in which he argues that post-industrial corporations have increas-
ingly tried to inspire employee productivity by appealing to a sense of social mission, or 
by “present[ing] the brashest rivalry as a healthy form of emulation, an excellent motiva-
tional force that opposes individuals against one another.”265 In other words, Deleuze ar-
gues, corporations have striven to displace worker solidarity by pitting them against each 
other in intensely pressurized environments. In the tech industry, the success of such 
workplace dynamics is rendered all the more disturbing by employees’ belief that, for ex-
ample, working day and night on the Macintosh project or performing aggressively at 
Amazon represents a refreshing break with corporate convention or the dehumanizing 
tendencies of scientific management. In reality, these employees’ deep, personal identifi-
cations with their work has made corporations such as Apple and Amazon incredibly ef-
fective corporate masters, capable of extracting rather astonishing time, labor, and psy-
chological commitments from workers. 
As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, critical observers have long argued that 
the troubling labor politics visible at companies such as Apple and Amazon are endemic to 
the U.S. technology industry. In the mid-1980s, Everett Rogers and Judith Larsen worried 
that the lack of worker rights and protections were producing a field defined by striking 
economic inequalities and pervasive job instability, while Dennis Hayes argued in 1989 
that tech workers’ individualistic tendencies and rejection of collective bargaining allowed 
labor abuses to run rampant in Silicon Valley.266 But as I have tried to show throughout 
 108 
this chapter, white-collar professionals in the tech industry have consistently blunted the 
impact of these criticisms by tolerating—and even defending—the cruelties of managers 
such as Jobs. They have likewise deferred sleep, friendship, and time outside of the office 
in order to meet incredible performance demands, all while seeing themselves as corporate 
rebels. The successes of corporate leaders such as Jobs, in other words, have rested upon 
professional workers’ willingness to trade strong worker rights and collective bargaining 
power for the intangible thrills of abrasive and high-pressure working environments. The 
desirability of these working arrangements, moreover, rests on the belief that they are an 
improvement over so-called corporate convention. Yet white-collar workers’ decisions to 
sacrifice formal rights and protections in exchange for more engaging or fulfilling work is 
a false bargain, as the pleasures they derive from their jobs were not won from corporate 
leaders, but rather encouraged by those leaders to fulfill the classic business aim of increas-
ingly employee loyalty and productivity. 
In focusing on the mythology of Steve Jobs, this chapter has mostly dealt with the 
small-scale, interpersonal dynamics of Silicon Valley labor, highlighting specific employ-
ees’ faith in Apple’s grander social mission and their motivations for tolerating Jobs’s cru-
elties and aggressions. But I have only begun to gesture to the larger stakes of the erosion 
of employee rights by summarizing some of the consequences of Apple’s 1985 crisis, and 
connecting the working environment on the Macintosh project to contemporary experi-
ences at Amazon. The next chapter, which draws much more extensively on the archival 
record of Apple’s history, attempts to get closer to the experiences of average workers out-
side of Jobs’s inner circle—the regular professionals who have remained largely anony-
mous and invisible in popular histories of Silicon Valley, and who are most likely to bear 
the brunt of disastrous executive decisions through layoffs and other workplace upheavals. 
Although these employees never worked directly alongside Jobs or Apple’s other charis-
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matic leaders, they largely shared the Macintosh group’s desire to believe that their com-
pany was special, rebellious, and nonconformist. I detail how corporate leaders, especially 
CEO John Sculley, who became Apple’s chief figurehead after Jobs’s departure, played on 
these desires to extract employee commitments to the corporate cause, especially during 
times of crisis. Remarkably, even when the actions of Sculley and other executives re-
vealed a manifest lack of concern for employee wellbeing, Apple employees typically 
struggled to recognize the harms they were suffering at the hands of Apple leadership. 
Thus, while Sculley and other executives proclaimed that Apple’s new “social contract” 
with employees was mutually beneficial for the corporation and for workers, I argue that 
the progressive erosion of worker rights at Apple left employees with few tools or resources 
to resist labor exploitation or to advocate for their own rights and interests. 
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Chapter 2.  
A Company of Artists: Anesthetizing Apple’s Workforce 
 
During his keynote address at the 1988 Macworld Expo in San Francisco, John 
Sculley exuded confidence. He had led Apple out of the 1985 fiasco, restoring Apple to 
profitability and winning the trust of his employees during a two-year period when most 
of the rest of the personal computer industry was still struggling to recover from a na-
tional recession.1 Business Week had put Sculley on its cover for the third time in January 
1987, lauding his remarkable turnaround of the troubled corporation. Comparing Apple’s 
performance to its main adversary, IBM, the article enthused, “While International Busi-
ness Machines Corp.’s 1986 earnings sagged, Apple’s surged 151%, to $154 million, in the 
fiscal year ended Sept. 30. The company now has $576 million in cash and no debt. Ap-
ple’s shares, which had plunged to 14 in mid-1985, now trade at over 40—a three-year 
high.”2 Touting investors’ restored faith in the firm, the article continued, “some Apple 
fans on Wall Street are predicting that its stock will hit 60 by yearend.”3 Sculley was 
pleased, but thought the coverage missed the larger point. As he put it in his memoir, any 
reasonably skilled executive could have slashed costs and maneuvered the company to 
post some short-term profits. What set his resurrection of Apple apart, he claimed, was 
that he had done it all without destroying “Apple’s soul”—the company still commanded 
the kind of deep employee devotion Sculley had first observed in the Macintosh group, 
which he saw as the core of Apple’s success.4 
At the Macworld Expo, Sculley moved into full proselytizing mode, proclaiming 
that he had cracked the code to successful post-industrial corporate leadership. In sweeping 
terms, he announced, “The world is in passage from the Industrial Age to the Information 
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Age,” and he informed his audience that the assumptions that had governed business and 
secured American prosperity during the industrial era were no longer valid.5 The key prob-
lem with industrial mindsets, he continued, was that they did not place enough value 
upon creativity or innovation. It was only through innovation, he maintained, that busi-
nesses could “find new ways to continue to create value in the world.”6 “Yet innovation 
has never come through bureaucracy and hierarchy,” he warned. “It’s always come from 
individuals.”7 This implied profound shifts in corporate organization as well as worker ori-
entations toward their jobs. On the institutional end, he argued, corporations would need 
to hone “their ability to support the creative contributions of many individuals,” and to 
“develop new patterns of organization that promote alignment and collaboration while 
avoiding rigidity and stagnation.”8 What he meant was that employers would need to in-
spire workers rather than discipline them, convincing employees to form close, personal 
identifications with corporations and their missions. On the other hand, Sculley insisted 
that employees would “need to have tremendous flexibility” to successfully contribute to 
corporate profits in the information age.9 He explained that to operate at their creative 
and innovative peak, workers would need to constantly learn, grow, and adapt to the 
changing realities around them. Sculley predicted that the integration of learning into 
work would be immensely satisfying, as it would stimulate employee intellects and con-
stantly expose them to new opportunities, and indeed, give them the freedom “to move 
from one company to another, or from one industry to another.”10 “Education will not 
simply be a prelude to a career,” he concluded, “but a lifelong endeavor.”11 
Unsurprisingly, Sculley described these shifts in labor and learning in relatively 
utopian terms, because he believed Apple and its technologies would lead by example. Ap-
ple could show other corporations how to prepare for the twenty-first century through in-
novative management and labor policies, and would sell computer tools to businesses to 
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help them reorganize more quickly and efficiently. Sculley made particularly clear his be-
lief that employees would become more empowered in this new paradigm, because their 
jobs would call on the “development of conceptual skills and the ability to test reality 
against multiple points of view,” which would make workers more intellectually inde-
pendent.12 Moreover, companies committed to innovation would place more emphasis on 
the “nourishment of individual creativity and the encouragement of exploration,” which 
meant that workers could expect to achieve more personal growth on the job, and finally, 
new working environments would require collaboration, which would make work more 
socially rewarding and engaged.13 In his memoir, Sculley claimed that he had already be-
gun to realize this “new world” of refined labor “inside Apple, where creativity permeates 
every facet of our work environment,” which made Apple “one small example of what an 
exciting new company can be in the information age.”14 
Sculley’s depictions of life at Apple in the late 1980s suggested that the company 
had matured, yet had retained its commitments to being a forward-thinking innovator, 
not just in technology, but also in business practices. However, Sculley’s proclamations 
that Apple had broken radically with industrial business conventions were not exactly ac-
curate. As we will see in this chapter, Apple did possess a conventional bureaucracy of 
middle managers to enforce executive directives and to discipline or reward employees ac-
cording to their adherence to top-down company policies. And while Apple did value em-
ployee creativity, under Sculley’s direction Apple had largely abandoned the mission of 
providing computer power to the masses in order to focus on building products for large 
corporate customers—innovative gambles at the company were now relatively con-
strained by considerations of whether or not they would pique the interest of deep-
pocketed corporate customers. The company had created Apple University to serve as an 
official avenue for learning and personal growth, but far from offering resources or classes 
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covering the kinds of cross-disciplinary subjects employees would need to switch compa-
nies or careers, Apple University emphasized self-management skills for employees and 
team management for managers. Sculley was not blind to these facts. He had installed the 
bureaucracy to gain more control over Apple during the 1985 crisis, he had shifted empha-
sis to business computing to secure more profits for the company, and he was much more 
interested in how employees’ growth could serve the corporation than their own aspira-
tions. The employee accounts that I examine in this chapter also clearly indicate that 
workers sensed fundamental changes at Apple under Sculley’s leadership. But Sculley and 
his employees shared a need to believe that their company, their work, and their products 
were special—not just something that any corporation could offer. 
My aim in this chapter is to suggest that work at Apple in the late 1980s became 
something of a consensual fantasy, designed to preserve Apple people’s sense that they 
were part of a cutting-edge enterprise that broke rules and scorned tradition. Employees 
and company leaders shared a collective investment in this project, and became increas-
ingly passionate about the symbols that could reassure them that their company was dif-
ferent, and that they had not simply become drones in the disenchanted offices and cubi-
cles of gray corporate America. I want to untangle how and why this particular fantasy of 
work at Apple took root and grew, as well as the reasons—some overlapping, some diverg-
ing—that it became so seductive for Apple’s workers and executives. People at Apple dur-
ing this era well reflect Melissa Gregg’s depictions of professional employees who come to 
“see work as the most significant demonstration of their success and identity.”15 But em-
ployee obsessions with Apple’s difference from other corporations also indicate that most 
work fails to fulfill the full range of human aspirations and experiences—Apple employees 
sought comfort in emblems of their corporation’s specialness to compensate for the in-
credible pressures and time demands their jobs often placed upon them. Even during 
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company crises and serious layoffs in 1990, 1991, 1993, 1996, and 1997, employees 
struggled to find enough distance between themselves and their employer to resist unrea-
sonable managerial demands or to recognize that executives’ goals and decisions often 
undermined their job stability and collective rights. 
To elaborate these arguments, I draw on two primary bodies of evidence. The first 
is John Sculley’s writings and speeches, which provide valuable insights into the personal 
motivations and ideological commitments that shaped his leadership at Apple. These 
documents reveal an executive who, much like his employees, wanted to see his work at 
Apple in idealistic and unconventional terms, as part of a progressive revolution in busi-
ness practice that would usher in a more humanistic, invigorating, and fulfilling era in 
corporate labor. At the same time, however, Sculley possessed a grand vision of Apple and 
Silicon Valley as the saviors of a troubled U.S. economy, and as a result, he was deter-
mined to drive his employees to reach new productive heights and to expand Apple’s 
revenues as quickly as possible, aspirations which often undercut his rather romantic proc-
lamations about the labor conditions at his company. Simultaneously, Sculley had signifi-
cant personal stakes tied up in Apple stock options, so the fluctuations and vicissitudes of 
the stock market often saw him putting his financial self-interest before the well-being or 
job security of Apple employees. 
Unlike Steve Jobs, Sculley and his activities at Apple have not been subject to 
much critical or popular analysis. Most commentators readily dismiss Sculley as an execu-
tive who simply did not understand the nuances of the technology industry, and who pur-
sued a number of misguided business strategies. Michael Moritz, for example, brushes off 
Sculley’s record of increasing Apple’s annual sales from $1 billion to $8 billion between 
1983 and 1993, insisting that Sculley merely helmed Apple during a lucky time, when the 
personal computer market’s overwhelming growth “conceal[ed] all types of shortcom-
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ings.”16 Walter Isaacson’s criticisms are more personal. He quotes Andy Hertzfeld calling 
Sculley “incredibly phony, a complete poseur…. He was a marketing guy, and that is what 
marketing guys are: paid poseurs.”17 For his part, Isaacson describes Sculley as someone 
who desperately wanted “to please other people” and who “painfully craved Jobs’s affec-
tion,” which he argues made Sculley incapable of making tough business decisions.18 The 
journalist Frank Rose classifies Sculley as the anti-Jobs: a by-the-books manager who 
“called for more structure, more obedience, more discipline,” rather than the impetuous 
rebelliousness that defined Jobs’s leadership.19 But such criticisms, which focus more on su-
perficial personality traits rather than substantive analyses of Sculley’s reign at Apple, miss 
the fact that Sculley was in fact a perfect emblem of the profound tensions inherent to 
Apple’s culture, and by extension, Silicon Valley corporate rhetoric and practices. Sculley 
was a business leader who avidly espoused the seemingly innovative and progressive as-
pects of Apple’s labor policies, all while presiding over a corporation where workers en-
joyed few rights or protections and were held accountable to executive demands through a 
strict and punitive managerial bureaucracy, and where executive compensation mush-
roomed in comparison to relatively modest—and stagnant—employee salaries. And as we 
will see at the end of this chapter, when Jobs returned to Apple’s helm in 1997, he ex-
tended many of the draconian features of Sculley’s leadership tactics while revoking most 
of the informal workplace perks that Sculley installed to make day-to-day life at the com-
pany more pleasant. Thus, while Sculley and Jobs may have differed in style, from a labor 
history perspective, their mutual obsession with high employee productivity and com-
mitments to Apple’s mission saw them both treat workers as exploitable and disposable 
commodities whose chief purpose was to enrich the corporation. 
While analyzing Sculley’s rhetoric and strategies offers an important context for 
understanding worker experiences at Apple during the late 1980s and 1990s, the true sub-
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stance of this chapter comes from a close examination of actual corporate labor policies 
and employees’ own perspectives on their work at Apple. I therefore turn to archival 
sources that illuminate how Apple leadership worked to bind employees to the corporate 
cause through a variety of playful workplace features, promises of personal growth on the 
job, financial perks and incentives, and more authoritarian mechanisms of managerial 
control. I also rely on a significant body of employee-produced ephemera, which shows 
Apple workers grappling with their corporation’s shifting business strategies and manage-
rial structures, all while striving to maintain their sense of Apple’s uniqueness in order to 
fuel the deep personal commitments and high performance demanded by their jobs. 
 
SAVING SILICON VALLEY’S SOUL 
Chapter 1 emphasized the internal dynamics that contributed to Apple’s serious 
crisis in 1985, but in this section, I turn my attentions to the broader context of that cri-
sis. Although Jobs’s disastrous managerial decisions and the Macintosh team’s destructive 
competition with other groups in Apple were primary factors in the corporation’s strug-
gles that year, the U.S. tech industry as a whole was headed for a fall in 1985. Manufactur-
ers of basic computer components, such as Intel and National Semiconductor, began to 
face stiff competition from cheaper Japanese products, while blind investor enthusiasm 
had driven a period of intense—but unsustainable—growth in the personal computer in-
dustry.20 Yet the boom years immediately before the 1985 high-tech slump had pro-
foundly shaped the mythologies of the U.S. technology industry. Silicon Valley leaders—
and a handful of top employees—grew accustomed to the wealth and fame that followed 
from the fantastic growth of their stock options, and because this growth occurred against 
a backdrop of sluggish performance in most other sectors of the U.S. economy, many 
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tech executives began to see themselves as the individuals most responsible for the future 
prosperity of the nation. John Sculley particularly ascribed to this belief, and far from be-
ing humbled by Apple’s serious managerial problems and the larger tech industry crash in 
1985, he began to see himself as a person who was uniquely positioned to revive Silicon 
Valley’s economic growth, all without sacrificing its reputation as a place that bucked cor-
porate convention. 
This section details Sculley’s efforts to turn Apple around during the 1985 crisis, 
which I argue deepened the conflicts between the company’s idealistic promises to its em-
ployees and the corporation’s broader financial goals. Specifically, Sculley proved unwill-
ing to accept that Apple’s phenomenal early growth was an unsustainable trend driven in 
large part by uncritical investor speculation. As he moved forward from the 1985 crisis, 
Sculley therefore pushed Apple into new markets to grow the company as quickly as pos-
sible, but as subsequent sections reveal, the business foundations of these strategies were 
far from sound, and they led Apple into a series of protracted crises in the 1990s. To a cer-
tain extent, Sculley’s questionable strategies reflected pure financial self-interest—as Ap-
ple’s chief executive, he could earn incredible returns on his stock options if the company 
performed well on Wall Street, and an essential determinant of Apple’s stock value was 
how rapidly the company’s revenues grew on a quarter-by-quarter basis. But there was also 
an element of personal hubris involved. Sculley had taken a huge risk by jumping into 
high-tech from the soft drinks industry, and he was determined to succeed according to 
the rules and myths of his new field. In other words, Sculley, like many Apple employees, 
possessed a strong desire to see his work as a radical departure from the hide-bound con-
ventions of the industrial world, which he had deliberately abandoned when he left Pepsi 
in 1983. As Apple’s leader in the 1980s and early 1990s, Sculley’s approaches to labor 
management were therefore particularly conflicted. On the one hand, he wanted his em-
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ployees to continue believing that they were members of an elite cadre of professionals 
who worked for a thrilling and unusual company, but on the other hand, he wanted to 
push employees to even higher levels of productivity and efficiency to drive the kind of 
feverish growth that would pay off in lucrative stock returns. This section deals mainly 
with Sculley’s assertions about his leadership regime at Apple, while subsequent sections 
examine how his ideas were set down in corporate rhetoric and official company policy, 
with an emphasis on how rank and file Apple employees fared during Sculley’s reign. 
When John Sculley gave up the presidency of Pepsi’s soft drinks division to be-
come Apple’s CEO in 1983, there were a number of risks involved. For one, even though 
he bargained with Apple’s board to give him a $1 million annual salary—twice his fee at 
Pepsi—and assorted other perks, Sculley was leaving behind the chance to become the 
chairman of the vast and powerful Pepsi empire, which Don Kendall, Pepsi’s chief execu-
tive and Sculley’s friend and mentor, had indicated was a very likely possibility. Moreo-
ver, Sculley’s expertise was marketing and advertising—he knew next to nothing about 
technology, and many of his colleagues and business associates on the eastern seaboard 
treated his planned move to Apple with suspicion or even outright derision, questioning 
how he could possibly make a successful transition to a very different kind of industry and 
corporate environment.21 When Sculley did make the move from New York to California 
to take up his post at Apple, it likewise placed considerable strain on his personal life, and 
he later admitted that shifting geographies and the all-consuming pressures of learning 
Apple’s business nearly broke up his marriage.22 
But the siren song of Silicon Valley was hard to resist, and Sculley was not im-
mune to the lures of the dynamic new industry. For one, Apple’s board had given Sculley 
350,000 shares of Apple stock as part of his signing package, and in his first three months 
at the company, the value of that stock doubled, increasing his net worth by some $9 mil-
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lion.23 While Sculley maintained in his 1987 memoir that he was a more realistic and ex-
perienced businessman than his “starry-eyed” colleagues, who simply expected Apple’s 
stock values to keep rising, the journalist Frank Rose suggests otherwise, reporting that 
Sculley was heard boasting in 1983 that “he hadn’t come [to California] to take Apple 
from a $1-billion company to a $2-billion company; he’d come here to take it from $1 
billion to $10 billion.”24 Indeed, other passages in Sculley’s own memoir belie his image as 
a sage and level-headed business leader, especially the revelation that he took out a $3 mil-
lion loan to buy more Apple stock in 1983, thereby betting his entire personal fortune on 
the company.25 
Simultaneously, Silicon Valley’s apparently unstoppable growth in the early 1980s 
earned unabashedly positive coverage in the media, which fueled the American public’s 
fascination with computer companies. The depth of popular enthusiasm could be meas-
ured by the unexpected bestseller status achieved in 1981 by The Soul of a New Machine, 
journalist Tracy Kidder’s on-the-ground account of computer design at Data General, 
which sailed on to win both the National Book Award in nonfiction and a Pulitzer Prize.26 
A 1982 issue of Time magazine, which featured Steve Jobs and the Apple II on its cover 
under the bold headline, “STRIKING IT RICH: America’s Risk Takers,” likewise suggested 
to the public that the computer industry was at the forefront of corporate practice and 
prosperity.27 Comparing the people who flooded Silicon Valley in the 1980s to the “jobless 
dreamers [and] mavericks from the status quo” who had driven California’s nineteenth 
century gold rush, Sculley averred that the new generation of gold diggers had been en-
ticed by “becom[ing] involved in something that not only lent them fortune but also 
fame.”28 Sculley shared in these dual aims—he reported being somewhat incredulous, but 
unable to hide his pleasure, the first time a stranger stopped him on the street to ask for his 
autograph after he became Apple’s CEO.29  
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While Sculley became increasingly enchanted with his newfound notoriety and 
growing personal wealth, he paid little attention to the business problems being created by 
Steve Jobs’s combative management of the Macintosh project, and he also failed to rec-
ognize the broader signs of an approaching industry-wide slowdown, as he simply ac-
cepted Jobs’s optimistic projections about how many computers Apple could sell.30 What 
Sculley failed to realize was that Apple’s rapid early growth—along with the overall expan-
sion of the tech industry—had been exaggerated by rampant speculation on Wall Street. 
Apple itself had helped drive the speculative bubble in tech stocks in the early 1980s—as 
Michael Moritz reports, Steve Jobs and Apple chairman Mike Markkula expended consid-
erable efforts in the late 1970s cultivating the favorable attentions of the influential Wall 
Street analyst Ben Rosen, who helped drum up so much enthusiasm for the start-up that 
Apple’s initial public offering of stock in 1980 was the largest since Ford had gone public 
in 1956.31 But as Moritz also suggests, investor enthusiasm in Apple was not entirely well-
placed—Regis McKenna, the San Francisco-based agency that handled Apple’s publicity 
and advertising, was so worried about the company’s poor management and lack of clear 
business plans that they seriously considered dropping Apple around the time of the IPO 
to avoid tarnishing their own brand.32 But the novelty of the personal computer industry 
in the early 1980s masked many mistakes at companies such as Apple—these firms were 
involved in creating a brand new market, and for a time, all it could do was grow.33 Inves-
tors were also not inclined to look a gift horse in the mouth in the early 1980s. The rav-
ages of deindustrialization had seen many sectors of the economy stall or contract 
throughout the 1970s, and when the United States entered a serious recession in 1982, 
high-tech companies seemed largely immune from the nation’s economic woes.34 A sig-
nificant number of investors therefore continued to pin their hopes on Apple and its Sili-
con Valley brethren. 
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In 1985, however, reality caught up with the computer industry. As the New York 
Times reported in the summer of that year, uncritical investors had dumped truly incredi-
ble sums into high technology firms in the past decade. The amount of money invested in 
computer companies, the article reported, “rose from $600 million in 1977 to $19 billion 
in 1983,” and as a result, the number of high-tech corporations had exploded, with per-
sonal computer manufacturers mushrooming from 8 to 47 between 1981 and 1985, while 
software companies had multiplied from 34 to 280.35 However, one financial analyst con-
ceded that these investments were “a very huge waste of money” because most of the tar-
geted corporations “did not advance technology but merely offered variations of other 
companies’ products.”36 In other words, the ready availability of capital for tech companies 
had allowed them to flood markets with indistinguishable personal computers and soft-
ware, completely saturating existing demand for the new technology—in 1985, most 
computer firms simply could not find customers for their products, and many went out of 
business.37 “What we’re going through is a large-scale hangover from a speculative orgy,” 
lamented the chairman of Hambrecht & Quist, an investment banking firm that had 
helped handle Apple’s initial public offering.38 The incredible growth that Apple had en-
joyed as one of the first companies in a new industry thus came to a screeching halt, and 
if the company survived the 1985 tech slump—which was not guaranteed—Sculley fore-
saw that finding significant numbers of new customers would be a serious and ongoing 
challenge. 
As Sculley surveyed the wreckage around him at Apple in the summer of 1985, he 
saw few reasons to be optimistic, and he struggled to come up with a strategy for putting 
Apple back on a solid business footing. Stock values had plummeted, employee morale 
was understandably low in the aftermath of the mass layoff he had executed, and even 
more troublingly for the long term, Sculley was beginning to realize that the much-
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vaunted Macintosh was simply not going to spark a mass computer revolution. Although 
Sculley admitted he had been swept up in Jobs’s “precocious, mesmerizing” vision of 
computer power for ordinary people, when he began to scrutinize the actual Macintosh 
sales data, he came to an unexpected realization: “The home market,” which Sculley and 
Apple had been depending upon to “driv[e] our growth, was a figment of everyone’s 
imagination.”39 As Sculley took a harder look at the actual capabilities of Apple’s products, 
he had to conclude that the “average consumer simply couldn’t do anything useful with a 
computer.”40 Despite the Macintosh team’s unshakeable faith that they were building a 
machine that would extend computer power to ordinary people while enchanting and de-
lighting them, in reality, the $2,495 machine—about $5,795 in 2016 dollars—did not 
have a diverse enough array of capabilities to satisfy most potential customers.41 As Sculley 
put it, “Most people who bought computers stuffed them in the closet because balancing a 
checkbook wasn’t reason enough to flick on the switch.”42 Although Apple still had strong 
relationships with schools, who had formed an important backbone for Apple II sales, 
Sculley began to believe that selling the pricier Macintosh in significant numbers would 
require Apple to break into a new and less familiar market: large corporations. “We would 
have to dramatically alter the whole orientation of Apple Computer,” Sculley averred; 
“Not its values, its groups, its environment, but the kind of business it was in.”43 Corpo-
rate customers, Sculley deduced, “perceived that technology had some functionality to it 
and were willing to pay for that functionality,” so he held out some hope that Apple could 
pull back from the brink if the company could win a number of business contracts.44 
Although Sculley’s desire to pursue corporate customers made some sense from a 
business strategy point of view, his employees were not happy when he made his plans 
known. In addition to the anxieties caused by 1985’s painful layoffs and Apple’s fast-
shrinking profits, Sculley was effectively telling employees that their desire to empower 
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ordinary people with useful computers was little more than an illusion, while simultane-
ously informing them that they needed to focus all their efforts on selling machines to the 
very customers Apple employees most despised—large corporations. Even worse, to suc-
ceed in business environments, the Macintosh would need to be able to talk to the com-
puters made by IBM, Apple’s greatest adversary. Due in no small part to the failure of the 
Apple Lisa and the Macintosh group’s inability to deliver a fully functional Macintosh Of-
fice software suite on time, IBM had been able to capitalize on its longstanding ties to the 
corporate world and had secured a large enough position in the market to be seen as the 
business standard in personal computing. Conceding that Apple, in its weakened state, 
could not mount a successful assault on IBM’s market share, Sculley immediately called 
on his workers to produce the hardware and software necessary to integrate Macintoshes 
into IBM-dominated offices, but some Apple employees balked. “Even faced with Apple’s 
possible ruin,” Sculley remembered, “people still resisted reaching out to business markets, 
connectivity, and coexistence with IBM—their all-time enemy, the symbol of evil.”45 
Sculley faced outright mutiny in the ranks—a few employees “rebelled, some refusing to 
work on products like MS-DOS co-processors cards and IBM mainframe terminal emula-
tors that would allow us to coexist with IBM.”46 Sculley recognized that much resistance 
stemmed from the fact that he was not a technologist, but a transplant from corporate 
America with an Ivy League pedigree. He heard his employees muttering, “How could a 
soda-pop executive lead us in a direction we can trust?”47 
Similar doubts about Sculley’s leadership abounded across Silicon Valley. As Mi-
chael Moritz, puts it, corporate leaders in the tech industry had come to see themselves as 
“people with daring imaginations and a yen for risk,” and Steve Jobs, as “Silicon Valley’s 
most precocious child,” had come to serve as something of a standard-bearer for the indus-
try’s most iconoclastic traits.48 Sculley therefore faced significant pressure from the rest of 
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the field to maintain Apple’s rebellious image, as was made clear in a letter he received 
from Technologic Partners, one of the third-party developers Apple depended upon to 
create supporting products for its computers. “You were right, Apple is like Dynasty. It’s 
prime-time viewing,” the letter began, and suggested that Sculley was “left without much 
room to wriggle as we all watch you try to turn a consumer company into a computer 
company.”49 The letter granted that Jobs could “be maddeningly obdurate and capricious,” 
but Technologic Partners simply did not see how Apple could survive without “his in-
stincts, enthusiasm, wit, impatience, competitiveness and plain voltage.”50 Such commu-
niqués revealed that Silicon Valley observers would be scrutinizing Sculley’s every move as 
he struggled to revive the corporation, measuring whether he was holding fast to Apple’s 
singular image. 
Sculley was therefore deeply uncomfortable position as Apple’s leader in 1985, a 
situation made all the worse by his personal financial problems. The value of his stock op-
tions had plummeted, and he had to admit to his wife that this had made them completely 
bankrupt because of the $3 million personal loan he had taken out to buy more shares in 
1983—the only way he could climb out of the hole was by recovering some of Apple’s 
value on the stock market, which he clearly wanted to do as quickly as possible.51 In addi-
tion to the high personal financial stakes weighing on Sculley, he knew that if he failed to 
revive Apple, many former colleagues from his Pepsi days would think he was getting his 
just deserts for making a rash move to a new industry, while his Silicon Valley peers would 
be confirmed in their suspicions that he was an outsider without the nerve or skill to suc-
ceed in high technology. Failure at Apple would see him forever ostracized from the upper 
echelons of corporate America—there would be no second chances to prove his mettle as a 
business leader.52 Yet the only way Sculley saw out of the 1985 crisis was by seeking con-
tracts with large corporations, a move that inspired serious doubts among his employees 
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and other Silicon Valley observers. On top of all this, Sculley possessed no little hubris 
about the vital importance of the tech industry to the overall health of the national—and 
even global—economy. According to Sculley, Silicon Valley was supposed to guide the 
United States into a profitable post-industrial age, to “become a territory as rich as the 
country’s steel belt became poor,” and to “len[d] hope that innovation and creativity were 
still possible in American business.”53 “If the Valley was doomed,” Sculley agonized, “so 
was the country.”54 Time would only deepen these beliefs—at the 1988 Macworld Expo, 
Sculley raised the stakes to dizzying rhetorical heights. In making the transition from an 
industrial business paradigm to a post-industrial one driven by high-tech innovations, 
Sculley intoned, “What is at risk is not simply our own standard of living, but also the 
health of the world economy.”55 Casting Apple as an exemplar of the new business ideas 
and technologies that would drive future economic growth, Sculley suggested that the 
success or failure of his company would say much about the health of global capitalism.  
The various personal, ideological, and business pressures weighing on Sculley 
shaped his handling of the 1985 crisis at Apple in deeply contradictory ways. On the one 
hand, his own financial losses and the doubts of colleagues made him want to restore Ap-
ple’s growth speedily, which pushed Sculley to aggressively pursue contracts with large 
corporate customers. On the other hand, this strategy conflicted with Apple’s image as an 
iconoclastic anti-corporation, which risked alienating employees and frustrated Sculley’s 
own desire to cast Silicon Valley’s unusual business practices and working environments 
as the key to the future prosperity of the U.S. economy. To begin to get a handle on these 
complex problems, Sculley saw his most pressing task as gaining more control over Ap-
ple’s recalcitrant workforce so that they would be more pliable to his executive decisions, 
but he also wanted his employees to embody the incredible corporate devotion and labor 
productivity he had witnessed on the Macintosh team to drive Apple beyond the crisis as 
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quickly as possible. However, Sculley, unlike Jobs, would not rely on abusive tactics or ag-
gressive psychological manipulation to maintain employees’ faith in Apple or gain direct 
influence over workers. Instead, he would undertake a softer campaign, appealing to em-
ployees’ sense of elitism and reassuring them with a variety of symbolic gestures, while 
simultaneously installing managerial structures that would make it easier for Apple man-
agement to apply pressure to employees to make them more productive and accountable 
to executive orders. The remainder of this section examines Sculley’s own account of how 
he managed employees during the 1985 crisis, which he presented as a series of smart tac-
tical maneuvers that got employees on board with an essential business strategy, all with-
out sacrificing “Apple’s soul.” However, I also highlight some of the questionable aspects 
of Sculley’s tale and explain some of the key problems with his decision to pin Apple’s fu-
ture on business customers. 
Sculley’s depiction of how he modulated employee expectations during the 1985 
crisis revealed his personal proclivity for mythmaking and storytelling. To gain greater 
control over Apple, Sculley determined that he needed to create a more conventional cor-
porate bureaucracy, but he also claimed that he did not want to further alienate employees 
with such an overt symbol of traditional corporate authority. It would be necessary, he 
reasoned, for his employees to see people whom they trusted occupying the new positions 
of power. “So while I turned to a traditional organizational concept,” Sculley remem-
bered, “I reached for non-traditionalists to fill some of the key jobs.”56 Chief among these 
was Del Yocum, a “California laid-back” employee who had been with Apple since 1979 
and had risen to general manager of the Apple II group. Yocum bore primary responsibil-
ity for installing and directing the new managerial hierarchies, as well as overseeing the 
extensive layoffs and clamping down on errant teams, processes that Sculley knew could 
get messy. “Giving this job to Del,” in Sculley’s words, “made it more [palatable] to the 
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organization.”57 Sculley continued, “If I tried to superimpose controls over freewheeling 
Apple, it would have been as if corporate America had rushed in to clamp down the com-
pany. Del, one of the Apple originals, could install the process without creating anxiety. If 
I did it, it would scare people to death.”58 
Sculley included this anecdote in his memoir as evidence of his deft managerial 
skills, specifically his ability to bring some conventional order and business sensibilities to 
Apple without employees feeling a thing. But the notion that putting Yocum in charge 
completely blinded Apple employees to the new hierarchies strains credibility, especially 
when a company-wide memo from 1988 spoke openly to employees about the existence 
of said bureaucracy. This memo, penned by Sculley himself, summarized why he had cre-
ated “a functional organization structure” in 1985 to install a “centralized decision proc-
ess,” which allowed him to more effectively make and enforce top-down directives 
through a managerial hierarchy.59 While that structure had been appropriate at the time, he 
continued, “today it is too hierarchical to create a focused and exciting work environ-
ment.”60 As a result, he initiated New Enterprise, a company unit composed entirely of 
“middle managers,” to revise Apple’s organization for the future.61 Chief among the 
group’s recommendations was that Apple should use its “own technology, a flat organiza-
tion structure and a network vs. a hierarchical paradigm to lead by example in innovation, 
quality, and flexibility. We will be a model of a great 21st Century company.”62 Clearly, 
Sculley could not refer so offhandedly to the hierarchical bureaucracy he had created in 
1985 if employees had no inkling that it existed. And employees could hardly miss the 
fact that Sculley tapped middle managers—rather than rank and file workers—to conceive 
Apple’s restructuring, which suggested that the managerial bureaucracy originally installed 
in 1985 would continue to wield a great deal of authority within the updated company. 
Moreover, this memo post-dated Sculley’s 1988 Macworld speech by some eight months 
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and his memoir by more than a year, which reveals that the ways he presented Apple to 
the public—as a revolutionary “network” of “temporary teams…. designed for manage-
ment by dissent”—were in essence prospective visions, yet to be attempted in reality.63 
Sculley offered an equally questionable account of how he convinced employees 
that selling Macintoshes to corporations was not a betrayal of the computer’s creators’ in-
tentions to empower ordinary people, nor a breach of Apple’s own anti-corporate culture. 
First, Sculley said he appealed to employees’ beliefs in the inherent superiority of their 
product. He assembled evidence from Apple’s corporate customers to prove that “Macs 
were easier to use by far than IBM personal computers and…they were used far more fre-
quently because of it. The average IBM PC in business is used only thirty minutes a day, 
while a Mac gets more than two hours of use daily.”64 Citing the Macintosh’s revolution-
ary graphical interface and multitasking capabilities, Sculley also found that corporate 
Mac users ran far more programs, indicating the Macintosh’s superior versatility. Moreo-
ver, Apple’s marketing division discovered that offices were buying Macintoshes and Ap-
ple laser printers to make use of the computer’s unique word-processing and text format-
ting capacities to design and print in-house “newsletters, circulars, and even books.”65 
Dreaming up the name “desktop publishing” to describe these activities, Apple’s market-
ing and sales teams turned this unexpected office use of the Macintosh into an effective 
sales pitch, while Sculley worked avidly to convince employees that even corporate cus-
tomers could find creative uses for the Macintosh’s graphics.66 However, the contention 
that Apple’s early corporate customers—banks, insurance companies, and other traditional 
firms—were doing truly amazing text and graphics publishing with the Macintosh some-
what overstated the case. As Sculley revealed in his memoir, most companies were simply 
enticed by the prospect of cutting costs and increasing efficiency by creating documents 
in-house rather than “send[ing] their printing jobs to outside printers.”67 No reliable re-
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cords exist to corroborate whether employees cared deeply about desktop publishing, but 
once the shock had worn off of Apple’s new emphasis on corporate customers, employees 
could certainly appreciate that the strategy was good for the bottom line, with new busi-
ness contracts bringing Apple back from the brink of destruction by the end of 1985. 
Sculley insisted that shielding employees from the new managerial realities at Ap-
ple and his arguments about Macintosh’s uses in corporate offices were necessary strate-
gies to regain employee trust in the aftermath of the 1985 crisis—tokens and symbols that 
would reassure them in a time of uncertainty. But I argue that Apple employees’ aspira-
tions and motivations were more complex, and that Sculley had not completely hood-
winked the company’s workforce into believing that their company was operating accord-
ing to its original mission of creating a computer revolution for the masses. As I will show 
in the subsequent sections of this chapter, official corporate rhetoric had long encouraged 
employees to see themselves as elite performers, and to see high productivity as a matter 
of individual determination and skill, blurring the lines between professional success and 
personal identity. As we will see, a number of employees came to understand their ability 
to contribute to Apple’s business goals as something that called on their essence as unique 
human beings, not simply their skills as paid laborers. Moreover, as I explained in chapter 
1, Apple had enticed some employees to align their professional exertions with Apple’s 
stock value by giving them options to buy shares out of their salaries—in the aftermath of 
the 1985 crisis, Sculley greatly expanded the employee stock purchasing program, pushing 
a larger proportion of his workforce to tie up more of their compensation in Apple shares, 
which gave them direct financial incentives to be conscious of how their daily perform-
ance might impact the corporation’s financial value, and to be more committed to the 
business strategies that would most serve Sculley’s own financial self-interest.68 Finally, 
while Sculley installed a more powerful—and punitive—corporate bureaucracy to scruti-
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nize and manage his employees, he softened this structure with a multitude of symbolic 
gestures and workplace practices that largely maintained Apple’s look and feel as an un-
conventional employer, and granted many employees considerable feelings of autonomy 
with respect to how they carried out their jobs on a day-to-day basis. 
The corporate culture that emerged at Apple after 1985 therefore brought to the 
surface many of the inherent conflicts in the company’s identity. While workers—and 
executives—had been inspired by the mission of bringing computer power to the masses, 
and enjoyed their popular notoriety as technological visionaries operating in an unortho-
dox corporate environment, they also desired the luxuries afforded by working at a fast-
growing corporation with a cozy relationship to Wall Street. There were thus complexities 
and layers to every development at Apple during this era, and many mixed feelings. As 
John Sculley’s leadership took Apple to new heights between 1985 and 1990, employees 
found themselves pondering what kind of company Apple really was, even as they hoped 
that the gravy train would not come to an end. Before I turn to a closer analysis of corpo-
rate rhetoric and employee experiences under Sculley, however, I want to briefly outline 
the fundamental flaws in Sculley’s overarching business strategies, because the choices he 
made during the 1985 crisis would ultimately lead Apple into an even graver series of cor-
porate catastrophes in the 1990s, with deeply troubling consequences for Apple employ-
ees. 
When Sculley aggressively pushed Apple into the corporate market for personal 
computing in 1985, the unique graphical and textual capabilities of the Macintosh helped 
the company capture a new, niche market in desktop publishing, which helped Apple post 
some much-needed profits and move past the crisis. Yet Esther Dyson, an influential 
journalist, venture capitalist, and self-described “matchmaker” for business partnerships in 
the high-tech industry, wondered whether it was wise for Sculley to bet Apple’s future al-
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most exclusively on large business customers. “Does Apple really belong in the corporate 
marketplace?” she asked Sculley in a personal meeting. “Or is it like Dorothy, searching 
for happiness far away in Oz when the true riches lie at home, in the small business and 
education markets so familiar and friendly to Apple?”69 Sculley, however, did not heed her 
advice, and he failed to take the time to reassess Apple’s strengths and to chart a more 
careful, multipronged, long-term course for healthy expansion. The problem was that 
desktop publishing was the only segment of the corporate market where Apple had sig-
nificant traction, not least because Steve Jobs’s undermining of the Lisa and his failure to 
deliver Macintosh Office had crippled Apple’s ability to compete with IBM for mainline 
corporate computing contracts. Moreover, Apple only dominated desktop publishing be-
cause no other computer company in the mid-1980s could offer comparable textual and 
graphics capabilities, and somewhat incredibly, Sculley did little to prepare for potential 
competitors in that field, even though he was well aware that at least one powerful tech 
company was working hard on systems software that would allow any other computer to 
match the Macintosh’s capabilities at a fraction of the price. That company was Microsoft, 
but like Jobs before him, Sculley failed to take seriously the company’s new operating sys-
tem, Windows.70 Windows, of course, would ultimately almost put Apple out of business. 
If Sculley, however, had truly let Apple be “manage[d] by dissent,” and valued his em-
ployees’ perspectives on the kinds of technologies and strategies Apple should pursue, 
there might have been a much more vigorous company debate about how Apple should 
deal with the threat posed by Microsoft Windows.71 As it was, Sculley instead pushed his 
employees to focus on their attentions on quarterly profits and fluctuations in Apple 
stock values, fostering a culture where short-term gains assumed much greater importance 
than coherent long-term strategies. Although Apple’s board would ultimately fire Sculley 
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in 1993, as we will see, it was once again employees who suffered the most as a result of 
the direction Apple took under Sculley. 
 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ANTI-CORPORATION 
During the latter half of the 1980s, corporate rhetoric and managerial tactics at 
Apple strove to maintain employee faith in the company’s image as a rebellious anti-
corporation, but at the same time, Apple’s leadership worked to enforce greater employee 
accountability to executive directives and corporate financial goals. In the previous sec-
tion, we witnessed John Sculley’s rather fabulous contentions that Apple employees were 
effectively shielded from signs that their employer had installed a much more conven-
tional—and much stricter—managerial bureaucracy, and that he had convinced his 
workforce that selling computers to large corporate customers was not a betrayal of Ap-
ple’s mission to empower the average individual. In this section, however, I present evi-
dence that indicates Apple’s professional staff was well aware of the contradictory impulses 
that motivated Sculley’s executive decisions in the aftermath of the 1985 crisis, and that 
employee decisions to capitulate to Sculley’s managerial directives rested on a number of 
tacit bargains regarding the character of day-to-day working experiences at Apple. Once 
again, however, we will see that Apple employees proved more invested in maintaining 
the more intangible symbols of their workplace freedoms than in securing stronger job 
security guarantees or more meaningful control over the scope and extent of their profes-
sional responsibilities. 
Most of the sources for this section come from original archival research. In part, I 
draw upon Apple brochures and publications that specifically targeted employees, and 
which explicitly sought to shape worker beliefs and behaviors. This kind of corporate 
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rhetoric, designed to enhance employee faith in the company and secure greater loyalty to 
corporate causes, has been around for a long time. As Roland Marchand details in his his-
tory of corporate public relations efforts, as U.S. firms began to grow increasingly large 
and impersonal in the early decades of the twentieth century, business leaders worried that 
employees might feel alienated from their corporate employers, and companies therefore 
developed a number of publicity efforts to convince employees that even large corporate 
enterprises possessed humanistic concerns and impulses.72 Some of the Apple documents I 
cite directly extend this venerable tradition of corporate rhetoric, but Apple’s archives at 
Stanford also include a compelling collection of employee-produced ephemera, which of-
fers fascinating and valuable glimpses of employees negotiating such corporate rhetoric 
and ideologies on the ground. In combination, the records I cite show that Apple pushed 
employees to believe that they were part of an elite and highly committed class of profes-
sionals who should be willing to devote themselves heart and soul to their work, and that 
Apple’s leadership simultaneously subjected employees to fine-grained biannual reviews to 
scrutinize whether they were truly contributing enough to the company’s growth and 
profits. In return for high commitments, Apple promised to provide employees with sub-
stantive personal growth opportunities, a fun and invigorating working environment, 
and special rewards for exceptional performers. For their part, employees grappled openly 
with the high workplace pressures they faced, Apple’s declining commitments to empow-
ering the average person, the specter of a stricter managerial hierarchy, and the apparent 
financial benefits of going along with Sculley’s overarching corporate strategies. And al-
though a number of Apple employees expressed significant doubts and concerns about the 
state of their company, they struggled to move beyond fleeting and individualistic re-
sponses to the problems they saw at Apple. 
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The corporate rhetoric that Sculley and his leadership team used to shape employee 
attitudes during the latter half of the 1980s was not entirely of their own invention. As we 
saw in chapter 1, work at Apple was subject to a mythologizing tendency from the com-
pany’s earliest days, indicated perhaps most clearly in the Macintosh group’s undying 
proclamations that they were anti-corporate warriors, but who spent most of their waking 
lives in Apple’s offices, pouring the lion’s share of their energies and passions into making 
a corporate product. Extrapolating from these employee mindsets, company rhetoric 
memorialized the notion that Apple was an unconventional workplace. For example, a 
1983 employee handbook, Welcome to the World of Apple, highlighted Apple’s unique 
mission to extend computer power to the masses, exclaiming that the company and its 
employees were deeply “proud of what our personal computers are and will be doing for 
individuals and society,” and inviting new hires “to share in our adventure with us.”73 In-
deed, the handbook continued, “Society will be dramatically altered as personal computers 
extend our individual capabilities far beyond current limitations,” and Apple was “com-
mitted to making major contributions to the expansion of human potential.”74 “Our pride 
and enthusiasm,” the pamphlet continued, “are reflected in the way we work at Apple. 
You will find that it is an open, friendly place where hard work coupled with creativity is 
prized. We encourage flexibility and innovation and avoid formality. We don’t hide be-
hind doors or titles.”75 
A 1984 follow-up, Inside Apple, established that Apple’s difference from other cor-
porations began with its very name, which “didn’t sound like other high-tech compa-
nies.”76 The booklet continued, “Even the logo was different. Multi-colored stripes aren’t 
the stuff serious logos are made of. Why an apple? Why bright stripes?”77 Inside Apple ex-
plained that “these important symbols” indicated that Apple’s computers were “friendly, 
approachable, simple, and affordable” machines “that enable people to be more creative 
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and productive than they ever dreamed possible.”78 The subsequent 1985 employee hand-
book spoke more directly to the rebellious pretensions that had grown up among the Mac-
intosh crew. Insisting that Apple managed its workforce “with vision and shared values, 
rather than rules,” the document stated that the “development of Macintosh is a prime 
example of our vision. While everyone else in the industry was in a headlong rush to be-
come ‘compatible,’ Apple was in a headlong rush to become better.”79 Announcing that 
the company was always looking to hire and retain “[p]eople with the skills and sense of 
daring that characterized the early pioneers,” the handbook asked its readers, “So, which 
would you rather do? Follow the so-called rules and be ‘compatible’? Or follow a vision? 
And change the world.”80 To preserve this spirit, the booklet promised, “we don’t have a 
rigid, structured, bureaucratic organization.”81 
While these documents emphasized Apple’s unconventional business strategies 
and working environments, other company policies and publications addressed the quali-
ties and characteristics Apple looked for in employees. According to much corporate 
rhetoric, not just anyone could succeed at Apple—the company explicitly looked for elite 
performers who were willing to push themselves beyond conventional expectations. A 
1984 memorandum on compensation and performance reviews, for example, stated, “We 
seek better than average people and expect from them a better than average perform-
ance.”82 A company handbook from the same year likewise touted that Apple employees 
generated more revenue than their counterparts at most other companies, demonstrating 
a high level of individual commitment to Apple’s business goals. “To have achieved an-
nual sales of $1 billion with fewer than 5,000 employees demonstrates the importance of 
each individual’s contributions,” the handbook read. “Most billion dollar companies have 
twice as many employees and are proud of adding more.”83 The 1987 revision of the Apple 
Values, composed at the height of Sculley’s reign, reiterated the theme. “We expect indi-
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vidual commitment and performance above the standard for our industry,” the Values in-
formed employees. “Each employee can and must make a difference[,] for in the final 
analysis, individuals determine the character and strength of Apple.”84 An undated memo 
explaining employee benefits at Apple offered softer words for the corporation’s hard-
working staff, but also made clear that high performance was primarily recognized 
through rewards linked to quarterly balance sheets and stock values. “Apple Employees are 
special people,” the memo read. “They’re hardworking, committed and their performance 
far outstrips the industry average…. As a result, our benefits and compensation philoso-
phy is fired by a simple and compelling idea: Outstanding people deserve the best!”85 “It all 
Begins with Money,” the memo elaborated, outlining that top performers could expect 
bonuses in the form of special stock options, all-expenses-paid vacations, and, if quarterly 
profits warranted, a profit-sharing program.86 
But Apple management suggested that there were additional, intangible rewards 
that employees would derive from pushing themselves to perform at the peak level. In 
particular, Apple promised to support employees’ personal growth in the workplace, and 
Sculley was an especially keen advocate of the idea that Apple and other post-industrial 
companies should give employees ample opportunities to learn new skills and explore new 
ideas and fields on the job.87 At Apple, the primary avenue for employees to pursue self-
growth was through a company organization called Apple University, formed in 1983. 
Yet there was some dissonance between the official purpose of Apple University and how 
the company presented the organization to employees. Apple University’s brief charter 
revealed that company leaders primarily expected the organization to improve employee 
productivity, explaining that the “purpose of Apple University is to support Apple’s busi-
ness direction by designing and delivering” classes and resources to “optimize individual, 
team, and organizational performance.”88 A course catalog from 1985, however, suggested 
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that Apple University was committed to fulfilling employees’ personal aspirations in addi-
tion to developing workforce skills that would serve the company. In their introductory 
note, John Sculley and Steve Jobs proclaimed, “We want to do things that have never 
been done before, to create our own way of managing our business, to challenge ourselves 
to meet impossible goals.”89 To ensure that Apple would continue to be such a forward-
thinking and invigorating company, Jobs and Sculley continued, “we need commitment 
and discipline as well as great ideas. We must build inspired leaders and contributors that 
can help Apple continue to succeed and remain the industry’s innovator.”90 These state-
ments emphasized that Apple’s ongoing ability to satisfy employee goals relied on em-
ployees working hard every day to make sure that Apple was performing at its best, churn-
ing out innovative products and selling them at a profitable rate. Yet the catalog in-
formed employees that they could use the resources of Apple University to map their per-
sonal desires to the company’s needs. “Where do you want to be a year from now? Five 
years from now?” the catalog asked. Linking the personal to the corporate, the catalog 
continued, “Where is Apple heading? How will it get there? How can you make that hap-
pen?”91 By asking these questions, employees could begin to identity a path through Apple 
University that would speak to their personal aims and give them the satisfactions of high 
achievement, while simultaneously providing them with plenty of opportunities to make 
Apple a stronger business. Once employees knew where they wanted to go, Apple Univer-
sity promised to help them find the resources they needed to get there. The catalog in-
sisted that the whole process would cater to employee desires. “If you don’t see what you 
need in this catalog, talk to us. We’ll help you find it. Or create it,” the catalog assured 
readers. “So you see, Apple U. is really Apple You.”92 
Scanning through the actual course listings, however, does not exactly suggest that 
Apple University existed to help employees grow in diverse or deeply personal ways. The 
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first category of courses, “Self Management,” covered time management, understanding 
different personalities to improve teamwork, and negotiation tactics to extract better per-
formance from peers and subordinates.93 Likewise, employees could choose from an exten-
sive range of “Business Communications” classes to improve their presentation skills, their 
business writing, or the effectiveness of their meetings.94 Rounding out the offerings were 
some dozen classes to help employees use their Apple computers more effectively for work 
tasks.95 By taking advantage of such opportunities, the catalog assured employees, “You’ll 
be able to contribute and do more. So your division will be able to do more.”96 For all the 
talk about personal growth, the ultimate aim of Apple University was clearly to make em-
ployees perform more work more quickly and at a higher quality. “Let’s face it,” the cata-
log reasoned, “there are only two ways this company can grow. One way is to add a lot 
more people. The Other Way is to help the people already here to grow. Here’s to the 
Other Way.”97 
Some employees were apparently jaded about such attempts to align personal 
growth with corporate growth, as suggested by an official-looking, undated document 
that circulated around the company, bearing the title, “Voluntary Education Center: En-
rollment Form.” Much resembling other sign-up sheets for Apple activities or opportuni-
ties, a closer look revealed something a little off with this course listing. Interested em-
ployees, for example, could take such “Self-Improvement” courses as “SI 101: Overcom-
ing Peace of Mind” or “SI 109: How to Overcome Self-Doubt through Pretense and Os-
tentation,” as well as courses in “Business & Career,” including “BC 3: Packaging and 
Selling Your Child,” “BC 6: How to Profit From Your Own Body,” and “BC 7: The Un-
derachievers’ Guide to Very Small Business Opportunities.”98 In home economics, em-
ployees could explore “H 220: Biofeedback, and How to Stop It” or “H 408: Tap-Dance 
Your Way to Social Ridicule,” while the crafts subject area offered “C 101: Self-
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Actualization Through Macrame.”99 This course listing, which circulated through corpora-
tions around the globe throughout the 1980s and 1990s, was not the creation of an Apple 
employee, but it obviously resonated at least with the anonymous soul at the company 
who preserved it for posterity.100 Much as Apple University told employees that they could 
experience meaningful personal growth by better managing their time or performing 
more effectively during meetings, no few Apple people must have chuckled at the Volun-
tary Education Center’s equally questionable self-fulfillment opportunities. But the form 
was also indicative of the relatively insubstantial nature of employee criticisms of hollow 
corporate rhetoric, consisting more in private, sarcastic laughter over oblique satire than in 
concerted attempts to hold Apple leaders such as Sculley accountable to their promises to 
help employees grow. 
Employee motivation at Apple was therefore clearly a multipronged—and at times 
ticklish—affair. On the surface, corporate rhetoric and practice constantly sought to estab-
lish and sustain Apple’s status as an unusual corporation with a particularly inspiring mis-
sion—in other words, a corporation that was worthy of unusual commitments from em-
ployees who were themselves unconventional in their workplace aspirations and exertions. 
Yet the underlying point of massaging employees’ egos, offering “personal growth” op-
portunities, or trumpeting Apple’s specialness was to push workers to be more productive 
and committed to increasing corporate profits. But while Apple did offer tangible finan-
cial rewards to stimulate employees’ efforts, the company was less concerned with helping 
employees manage the stresses and strains of their high-intensity jobs, even under particu-
larly difficult conditions. Instead, employees were expected to find personal ways of cop-
ing with work-related pressures. 
A handout circulated to employees in the midst of the 1985 crisis offered a glimpse 
of the self-management techniques favored by Apple leadership. Titled “Prescription for 
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Achieving Excellence,” this document inquired after a variety of employee “symptoms.” 
“Feeling overworked?” the printout asked. “Anxious about deadlines? Concerned about 
not achieving excellence on a consistent basis?”101 The document’s “prescription” called 
on employees to find their own ways to handle the added strain. “Find something you 
love to do,” the memo pronounced airily, as well as exhorting, “Work hard and work 
smart, Focus on results,” and “Challenge yourself and learn from your mistakes.”102 If the 
stress was still too great, the handout had three more recommendations: “Make movies in 
your mind, Believe in yourself and take care of yourself,” and “Build support networks.”103 
The printout blithely glossed over such facts as the recent layoff that had cut 20 percent of 
Apple’s workforce or the pressure Sculley was applying to remaining workers to churn out 
new products and win important sales, which made for a particularly punishing pace and 
atmosphere at Apple at that moment. Instead, the handout simply called on employees to 
push themselves even harder by developing a range of coping tactics or tricks. Apple still 
expected excellent results from overtaxed workers in troubled times, and it was employ-
ees’ personal responsibility to figure out how to deliver. 
In pursuing this worker management strategy, Apple revealed an altogether con-
ventional set of priorities, in which company profits took a marked precedence over em-
ployees’ emotional or mental wellbeing. But it also demonstrated the subtler workings of 
managerial power at Apple. As Melissa Gregg argues, demands for employee self-
management have become endemic in white-collar workplaces. She writes, “Self-
monitoring and individual goal-setting become disciplinary techniques by which employ-
ees engage in the ‘deep acting’ required to implement management tenets.”104 The “Pre-
scription for Excellence” memo might therefore be read as management through the crea-
tion of self-doubt and anxiety. Rather than calling on managers to strong-arm their em-
ployees to work harder, which could devolve into counterproductive interpersonal con-
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flicts, the memo simply planted a series of questions into employees’ minds: Are you 
working hard enough? Are you working fast enough? Are you achieving the best results? 
What more can you do to live up to Apple’s needs and expectations? Such a communiqué 
could reinforce employee awareness that they were being measured and observed without 
making the authority of the managerial hierarchy seem overly harsh or palpable, helping 
preserve Apple workers’ sense that their jobs were largely self-directed and independent. 
As Gregg assesses these managerial strategies, “The autonomy of salaried work comes at a 
price: to constantly prove responsibility.”105 
The existing records of Apple employee experiences indicate that many workers at 
the company did internalize the necessity to prove their employability and to manage 
their own stress. Moreover, these records suggest that when employees raised more serious 
concerns about structural problems with Apple’s labor practices, other employees tended 
to reinforce the personal responsibility of each individual to deal with job-related pressures 
rather than encouraging collective actions to challenge or resist excessive workplace ex-
pectations. One of the main forums for employees to express concerns and talk about 
their experiences at Apple was the company’s online message board, HotLinks. Any Apple 
employee, from the CEO down to the newest entry-level hire, could start a new discussion 
on HotLinks, respond to an existing thread, or simply peruse old conversations, and the 
forum left contributors anonymous by default, so it was a place where workers could air at 
least some of their more general grievances without fears of identification or direct repri-
sal. Many posters, however, did choose to identify themselves on HotLinks, or at least 
named what division of Apple they worked for, and the printouts of conversations pre-
served in the archives at Stanford indicate that the forum drew participation from units 
across much of the company, including sales, marketing, human resources, product devel-
opment, industrial design, hardware engineering, and software development. Much of the 
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remainder of this chapter draws on these discussions, as they offer unique and revealing 
glimpses into how employees absorbed, interpreted, coped with, or criticized the executive 
decisions, workplace pressures, managerial hierarchies, and corporate rhetoric that I have 
described from a more top-down perspective in the preceding portions of this chapter. 
One particularly illuminating HotLinks conversation about excessive and unrea-
sonable workplace demands began in April 1988, when an employee from the field sales 
division started a discussion thread on the topic of burnout. “I have been with Apple for 
nearly 3" years,” the employee said, and the “pace has been fast and exciting. The work 
precedence we set for ourselves is absolutely incredible!”106 After giving this positive intro-
duction, however, the poster went on to describe conversations with a number of other 
longer-term employees, and reported that the “common theme in the conversations is 
BURNOUT.”107 “So many excellent people,” the employee continued, “are working them-
selves into the ground and feel that they have to in order to keep momentum in their ca-
reers as well as just stay on top of the business.”108 This comment captured the incredible 
pressures Apple employees faced, as well as a feeling of relative powerlessness to resist such 
excessive demands. The poster worried that this pattern would not be good for Apple in 
the long term, yet expressed faith that “Apple has always been a company that puts the 
individual first and cares about the quality of life for its employees.”109 Certain that some-
one, somewhere in Apple’s managerial hierarchy was considering this issue, the poster 
asked, “Can someone clue us in on what steps Apple is taking to address this problem?”110 
The first employee to respond acknowledged, “Burnout at Apple is a problem. We 
seem to operate at a level of intensity here that’s greater than the pace at other companies. 
Work can be seductive, and after a while of relentlessly pushing ourselves toward goal af-
ter goal, it’s easy to reach physical and mental ‘overload.’”111 Yet this employee did feel 
that Apple had already made a number of good faith efforts to help workers manage the 
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high expectations they faced, including company policies allowing for flexible hours and 
some work from home, as well as “practices such as beerbusts and celebrations to ease ten-
sion and promote socializing.”112 In addition, this response touted Apple’s policy of using 
“profit sharing to reward employees and as a by-product to ease financial concerns.”113 
However, the employee admitted that “these benefits cannot prevent burnout, they can 
merely make employees’ lives easier, more fun, and occasionally ease tensions.”114 But 
rather than calling on Apple leadership to examine and possibly revise policies or practices 
that drove employees to overwork, this commenter called on employees to find more 
ways to help themselves. “Ultimately, each employee is responsible for monitoring his 
own level of burnout, and doing something about it. And this takes the same self-
discipline we put into our work, but this time directed toward ourselves.”115 The employee 
continued, “It involves expressing our feelings and asking for help from our managers, 
HR liaisons, family and friends; taking time off when we need to; saying ‘no’ to requests; 
and paying attention to the parts of our life that are important, but have been ne-
glected.”116 Finally, this poster commented, employees could aid each other by monitoring 
for signs of burnout, and encouraging coworkers to get help if they seemed to need it. For 
this employee, a fun working environment and a few financial perks were all one could 
expect from Apple—it was apparently beyond this commenter to imagine collective em-
ployee pushback demanding a more reasonable, sustainable work pace or more meaning-
ful efforts from Apple management to help employees manage the strain the company 
placed on its workers. 
Another employee chimed in that a stress management class offered at the Apple 
Fitness Center had helped her “look at some of the things I was doing that increased my 
stress and tendency to feel burnt out,” a comment that assigned primary responsibility for 
employee stress to personal habits and behaviors rather than to Apple and its high-pressure 
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working environment.117 “Like any other class,” she continued, “the benefit you get from 
it is proportionate to the effort you put into it: their techniques won’t work for you unless 
you have the discipline to practice them.”118 Once again, this commenter reinforced the 
idea that individual employees needed to take personal responsibility for managing job-
related strains. 
The next commenter demurred, offering a distinctly more critical account of how 
difficult it was to actually stand up to excessive demands in an environment where most 
employees were unwilling to resist their managers’ requests. Gesturing sardonically to the 
Macintosh team’s infamous slogan, she said, “It seems my manager is a workaholic. He 
works eighty hours a week (and loving it!) and expects each of us to do likewise.”119 She 
and others in her group had repeatedly complained to human resources about his excessive 
expectations, but to no avail. “Therefore,” she continued, “as we in our group work our 
paltry 40 to 45 hours per week, we continually receive criticism for not turning out 
enough work,” and she reported that she and her colleagues were typically “shredded” on 
their formal performance reviews, precluding raises or profit-sharing perks.120 This com-
menter somewhat derisively noted the lack of significant action from the top of the com-
pany on the issue of overwork. “Around three years ago,” she wrote, “Sculley and HR 
made some noise about how Apple employees need to have a life away from Apple. Since 
then, silence.”121 The conclusion to her post offered a grim portrait of existence at Apple 
for people who wanted to preserve an identity beyond work: 
I have learned to say ‘no.’ I do the amount of work that I can do in a reasonable 
amount of time, while still leaving time for my husband and family. I have ac-
cepted the fact that I will get bad reviews for missing externally-imposed projects 
and deadlines. I have removed myself from the fast track—you know, the one that 
leads to heart attack and stroke—and accepted that working for my present em-
ployer means living indefinitely on a fixed income. For me, in my little corner of 
the world, that’s Apple.122 
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This employee revealed that Apple’s actual expectations for employee performance far ex-
ceeded contractual obligations, and that managerial reviews did not assess employees ac-
cording to their official job descriptions, but according to a much higher standard. In her 
experience, Apple’s bureaucracy functioned to punish employees who merely did their 
jobs, extending much-vaunted rewards like profit sharing only to workers who were will-
ing to forego much of a meaningful existence outside of the corporation. 
The final post on the thread did not respond directly to this searing account of life 
at Apple. Rather, the next commenter demonstrated a good working knowledge of offi-
cial company rhetoric. After acknowledging that she had just gone “through a bout with 
extreme burnout,” she wrote, “Most Apple employees are overachievers. We strive for ex-
cellence at all times, and at any cost. We are constantly trying to prove ourselves the very 
best. We ARE committed to ‘Changing the World’ and to Apple Values.”123 For this rea-
son, she continued, it was “no small wonder that the psychiatric community loves Apple. 
Apple provides a rich customer base with our overstressed and burned out employees.”124 
Indeed, the journalist Dennis Hayes reports that a 1988 study undertaken by Apple man-
agement “suggested that at least 65 percent of Apple employees were ‘in therapy’” or re-
ceiving some kind of professional counseling for work-related stress.125 But whereas Hayes 
was highly critical of the serious psychological strain associated with work at Apple, this 
employee at least was much more hesitant to place blame with the corporation, insisting 
emphatically, “THIS IS NOT APPLE’S FAULT…. Apple does its part and more to help us. 
But all that will not help if we don’t take care of ourselves.”126 She went on to offer tactics 
she had found effective for managing her stress, including making lists, exercising, and 
getting away from her desk for at least half an hour at lunch. Finally, she told her fellows 
on the message board, “If you know you are overworked and ready to break, and someone 
comes up and asks you to do three more things, you have to say NO.”127 This last bit of 
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advice made no acknowledgement of the previous poster’s experiences with managerial 
reprisals, and offered no advice for how to resist if a manager simply would not take no 
for an answer. 
This thread about burnout disclosed some important features about Apple employ-
ees’ and managers’ orientations toward the workplace. The participants in the discussion 
suggested that Apple workers tended to believe that it was extremely important to push 
themselves as hard as possible, even if excessive workloads could eventually lead to exhaus-
tion and depression. When employees reached their breaking point, they typically refused 
to view their difficulties as part of a larger, cultural problem at Apple, where grueling 
workloads were the norm. Instead, employees tended to blame themselves for not prop-
erly managing their self-care regimes. When workers did resist managerial demands that 
they believed exceeded their contractual obligations—or indeed, a healthy amount of ex-
ertion—they tended to be punished by managers, and found that human resources and 
company leadership would not support them in their refusals to work longer than a stan-
dard full-time workweek. Moreover, they could not even expect much moral support 
from colleagues across the company. Because Apple employees generally accepted that 
their jobs would exceed the boundaries of a 9-to-5 workday, spilling into the home and 
onto the weekends, and because they liked to see themselves as superior performers com-
pared to their associates at other technology corporations, Apple’s workforce did not per-
ceive a need to collectively resist their extraordinary workloads—indeed, they tended to 
see excessive performance as a desirable trait, and the ability to thrive under extreme de-
mands as a measure of personal strength and responsibility. 
Although the burnout thread on HotLinks suggested that many employees disci-
plined themselves to keep up the pace, managers used biannual performance reviews as 
their primary mechanism for penalizing or rewarding Apple employees. The performance 
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review guidelines, as revealed in a 1984 company memo, assigned each employee a “Pro-
ficiency Value” for the review period, which determined what percentage of their base sal-
ary employees would receive for the next six months. For example, an employee with 
only “the absolute minimum skills and experience to learn the job,” might be given a Pro-
ficiency Value of 80, which meant that he or she would be paid 80 percent of the base sal-
ary deemed appropriate for his or her position.128 On the other end of the spectrum, the 
guidelines continued, “Salaries for employees who deliver consistently excellent results 
should be aggressively moved above the Proficiency Range,” but warned that “only truly 
superior performers should be moving over 120% of the Proficiency Value.”129 Rather than 
requiring managers to grade their employees based on specific contractual obligations, the 
compensation guidelines gave managers relatively free rein to set their own performance 
objectives. The specific performance criteria listed placed an especially heavy emphasis on 
individual employees’ self-motivation, asking, “Has the individual displayed innovation 
and creativity in getting results? Can the individual get others to cooperate as needed? 
Does the individual bring problems or solutions?” as well as asking for comments “on the 
extent and the importance of the individual’s ability to work independently” and “on the 
quality of the individual’s judgment.”130 Finally, the guidelines codified the expectation 
that employees would be able to work outside regular hours, asking, “Does the individual 
make extra time available in crunches?”131 Thus, while performance reviews could be used 
to give especially “committed” or “superior” performers added perks and bonuses, they 
also gave managers extensive latitude to discipline employees who did not live up to Ap-
ple’s aggressive pace, furnishing tools to slash salaries and ostracize employees who ques-
tioned the company’s pervasive culture of overwork. 
The performance review sessions were the most obvious sign that Apple was mov-
ing toward a more conventional managerial bureaucracy under Sculley’s leadership, and 
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for employees who did resist working above and beyond what they believed their con-
tracts required, the compensation guidelines revealed a rather authoritarian managerial 
culture. Yet because so many employees did push themselves to exceed expectations, bi-
annual performance reviews could also serve as a stimulating challenge, motivating indi-
viduals to attain a higher Proficiency Value so they could purchase more stock from their 
salary bonuses or gain personal satisfaction and monetary rewards by being a bigger con-
tributor to Apple’s quarterly profits and profit-sharing rates. As I indicated above, Sculley 
was especially keen to connect employee rewards to Apple’s stock value. Commenting 
that he expected his employees to take the kinds of creative risks needed to drive Apple’s 
business forward, Sculley insisted that bold workers must “be given high rewards for their 
high risk, especially in stock options.”132 Although Sculley likewise suggested that it was his 
responsibility as Apple’s chief executive to sustain the company’s “vision and direction,” 
and “to protect that vision and not allow quarterly earnings to get in the way of its sur-
vival or growth,” tying up significant amounts of employees’ salaries in Apple stock was 
an extremely effective mechanism for motivating employees to do whatever was needed 
to make every quarter’s profit margins as high as possible, which would help raise the 
stock’s value.133 Employees could only buy stock through automatic payroll deductions, 
and once they opted in, payroll would continue to automatically divert a set amount of 
their incomes to Apple stock purchases unless employees submitted an official “intent to 
withdraw from the plan.”134 Employees diverting significant portions of their paychecks to 
purchases of Apple stock—and facing significant personal losses should that stock value 
fall—could hardly be content with modest corporate growth. The employee stock plan 
therefore considerably raised the personal financial stakes of Apple’s continued growth, 
and served as another mechanism to inspire above- average commitments from workers. 
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Yet, as the burnout thread on HotLinks suggested, the pace and pressure of life at 
Apple could exceed the stamina of even the most determined employees. Apple’s staff 
clearly needed more than just the promise of future financial rewards to keep them going. 
They wanted also to believe that their company was special, and this required a new round 
of corporate mythmaking. Even if Apple no longer emphasized its original ambitions to 
empower the masses, and was instead more focused on providing technological solutions 
to corporate America, employees wanted to see their products in a unique light, and to 
maintain a working environment that plausibly diverged from corporate convention. 
Senses of technological superiority, or at least uniqueness, were not difficult to maintain. 
Until 1990, with the release of Microsoft Windows 3.0, Apple’s Macintosh was the only 
personal computer on the market with a high quality graphical user interface and operat-
ing system, so it retained its position as the only computer in its class capable of handling 
advanced visual applications, graphic design, and sophisticated word processing.135 Moreo-
ver, Apple would not license its core hardware or software to other manufacturers, so it 
was able to maintain its status as an exclusive brand, whereas other personal computer 
companies simply made universal machines that could run the same standard operating 
systems, first IBM, and later Microsoft Windows.136 Corporate rhetoric helped keep alive 
the notion that no matter where Apple computers ended up, they would “make this world 
a better place to live.”137 “We build products that extend human capability,” the 1987 Ap-
ple Values said, “freeing people from drudgery and helping them achieve more than they 
could alone.”138 
For Sculley, however, the look and feel of Apple’s working environments mattered 
the most for maintaining employees’—and his own—faith that Apple still differed from 
more traditional firms, despite the company’s newfound emphasis on financial growth 
rather than technological empowerment and innovation. The value of this was impressed 
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upon Sculley in October 1985, when Apple held its annual end-of-fiscal-year summit, 
with meetings and presentations for employees across the company. Traditionally, the 
multiday event ended with a Halloween party, which Sculley did not believe Apple should 
hold when it was still in the midst of a crisis. But the company had made some gains, and 
a few other executives finally convinced Sculley that the celebration was a good idea. He 
decided to dress up as “the Spirit of Apple,” donning “long woolen underwear with a sil-
ver-painted face and multicolored stars for eyes.”139 “I didn’t look the part of a traditional 
corporate CEO,” Sculley recalled, which he said served as “the first sign that the spirit [of 
Apple] hadn’t died.”140 It was an important symbolic moment that indicated to employees 
that Sculley would not take the fun out of Apple, even if he was determined to install a 
more conventional managerial bureaucracy and to make employees more accountable to 
the company’s financial growth. Day-to-day work would still feel less formal, and every 
Friday afternoon would still break into a “beer bust,” giving employees a chance to drink, 
carouse, and blow off steam.141 
The following year, 1986, as Apple crawled back to profitability and began hiring 
again, orientation sessions for new additions to the company were calculated to highlight 
Apple’s unorthodox side. As new employees filtered into the orientation auditorium, disco 
tunes would be pumped through the room’s speakers, which the orientation leader’s guide 
described as “upbeat music that sets a mood of excitement and action”—and, the guide 
added, “The group leader must also radiate this feeling.”142 Giving orientation leaders more 
pointers on how they should conduct the sessions, the guide said, “The program’s most 
important goal is to give new employees a sense of excitement about Apple’s mission and 
potential for changing the world.”143 Insisting that the orientation leader’s enthusiasm for 
the company would “greatly influence the way new employees start out here,” the guide 
exhorted its readers to remember, “how you say things will be more important than ex-
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actly what you say.”144 The vehemently gregarious and cheerful tone of these orientation 
sessions indicated Apple leadership’s belief that it was essential to begin crafting the corpo-
ration’s unconventional image from the first moment that new employees set foot on the 
company’s campus, and that maintaining this mood was critical for keeping employees 
“comfortable and productive.”145 
As employees moved from their first training sessions into their actual workspaces, 
they would continue to encounter a plethora of symbols designed to put them at ease and 
demonstrate Apple’s divergence from corporate convention. “The work environment 
needs to be informal and relaxed,” John Sculley purred; “it needs to remove the symbols 
of management, which in the traditional company means the uniform of the business 
suit, the closed-in offices, the overabundance of titles, the executive perks.”146 As far as 
Sculley was concerned, Apple employees could wear whatever they wanted, so long as 
their performance remained high. During Sculley’s reign, Apple endeavored to fill the 
workplace itself with irreverent symbols and playful customs. For example, the company 
encouraged the employees of each division to come up with “themes” for their buildings, 
where “meeting and conference rooms aren’t identified by cold, impersonal numbers,” 
Sculley observed, but by personalized names.147 “In our ‘Land of Oz’ building,” for exam-
ple, said Sculley, “the conference rooms are named Dorothy and Toto. Our Management 
Information Systems Group has meeting rooms with names such as ‘Greed,’ ‘Envy,’ 
‘Sloth,’ ‘Lust,’ and the remaining deadly sins.”148 Finally, Sculley revealed, in many Apple 
buildings “each floor is outfitted with a red-topped popcorn cart, so everyone at Apple can 
even sniff how different we are. It’s another symbol to remind us that Apple is not a tradi-
tional corporation, so doesn’t think in traditional ways.”149 “It’s not accidental that many 
of these are the symbols of childhood (popcorn included),” Sculley concluded, arguing 
 152 
that regressing to a more tactile state of childlike “innocence” helped employees attain 
“the most creative state of all.”150 
To keep up impressions that Apple’s leadership itself was not stodgy or traditional-
ist, Sculley installed some intriguing characters in important positions of power. One ex-
ample was Jay Elliot, a bearded surfer who Sculley tapped to run human resources, and 
another was Jean-Louis Gassée, Steve Jobs’s replacement as the head of the Macintosh di-
vision and product development.151 A wisecracking French mathematician, Gassée was 
well known for describing computers in baldly erotic terms. “We must always give our 
user pure sex,” he once proclaimed. “It’s like a rendezvous in the back seat of an automo-
bile with a beautiful girl. One’s experience with the personal computer should be better 
than the greatest orgasm you could have.”152 By peppering his executive team with people 
whose personalities would have stuck out like sore thumbs as corporations like IBM, Scul-
ley wanted to send a clear signal to employees that Apple was still a place that welcomed 
oddballs, artists, and wizards. Yet from a business angle, some of the choices were ques-
tionable. Gassée, for example, was “primarily a marketing man” with no engineering ex-
perience, but he became the head of all product development at Apple—in a corporation 
that relied primarily on technological breakthroughs to distinguish its costly, non-
compatible products from a sea of cheaper alternatives that could all run the same soft-
ware, Gassée’s lack of technical know-how was problematic. 
As if to reassure himself that the combination of bizarre leadership choices and 
playful symbology comprised a bold vision for Apple’s business was not just some silly il-
lusion, Sculley asked rhetorically, “If a traditional corporation did the same, would it 
work?” He could only conclude, “Probably not,” as he argued that the installation of such 
symbols at Apple reflected his company’s deeply held values and vision, whereas at a more 
conventional firm they could only serve as hollow emblems.153 It may seem somewhat ab-
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surd to an outside observer that “sniffing” Apple’s difference and Sculley’s rather infantil-
izing perspectives on employee motivation could make staff members profoundly in-
vested in the corporation, but the evidence suggests that such symbols of Apple’s unique-
ness inspired passionate personal identifications on the part of many workers. The impor-
tance of these symbols came into full view in late 1988, when an employee started a 
thread on HotLinks about the dress code for the upcoming Macworld Expo, which set off 
a veritable firestorm of debate about the meaning of Apple. 
“Does everyone know that the ‘Dress Code’ for Apple Employees at Macworld this 
January is ‘Jacket and Tie’?” the post began.154 “I find this development very unnerving 
for Apple and its ‘image,’” the employee continued, because he felt that formal dress 
“gives people the impression that we are a very conservative and regimented company. 
Not the type of company that would be at the forefront of technical accomplishments. 
Not the type of company that would take risks with great, new products.”155 He contin-
ued, “I don’t think Apple should change its current image, especially since it is not really 
an image, but the truth.”156 For this employee, much like Sculley, the symbolic gesture of 
not wearing a suit and tie at an official trade show was not empty posturing, but an im-
portant marker of what kind of company Apple really was—an innovative corporation 
that was willing to take great risks to develop groundbreaking computers, a company that 
hired people based on ability to perform at high levels rather than capacity to conform to 
corporate standards. Another employee expressed surprise at this news, asking how Apple 
was going to enforce the policy, while yet another staff member found the whole idea 
completely implausible. “I find it funny that anyone would believe such a rumor about 
Apple trying to enforce a dress code! Come on!” he laughed.157 “The idea of a dress code is 
bizarre, ludicrous, and totally without merit as far as I’m concerned. I came to Apple to 
get away from stupidity and conformity and I don’t believe for an instant that Apple 
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would ever stoop so low as to establish a dress code for anything other than a formal 
event.”158 This employee had an abiding faith that Apple liked and trusted its employees, 
and that the company’s leadership could not care less about personal appearance, even at a 
key sales and publicity event. 
For another employee, the specter of a dress code was somewhat more unsettling. 
“There is a lot of talk going on outside Apple,” she noted, “about ‘how big’ Apple is be-
coming and how we are losing our ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ and turning into ‘another big 
company.’ While this is not true, wearing jackets and ties just may make it seem so. WE 
CANNOT LET THE WORLD BELIEVE THAT WE ARE LOSING OUR APPLE-NESS. 
WHAT ELSE WILL BE LEFT AFTER APPLITES BEGIN WEARING 
SUITS????????????”159 After first calling on everyone to protest the directive by wearing 
Levi 501s and Reeboks, she mused that there could actually be some value to “presenting a 
serious/professional image,” as it might make it easier to relate to representatives from 
other, more conventional companies.160 So she suggested a middle ground, telling at-
tendees to “wear something half-way professional (a jacket at least) but DO JAZZ IT UP 
A BIT!”161 For her part, she planned to wear “a skirt and jacket and (yeck!!!!) NYLONS to 
Macworld…. but I promise you my skirt will be plaid, and my earrings will be funky, and 
my colors will be bright!!! And my hair will be wild. They will KNOW I am with Apple!” 
She concluded her post, “PLAY THE GAME WHEN YOU HAVE TO, BUT NEVER, 
EVER GIVE IN!!!!!!”162 These comments revealed an interesting slippage between symbol 
and corporate identity. The employee was insistent that Apple was not losing its particular 
character, and implied that simply wearing a jacket and tie to a trade show would hardly 
destroy what made Apple special, but then redoubled her argument that the outside world 
could not be allowed to believe that Apple was becoming more traditional. At the end, she 
sought the middle ground, looking for an option that would allow her to fit more easily 
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into the broader corporate scene without feeling like she had betrayed her own unique per-
sona or Apple’s unconventional reputation. 
Two other employees took a slightly patronizing tone when responding to their 
more impetuous colleagues. One quipped, “Having a clean, currently fashionable suit to 
wear shouldn’t be too difficult, considering the wages and profit-sharing we pull around 
here. (I’ve even seen Steve Jobs in a suit and tie).”163 For this employee, putting on a 
jacket just for a trade show was not such a big deal, as Apple’s current business strategies 
made it especially important “to be taken seriously in the business world,” which could re-
quire a little flexibility from Apple employees, at least until “we are well enough accepted 
to re-define any rules or standards we don’t agree with.”164 “I get the feeling that some of 
us are getting paranoid about becoming ‘Big Blued,’” or more like IBM, he concluded.165 
“Perhaps we’re just afraid of growing up and accepting more mature standards of behav-
ior.”166 In this employee’s eyes, getting past the childlike state that Apple culture inten-
tionally cultivated might not be such a bad thing, and, in any case, once Apple was suc-
cessful enough, the company could go on breaking any rules it wanted. One of his col-
leagues was more blunt. “If you’re working the booth, play by the rules,” he snapped. 
“Apple’s upper management has a business strategy that’s worked damned well for us. If 
they think that wearing suits in the booth will help our image (thereby increasing sales, 
profit-sharing, benefits, etc.), play the game for a few hours. If you don’t want to play, 
don’t volunteer for the game.”167 Here was an employee completely won over by Apple’s 
heady pursuit of profits. After all, just a few months before this conversation started on 
HotLinks, Sculley had written to employees to tell them that fiscal year 1988 was Apple’s 
most profitable ever, with sales for the last quarter alone topping $1 billion.168 Insisting 
that the year’s biggest gains were made with Macintosh in business, Sculley happily an-
nounced a record-high profit-sharing bonus for employees.169 With such lucrative payouts 
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coming employees’ way, who could quibble about something so meaningless as a jacket 
and tie? 
But these posts hardly ended the debate. Another employee, who had grown up 
and started his career in Europe, gleefully mocked his colleagues’ fears of formalwear, as he 
had long faced ridicule for his habit of wearing a suit to work. Saying he had been judged 
“a ‘lesser’ engineer” on the basis of his attire and “asked by management to ‘dress down’ 
in order to gain credibility,” he proclaimed, “[a] uniform is a uniform whether it is formal 
or informal and for this reason alone it should be abhorred,” suggesting that Apple’s en-
forced informality could be just as suffocating as the rules in the blandest of corpora-
tions.170 On a similar note, another employee sarcastically chimed in, “I love the idea of 
ALL OF US wearing Reebok brand shoes and model 501 Levis brand jeans. We wouldn’t 
want anyone to think that we were a bunch of dress-alike corporate clones by wearing 
suits and ties would we?”171 In an attempt to close down the discussion, an employee who 
helped manage the product booths at Macworld argued that the same “dress code” had 
been in effect since 1978, and that he found the thread’s “comments about wearing a suit 
and tie very silly.”172 He continued, “We can take risks, we can make great new products, 
and we can be on the forefront of technology, and some of us do it while wearing ties!”173 
The thread went quiet for a while until after the Macworld Expo, when the em-
ployee who began the thread said what bothered him most was the idea of a “‘mandatory’ 
dress code,” when he felt that “[l]etting employees determine what they think is suitable 
for Apple should suffice.”174 He also relayed the fact that one marketing manager he knew 
had “silently protest[ed] the dress code” by not wearing “underwear under his suit.”175 
Moreover, he continued, John Sculley showed up at the Expo wearing “green corduroy 
slacks and a baggy Apple sweatshirt,” leading this employee to conclude that “the middle 
management of Apple” were the true villains, enforcing some kind of conformity that 
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even the chief executive bucked.176 This comment kicked off a new round of post-Expo 
deliberations. One employee noted that she “did indeed wear business clothes—a real cool-
looking skirt, blouse and jacket, great hair and makeup.”177 “But here’s the point,” she con-
tinued, “I did not give in to anyone else’s idea of how they thought I should look. I pre-
sented my own personal style—and received a lot of compliments because of it.”178 For 
her, maintaining a strong sense of personal identity was important, but so was being 
flexible as times changed. “[A]lthough Apple was built on the jeans and bare-feet culture, 
we are, either fortunately or unfortunately moving along with the times (and the 
money!), and growing up and ‘playing the corporate game.’”179 Given Apple’s need to 
stay profitable by courting business customers, this employee perceived that there would 
be trade-offs. But she likewise wanted to hold onto her sense of personal identification 
with her job. “The trick here is not playing the game,” she reasoned, “it’s making them 
THINK you play the game, while still maintaining that sense of self. Isn’t that the more 
important issue here?”180 
The employee who had suggested that everyone don their Reeboks and Levis ex-
pressed a similar perspective, saying that she had subverted the formalwear conventions 
with “funky earrings,” lots of hair mousse, and “un-solid-color pieces,” but also claimed, “I 
felt MOST comfortable in my running tights, Nikes, bright pullover windbreaker, and 
green bicycling sunglasses…. Somehow I really felt I represented the Apple spirit BEST 
when I was dressed like this yet had my briefcase slung over my shoulder. The contradic-
tion of casual/athletic attire and a business-like briefcase seemed to express both my crea-
tive side and my business side and I liked it!”181 This comment suggested that employees 
let their work at Apple spill out into other realms of their lives not simply because it was so 
demanding and time-intensive, but because it seemed to call on multiple aspects of their 
interests and personalities. In yet another post, she described the sense of empowerment 
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she derived from being able to express her personality through clothes on the job. For a 
business meeting at another company, she decided to wear “a sweater, baggy trousers, and 
shoes (gotta be careful not to wear holes in your socks),” and as a result she said she felt 
“comfortable and projected confidence and intelligence and a real sense of self.”182 Indeed, 
she argued, “dressing ‘down’ puts you to the test even more because what you say and 
how you present your ideas and thoughts count even more than if you ‘look the part’!”183 
Issuing a challenge “to all those people out in the corporate world,” she proclaimed, “take 
off those suits and ties you’ve been hiding behind and prove yourself in your tennis shoes! 
THIS is the ultimate test!”184 These comments got to the heart of how something as seem-
ingly simple as Apple’s lack of a dress code in day-to-day affairs could stimulate a deep 
personal connection to work. Employees could feel like themselves on the job rather than 
as if they were merely putting on a performance that had little to do with their personal 
identities, and they could therefore see their workplace successes as a true reflection of the 
self. 
Another employee was not so sure. Writing that he had been at Apple more than 
eight years—predating even John Sculley—he suggested that in the past, “Apple’s culture 
was stronger; wearing jeans was just a side effect.”185 Now, he mused, employees’ intense 
preoccupations with sartorial preferences indicated that Apple’s real values had been hol-
lowed out—if the corporation still commanded the faith of its employees, he contended, 
people would not be so anxious about something as mundane as wearing a jacket to a 
trade show. Even though he admitted that “Apple is getting closer to feeling like ‘just-
another-big-multinational,’” he called on his fellow employees to be more like “a family 
stretching itself to be the best on the inside.”186 Another commenter shot back that it was 
absurd for Apple to have the same values and character from eight years previous, as Apple 
was no longer the same company. In the past, he wrote, many Apple people might have 
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been inspired by “relating to the average Joe out there who just wants to know how a 
computer can help him.”187 But Apple had to face facts. “Unfortunately,” he said, “the av-
erage Joe doesn’t really need a computer yet, so we have to deal with corporate America. 
It’s very easy to scoff at the blue-suiters, but, let’s face it, they’re the ones who buy our 
boxes.”188 He warned that instead of obsessing over something ineffable like dress codes or 
the company’s heavily mythologized culture, Apple employees needed to focus on mak-
ing truly great products—he sounded a note of anxiety that Apple’s competitors were now 
producing computers and software that might not have the same elegance as the Macin-
tosh system, but which offered much the same functionality. Only by making truly excel-
lent products, he reasoned, would Apple remain “unstoppable.”189 
This lengthy and spirited debate, which linked together fashion, corporate culture, 
and personal identity, disclosed significant tensions in Apple employees’ aspirations to 
grow the company aggressively while holding onto their special, personal identifications 
with Apple’s unconventionality. Their conundrums echoed the experiences of the Macin-
tosh group, but where members of that project held fast to the fantasy that they were 
building their machine to extend computer power to the masses, Apple employees of the 
latter 1980s were more swept up in John Sculley’s drive to keep Apple’s productivity—and 
stock growth—at a premium. Yet many still sought assurance that their contributions to 
Apple’s single-minded pursuit of profits had not turned them into corporate drones. Yet 
here again, there were slippages. Some of the employees on the thread insisted that break-
ing with outward signs of corporate conformity—by donning funky clothes, wild hair-
styles, or flamboyant accessories—actually helped them play the corporate game at a 
higher level. The ultimate aim was therefore not to break the chains of workplace de-
mands, but to bind the self more closely to Apple’s challenging business goals. But at least 
a few employees pointed out that this orientation toward work was perhaps just as con-
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formist as wearing traditional business attire. Others were more straightforward in their 
assertions that Apple’s high profitability was more than enough recompense for periodi-
cally needing to appear more conventional. All of the employees, after all, believed they 
were profiting under Sculley’s leadership—on whichever side they fell of the fashion di-
vide, each employee was determined to find her or his own particular way to contribute 
more vigorously to Apple’s business strategies. 
Yet Apple employees’ were able to suppress their worries about Apple’s declining 
specialness and their confusion about the company’s direction chiefly because they felt 
like Sculley’s business strategies were paying off. Apple appeared to be growing and profit-
ing at healthy rates, and employees were seeing some of those benefits through stock op-
tions and special bonuses. For many workers who chimed in on the dress code discussion, 
their continuing faith in the inherent superiority of Apple technologies, the company’s 
overall financial health, and a handful of informal perks were enough to sustain their 
strong personal identifications with their jobs and to keep them wedded to Apple’s corpo-
rate mission. They did not, on the whole, express concerns that employees lacked mean-
ingful, collective control over their working environments, instead undertaking individ-
ual actions—such as not wearing underwear—to protest managerial directives they did not 
like. And even if employees were not entirely thrilled to be selling computers to corporate 
customers, no one participating in the conversation suggested that employees should have 
more say in what kind of business Apple was in. It was simply up to individuals, this 
thread suggested, to keep Apple’s spirit alive on a day-to-day basis, as long as Sculley and 
the rest of the executive team kept the profits rolling in by whatever means they believed 
were best. Yet as I indicated above, Sculley’s overarching strategies, established amidst the 
1985 crisis, were deeply flawed. As the 1980s came to a close, those flaws sent Apple into a 
downward spiral, where employees’ troubling lack of collective rights, workplace controls, 
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or influence over Apple’s business direction would play out most vividly in the conflicts 
over serious layoffs in 1990, 1991, 1993, 1996, and 1997. I chronicle the unraveling of 
Apple’s workplace myths in the next section. 
 
WE WANT TO BELIEVE: EMPLOYEE FAITH AND THE UNRAVELING OF SCULLEY’S NEW 
SOCIAL CONTRACT 
If many Apple employees and Wall Street investors got on board with John Scul-
ley’s post-1985 Apple relatively quickly, and largely maintained their enthusiasm for the 
corporation for the remainder of the decade, John Gantz, the business columnist for the 
industry magazine InfoWorld, saw the writing on the wall as early as 1986. “It’s hard to go 
against the pro-Apple sentiment these days,” he wrote in the summer of that year, noting 
that “Wall Street has doubled the company’s stock price in 1986” and that investors were 
expressing high confidence in the company’s future earning power.190 “But I am a still a 
little queasy,” he continued, claiming, “Apple is no longer a computer company. It is a 
financial engine. At the moment it is well-tuned—its operating margins are in line, and 
its hoard of cash enviable—but it also has an insatiable appetite for fuel.”191 Gantz ex-
plained that Apple “needs ever-increasing revenues,” on the order of thirty percent per 
year, and he calculated that the company would therefore need to post yearly growth of at 
least sixty percent in unit sales to cover the perpetually falling cost of hardware and soft-
ware.192 He was concerned that there was not enough demand for the Macintosh’s distin-
guishing features—sophisticated graphics and word processing—to justify that rate of 
growth for long. Gantz predicted that Apple might begin running into problems by the 
end of 1987. 
Gantz’s assessment was astute, although 1990 was the year that Sculley’s strategies 
began to crumble. Although Apple had turned out a few new models of the Macintosh, its 
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basic features and capabilities had not advanced appreciably since its debut in 1984, while 
Windows—which Jobs had called “really a piece of shit” the first time Bill Gates demon-
strated it for him—had progressed through a number of versions, slowly coming up to par 
with the Macintosh’s capabilities.193 Windows 3.0, released in 1990, was good enough for 
many corporate customers to make the switch.194 While Sculley had insisted that Apple’s 
proprietary hardware and software were the company’s “crown jewels,” the fact that the 
Macintosh operating system and software would only run on Apple hardware made the 
whole system much more expensive than competing computer manufacturers, whose ma-
chines would all run the same software.195 When the Macintosh offered unique capabilities 
in the mid-1980s, Apple could squeeze corporate customers because they had nowhere else 
to turn. When Windows 3.0 debuted, those customers gained the ability to do almost eve-
rything the Macintosh could do on computers that cost a fraction of the price. 
As we will see in this section, these larger shifts in the personal computer industry 
rapidly cut into Apple’s business, and I focus on the consequences for the company’s 
workers. It is in the period between 1990 and 1997 that the flimsiness of Apple’s new “so-
cial contract” with its employees comes into the clearest view, as Sculley and other execu-
tives repeatedly prioritized short-term profits over employee well-being or job security. 
Apple leadership repeatedly carried out sweeping layoffs in an effort to cut costs during 
bad quarters, and company policies increasingly measured worker performance according 
to impact on Apple’s stock value, while formalizing employees’ lack of rights and protec-
tions. I continue to draw on company policy documents, internal communications, and 
employee HotLinks discussions to show why the labor arrangements at Apple in the 1980s 
and 1990s were actually a terrible bargain for workers, despite the company’s repeated ap-
peals to fun and self-fulfillment on the job. 
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Employees at Apple’s headquarters in Cupertino, California, were the first to re-
ceive indications that the 1990s would be much more unsettled than the late 1980s. On 
the morning of January 12, 1990, they received a voicemail from John Sculley, who had 
some bad news. He reported that the initial data from the first quarter of fiscal year 1990, 
which began in October 1989, indicated “that our revenues and profits will not meet our 
original expectations.”196 He continued, “Given these results, we are reexamining our out-
look for FY90, and must take some immediate steps to bring expense growth better in 
line with revenue growth.”197 Sculley informed employees that they would soon receive a 
letter detailing specific plans to cut costs at Apple, which would include layoffs, a reduc-
tion of profit-sharing with employees, and new criteria for performance reviews, while ex-
ecutives would give up their luxury model company cars for more modest vehicles. Trying 
to strike a more reassuring tone, he said, “I want to emphasize that our business is funda-
mentally sound,” but asked for employees to understand that “even the most successful 
companies must have the flexibility to move quickly when times get tougher.”198 
Compared to the 1985 crisis, the layoffs in 1990 were rather more modest—when 
Apple’s executives finalized the figures on February 21, 1990, Sculley terminated about 
400 employees worldwide, in contrast to 1,200 in 1985. In his personal letter announcing 
the layoffs, Sculley tried to soften the blows with kind words for those losing their jobs. 
“The people who will be leaving Apple are good people who have contributed a lot to the 
success of this company,” he wrote. “Like the rest of us, they’ve worked long hours and 
shared in our hopes, successes, and dreams, as well as in our disappointments. It is impor-
tant to me that they leave Apple knowing how much they are appreciated, and with the 
full support of Apple behind them.”199 For those remaining with the company, Sculley 
granted that the next few weeks would be difficult, but asked employees to “try to re-
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member that these layoffs mean we’re nearing the end of a particularly difficult period for 
Apple,” suggesting that Apple would soon be back on track to profitability.200 
However, in a company that had extracted extraordinary employee commitments 
to fuel rapid growth, the drop in profits and the layoffs left some workers deeply unset-
tled. Given how much of themselves they had poured into Apple, they were disturbed to 
think that Apple executives would not think twice about sacrificing people to make the 
next quarter’s balance sheets look better. Such a maneuver smacked of the conventional 
corporate world—only businesses that did not care about their workers could be so ruth-
less, and many Apple people bought into the rhetoric that their employer cared about 
them as individuals. Yet a fact sheet generated by human resources to answer common 
questions about the terminations reinforced impressions that Apple was not deeply com-
mitted to its workers. The memo noted that even should Apple’s profits rebound, “We do 
not anticipate that the positions which are eliminated will be reinstated, and no laid off 
employees will be recalled.”201 As for whether terminated staff members could apply to 
work at Apple again, the fact sheet said that they could, but that they would “not be given 
preference in hiring.”202 Arne Kalleberg points out that such layoffs, carried out to “in-
creas[e] short-term profits by holding down the wage bill,” became increasingly common 
in the 1980s and 1990s.203 These permanent terminations, he continues, were a striking 
departure from the standard practices that defined the three decades following the Second 
World War, when layoffs were generally viewed as an justifiable tactic only if the corpora-
tion was in danger of outright bankruptcy, and were carried out with the understanding 
“that workers would be hired back once business conditions improved.”204 Without strong 
collective bargaining power or worker rights, Apple employees had no definitive means of 
extracting such concessions from their executives. 
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An open letter to John Sculley, posted anonymously to HotLinks by “A Loyal 
Employee” the same day that Sculley announced the layoffs, disclosed the profound an-
guish of Apple’s workforce as they grappled with the possibility their company was, in 
fact, much like any other aggressive corporation—driven by leaders more concerned with 
quarterly profits, stock values, and executive perks than the plight of their employees. “I 
think that you really are trying to do the right thing,” the employee wrote in the first 
paragraph of the letter, and averred that “most of us understand that this is a tough time 
for Apple and we really WANT to support you and the executive staff in getting the 
company back on course.”205 But, the loyal employee also admitted, “many people within 
Apple feel as if you are very out of touch with ‘the common man,’” which could “prevent 
many of us from getting whole-heartedly behind you.”206 The main problem, the em-
ployee continued, was the distinct disparity in how the company was distributing its cur-
rent pain to executives versus employees. “You and Mike [Spindler, President of Apple 
International,] talk about being one Apple and pulling through this together,” the worker 
said, 
something many of us WANT to get behind. Yet when talking about the fixes, 
you state in the same breath, “the Executives are losing their cars, and 400–500 
people are going to be laid off.” Does ANYTHING about this message sound 
funny? I sure hope so. You’re saying that 125 executives are losing the $40–50K 
car while 400–500 people are losing their jobs. IT JUST AIN’T THE SAME. To 
add insult to injury we find that these poor executives are going to get a big bonus 
to help pay for their car…. We understand the idea that the car was part of the 
compensation package for these executives, but a weekly paycheck was part of the 
compensation package for the 400–500 people being laid off.207 
It was difficult for this faithful worker to believe that the layoffs were really necessary, 
when it was obvious that the company’s leaders were not bearing any meaningful respon-
sibility for Apple’s troubles. “The main point here, John, is that, perhaps unwittingly, you 
have not simply slapped Apple employees in the face but have sent them reeling with a 
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right cross,” the worker wrote, “asking us to believe that somehow the executives of the 
company have really made a sacrifice while at the same time we’re about to lay off people. 
It seems to me that layoffs should be the absolute LAST resort to cutting costs.”208 
The most alarming signal these events sent to this employee was that Apple might 
be turning into a company defined by a “class struggle,” where most executives were 
guaranteed at least a $1 million severance package, whereas laid-off employees would only 
continue drawing their regular salaries for up to sixty days, depending on rank.209 “I fear 
that with the large compensation packages comes a detachment from what most of us 
consider reality,” the employee elaborated, citing the exorbitant cost of living in Silicon 
Valley.210 “It’s hard for us to feel sympathetic when, even without the increases,” the 
worker wrote, “you guys are making anywhere from 10–40 times more than most of us 
(you figure it, $50,000 (which is high [for an average Apple employee]) vs $500,000–$2 
million). Does that statistic affect you in the least? So very many of us down here sure 
hope so.”211 “John,” the letter pleaded, “would you have any idea what it’s like to be a sin-
gle parent with a grade 35 job at Apple and have to raise 2–3 kids in an apartment or 
some small home in the valley? The extremities we’re talking here are enormous.”212 De-
spite deep concerns about the executives’ indifference to their employees’ quality of life 
and the callousness of the layoffs, this loyal worker had not yet lost all faith. “John,” the 
employee continued, 
[w]e really truly WANT to support you and believe you and understand you and 
get behind you. But right now you’re giving us the impression that you have abso-
lutely no idea what it’s like to be a peon…. Do you not see that what you’re saying 
sounds like hypocrisy to us? Please John, help us regain the trust that we’ve had in 
you these past 5 years. We really do all want to be One Apple. We all share a vi-
sion of the greatness this company can achieve. But you need us, John, just as we 
need you. Please try to get back in touch with us.213 
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Capturing Apple employees’ sense of personal investment in the company, the worker 
signed off, “Give us back the Apple we know and love.”214 
This remarkable and poignant letter encapsulated a pivotal turning point in Apple 
employees’ relationship to their employer, a moment when some began to glimpse that 
the informal attire, popcorn carts, themed buildings, and Friday afternoon beer busts were 
not a reflection of Apple’s soul, but ornaments designed to make them believe that Apple 
was “a company of artists,” in Sculley’s airy phrasing, rather than a ruthless—and perhaps 
soulless—corporation.215 In a private letter to Jean-Louis Gassée, Apple’s head of product 
development, another employee directly attacked the myth that Apple was not like other 
large companies. “I recall people saying that Apple was a place where we didn’t have the 
negative trappings of Corporate America,” he wrote. “You could call all the executives by 
their first names, people didn’t wear ties, there were no executive washrooms, executive 
cafeterias, or executive parking places.”216 That may have been true when he joined Apple 
in 1984, the employee continued, but even though “you can still call the executives by 
their first names and you still don’t have to wear a tie…today, we do have executive cafe-
terias, we do have executive washrooms, and we do have executive parking spaces,” along 
with executive “signing bonuses, golden parachutes, and guaranteed stock appreciation 
payments (even if the stock doesn’t appreciate).”217 This employee found the severance 
packages particularly disturbing. “Where is the incentive for these executives to act in the 
long term interest of the shareholders?” he asked. “They are better off if they are fired 
than if they stay with the company.”218 This employee argued that Apple desperately 
needed some kind of “operating body that acts as a conscience for senior management,” 
but did stop short of suggesting that rank and file employees should have any direct bar-
gaining power: “We certainly don’t want a labor union,” he affirmed.219 
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Whereas John Sculley had proudly and publicly proclaimed that Apple was a com-
pany committed to making bold departures from corporate convention, the details of the 
1990 layoffs indicate that Apple was in fact closely aligned with the major trends that 
transformed corporate America throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Rather than revealing a 
desirable new “social contract” between corporation and employee, under which Sculley 
promised that workers would be empowered to learn, grow, and prosper, the years leading 
up to 1990 showed employees being worked to the bone, and then discarded at the slight-
est hiccup in quarterly profits. And although Apple’s problems had been set in motion by 
Steve Jobs’s destructive tendencies before the 1985 crisis, followed by Sculley’s inordinate 
desire for astronomical growth and failure to establish a solid foundation for that growth, 
the culture Sculley built at Apple enlarged the salary disparities between executives and 
employees while shielding executives from the economic costs of poor management. Such 
maneuvers have increasingly defined U.S. corporate practice. The union of the Commu-
nication Workers of America, for example, reports that the ratio of CEO pay to average 
worker pay at top corporations rose from 46-to-1 in 1983 to 335-to-1 in 2015, while the 
economic geographer Chris Benner suggests the disparities have long been higher in Sili-
con Valley, with executives being paid 1,000 times more than average employees by 
2000.220 1990 at Apple offered a presentiment that trading collective bargaining, strong 
worker rights and protections, and clear contractual obligations for a casual dress code, 
playful office environments, and 80-hour workweeks might not have been a fantastic 
deal. 
Not every Apple employee came to such conclusions. In fact, one worker insisted 
that Apple as a company was not ruthless enough. Taking his opinions to the HotLinks 
message board, he wrote, “Today within Apple exists the personnel, physical facilities, and 
capital to embark on a long-range venture designed to lift our company to new highs in 
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earnings, return on investment, and stock prices.”221 However, he insisted, “To accomplish 
that goal, our management must adopt a new standard—a standard called capitalism.”222 
Apple’s current problems, he continued, stemmed from the fact that Apple was “operating 
on a different standard…a standard directed toward a mystical ‘higher cause’ called soci-
ety. The standard is altruism…a morality diametrically opposed to capitalism.”223 Rather 
shockingly, this employee was especially critical of Apple’s supposedly “altruistic execu-
tives,” who he said had betrayed Apple’s core purpose of “serving the stockholders by in-
creasing their long-range common-stock values.”224 Concluding with a call to arms, he ex-
claimed, “If we rid ourselves of this altruistic cancer, we will be guaranteed a growing, ex-
citing, 21st century company!”225 Many of this employee’s comments could have been 
pulled directly from neoliberal economist Milton Friedman’s 1970 diatribe in the New 
York Times Magazine, in which he railed that the only “social responsibility of business is 
to increase its profits.”226 
Apple employee responses to this post ranged covered a considerable range. “Get 
real, pal,” one employee quipped, “get a little balance in your life, take some vacation. We 
are all rooting for your recovery.”227 Another said, “‘Altruistic cancer’ indeed! Chilling. 
Shades of Ayn Rand.”228 “Just when you thought Apple didn’t have a drug problem… :-),” 
yet another worker replied.229 A few other employees engaged with the comments more 
seriously. “Yes, we all want Apple to make lots of money so that we personally can make 
money,” one employee wrote, but suggested that Apple’s “altruistic” rhetoric, whether or 
not it was rooted in demonstrable social commitments, was likely good for business.230 He 
explained, “it makes many people ‘feel good’ to help others and therefore may make them 
feel better about Apple and more motivated to work harder” if they could believe that Ap-
ple was committed to “‘changing the world through personal computers.’”231 A different 
employee disagreed with the original poster’s specific rhetoric, but did agree that Apple’s 
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leadership was not behaving in the best interests of the company. The real problem, he 
continued, was that executives were “run[ning] on knee-jerk reactions” rather than estab-
lishing a coherent, long-range plan for the company’s growth.232 Someone else com-
mented that Apple had simply lost its focus on making “great products that have a posi-
tive impact on the world,” a goal which he believed could comfortably combine altruistic 
impulses with financial self-interest.233 Finally, one worker attacked the ideology underly-
ing the original post. “I think your link represents the most disgusting aspect of the 20th 
century: a money-grubbing, selfish, short-sighted, and inhumane attitude that says to hell 
with society (and the people who live in it) and up with a bunch of meaningless pieces of 
green paper,” the employee wrote. “If the 21st century means that more and more people 
will begin to share your goal of selfish, capitalist greed, I refuse to be a part of it and will 
work actively against such a trend.”234 
This discussion on HotLinks revealed that even though there might have been the 
odd employee at Apple who looked upon the company’s social progress rhetoric with dis-
dain, many others took those aspirations seriously. Even when presented with evidence 
that Apple Computer, Inc., did not treat its own people with consistent respect and dig-
nity, they sought to distance themselves from the baser aspects of the corporation’s finan-
cial self-interest. They preserved the hope that working for Apple did not entail selling out 
to the uglier demands of an aggressively competitive corporate capitalist system. 
For the next several years, however, Apple slid further and further on a downward 
spiral, and employees faced additional layoffs and mounting demands that they perform 
at an even higher level for their struggling employer. On June 20, 1991, John Sculley and 
Michael Spindler—who was taking on an increasingly important role in the company’s 
leadership—wrote to employees with news of another workforce reduction, this time to 
the tune of 900 employees worldwide, almost six percent of Apple’s staff. “Although we 
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take pride in Apple being a different kind of company, in some respects we are not im-
mune to the realities of the marketplace,” they explained, arguing that it was necessary to 
engage in an extensive restructuring process to keep Apple competitive for the future.235 
Surely in response to considerable employee outcry that executives had not borne much 
of the burden during the 1990 layoffs, Sculley and Spindler also announced that the ex-
ecutive staff would be taking pay cuts of between ten and fifteen percent, but in the con-
text of their substantial salaries and additional benefits in stock, severance packages, and 
miscellaneous perks, these sacrifices seemed largely symbolic. Moreover, they made clear 
that although the terminations were “personally painful,” it was essential to preserve Ap-
ple’s momentum so that the company could be “an important leader in the future.”236 
Part of the executive plan for moving Apple forward was to raise employees’ al-
ready remarkable productivity to even higher levels. In 1991, human resources distributed 
a video entitled Rethinking the Way We do Business along with associated training materi-
als to groups and divisions throughout the company. The handouts proclaimed, “Our 
business is constantly changing, and the challenges we face are enormous.”237 The respon-
sibility for handling these challenges, the training materials continued, fell largely to the 
rank and file, who were exhorted to make “your group be more effective, decrease costs, 
and help Apple succeed in today’s competitive environment.”238 Although the materials 
did not threaten employees with possible negative repercussions, with two serious layoffs 
in the very recent past and a major corporate restructuring underway, the implication was 
clear—if employees did not do their best to work more efficiently, use fewer resources, 
and produce more value for Apple, their jobs were clearly on the line. A memo to manag-
ers from around the same time similarly indicated that employees’ pursuits of further 
training and growth through avenues such as Apple University were no longer seen as op-
tional. “Apple employees are responsible for their own development,” the memo stated 
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flatly, and informed managers it was their duty to make sure employees were living up to 
their responsibilities by “defin[ing] goals and accountabilities for and with employees,” 
providing continuous “performance feedback,” and monitoring employee progress “as 
he/she creates and implements a development plan.”239 
This rhetoric only grew more intense in 1992. A memo from Sculley and Spindler 
in March of that year had some positive news about Apple’s overall outlook, but they 
maintained that “the worst thing that Apple could do today is to become complacent with 
our success of the moment.”240 As a result, they had decided to restructure Apple once 
again, redrawing divisions and product development plans with the specific goal of “creat-
ing shareholder value.”241 This would require considerable flexibility on the part of Apple 
employees, as numerous “people will be asked to take on new responsibilities or to relo-
cate,” while others would have to adapt to changing organizational structures and job de-
scriptions to accommodate the restructuring plan.242 In addition, Sculley and Spindler 
noted that employee performance reviews would now focus specifically on whether work-
ers were “creating the highest possible value for our shareholders.”243 Although I could dis-
cover no records of employee responses to this particular communication, it would seem 
to put to rest any questions as to whether Apple executives were concerned about maxi-
mizing shareholder values. 
Despite numerous, mounting pressures on Apple employees—to retrain, to take 
on additional responsibilities, to relocate, to demonstrate their direct contributions to 
shareholder value—John Sculley used a 1992 brochure for Apple Fitness Centers to 
patronizingly inform his workforce, “it’s easy to forget that there’s more to life than work. 
You may not find the time to exercise, to eat right, or to take time off for yourself.”244 
Failing to acknowledge his own role in cultivating such unhealthy habits at Apple, Sculley 
continued, “But to be at your best, you must find a balance—one that includes regular ex-
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ercise, good eating habits, recreation, and positive thinking.”245 To find this balance, Scul-
ley encouraged his employees to take advantage of the company’s fitness centers, which 
they could use for the cost of “a nominal membership fee…deducted weekly from your 
paycheck.”246 The brochure went on to tout the “stress and lifestyle management semi-
nars” at the centers, including classes in “How to Deal with Headaches, Stress Identifica-
tion, Psychological and Physiological Effects of Stress, Stress Management Equals Life 
Management, and Body Esteem.”247 This brochure merely extended an existing corporate 
trend in a time of crisis—burned out, overworked, stressed employees needed to find ways 
to self-manage the workplace pressures they faced. Apple itself would offer some resources, 
but employees would have to voluntarily seek them out in their spare time, and pay to 
take advantage of them. 
Such blithe treatment of the intense pressures employees faced was indicative of 
Apple leadership’s lack of honesty and transparency in interactions with employees. For 
example, on October 26, 1992, Sculley gave his employees a brief, yet false, ray of hope 
that things were turning around. He reported that Apple had posted high unit sales for fis-
cal year 1992—in fact, more than any single competitor. Yet this statistic masked the real-
ity that Windows PCs were flooding the market at record rates, and that Apple’s overall 
share of the personal computer market was dwindling fast. Nevertheless, Sculley boldly 
proclaimed, “we are now the king of the mountain that everyone else will be shooting 
at.”248 The sense of euphoria was short-lived. In May 1993, Sculley and Spindler sent an 
ominous missive to employees with the subject heading, “Apple is Evolving.” Speaking in 
sweeping terms, they informed workers that “continuing reorganization of work itself is 
part of a social transformation as massive and wrenching as the Industrial Revolution,” 
and that in order to provide technologies that could help other corporations restructure 
their own employment practices, “Apple has to anticipate and be in a leadership position 
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in order to be a role model for its marketplace.”249 Unsurprisingly, Apple employees them-
selves were called upon to manage their own evolving roles, personally “assess[ing] and 
enhanc[ing] their skills and effectiveness” by “tak[ing] advantage of the learning oppor-
tunities that are available both on and off the job” to prepare for a variety of possible fu-
ture roles and responsibilities.250 “The addition of new skills and knowledge increases each 
employee’s contribution and employability in the short run,” Sculley and Spindler wrote, 
“and helps them to be more adaptable and flexible in the face of future challenges.”251 
The suggestion that employees’ self-training efforts could appreciably increase 
their job security was hollow. Less than two months later, Sculley himself had been fired 
by Apple’s board, and Spindler, now CEO, wrote to employees with news of another seri-
ous layoff. “We must do whatever is necessary,” he wrote, “to accelerate our revenues, 
units, and profits.”252 This included terminating approximately 2,500 employees, or fif-
teen percent of Apple’s worldwide workforce, freezing all salaries, and implementing a 
“regional pay” scheme that would allow Apple to pay lower salaries to employees working 
in regions with lower costs of living.253 “The number of employees to be laid off,” he con-
tinued, “is based upon our understanding of the level of expense we must immediately cut 
from our business in order to live with lower margins and maintain the level of profitabil-
ity that the board of directors and shareholders expect from us.”254 He emphasized that the 
layoffs represented a permanent workforce reduction. Spindler’s focus on serving the 
short-term interests of investors at the expense of employees’ job stability once again il-
lustrated that Apple’s executives could hardly be accused of suffering from an “altruistic 
cancer.” In an especially cruel twist, Spindler informed employees that he could not yet 
provide any details about who would actually be losing their jobs, “simply because we’re 
working out the details.”255 “[M]anagers will do their best to keep you informed,” Spindler 
promised, but in the meantime he asked all employees to continue to show their “support 
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in moving Apple forward, and at the same time, helping each other through this difficult 
period.”256 Although the extensive Apple collections in the Stanford Archives do not re-
cord employee experiences during this moment in the company’s history, employees were 
undoubtedly profoundly anguished by the pressure to work harder than ever without 
knowing for certain whether their jobs even still existed. 
Apple leadership’s handling of these company crises and layoffs in the 1990s re-
vealed that it was all too easy for idealistic company rhetoric to evaporate when profits 
were threatened, and that without formal worker rights and protections, tacit promises 
from Sculley or other executives could be revoked at any time. Even Apple’s mythmaking 
efforts could not fully disguise the fact that the company was not as unconventional as it 
had long maintained, as revealed in a 1993 document from Apple’s human resources de-
partment. Titled the Apple Employee Handbook 1.0, this company publication opened 
with a note from then-CEO John Sculley, who offered the book as a “guide to life at Ap-
ple,” where he claimed that “we work to communicate with each other openly and hon-
estly,” and that even “in the midst of constant change we still treasure core values such as 
designing friendly products for people, innovation, quality, and teamwork.”257 The hand-
book sought to reassure employees—new hires, in particular—that Apple was a special 
company with “lore” and “traditions” that had built “a dedicated, enthusiastic work force 
that is second to none.”258 While the handbook insisted that Apple managers were accessi-
ble to employees and the company still valued the kinds of nonhierarchical employee rela-
tions that Sculley had extolled so avidly in his memoir and public comments in the late 
1980s, the publication also disclosed a more authoritarian bent, telling employees to 
“[l]isten a lot at first” and “[r]esist the temptation to compare how things are done at Ap-
ple versus the company you came from.”259 Far from painting a picture of an unconven-
tional, anti-bureaucratic environment, the handbook informed employees that they 
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should “[o]btain an organization chart from your manager for your group and other 
groups with which you will be working,” and ask “your manager for an overview of the 
company organization from the top down.”260 The handbook also made clear that manag-
ers wielded considerable power over employees, as new hires or people transferring to new 
jobs inside the company were expected to learn “your manager’s preferred work style, 
your manager’s expectations of you (e.g., work schedule), performance goals for your first 
review cycle, your first assignment and what your manager sees as your priorities, and 
who to talk to in your group and in other parts of Apple for orientation.”261 As Apple’s 
travails deepened in the 1990s, it was clear that the signs and symbols that many employ-
ees had previously taken as emblems of Apple’s core values had boiled off to reveal the 
company’s skeleton—an inflexible hierarchy where employees were expected to hew to 
managerial demands and not ask too many questions or make much noise. 
The records from inside the company become sparser after 1993, and employee 
perspectives in particular become harder to track, perhaps because workers were more reti-
cent to engage in discussions on HotLinks or in other public forums under increasingly 
hostile conditions. But the lineaments of the ongoing crises at Apple can still be traced. 
For example, Spindler wrote his employees on January 17, 1996, to inform them that Ap-
ple was facing more financial losses and another major layoff—this time, 1,300 people 
would be losing their jobs, about eight percent of Apple’s staff.262 The typical platitudes 
Spindler included about restructuring Apple to maintain competitiveness and “move our 
business forward” must have sounded fairly empty by this point in time.263 Indeed, layoffs 
seemed to have become the defining feature of existence at Apple—so much so that the 
company had taken to circulating handouts for employees with advice on how to cope 
with the termination of fellow workers. “When seeing your fellow employees laid off, you 
may experience a wide variety of feelings,” one such document read, suggesting that em-
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ployees might experience relief, anger, frustration, sadness, fear, a “strong need to prove 
your value to the company,” sleeping problems, or a “[r]e-examination of how important 
your job is in the context of your life.”264 While acknowledging that these feelings could 
be overwhelming and that it was necessary to “[t]ake time to grieve the loss of your co-
worker,” the document focused on tactics to help employees adapt to their changing—and 
likely increased—job responsibilities.265 The concrete advice, however, was not much dif-
ferent from what Apple’s human resources department had offered in the past. “Do some-
thing each day that you find rewarding or that makes you feel successful,” the handout 
read. “Get some exercise…. Look for ways to positively impact the way your work group 
recovers from the layoff.”266 Another handbook, designed explicitly for managers, empha-
sized that it was important to “show how the ending”—a layoff—“ensures continuity of 
what really matters”—the survival of the corporation.267 
Finally, the disposability of Apple employees was set down in official policy with 
the publication of the Apple Employee Handbook 2.0 in 1995. Informing employees that 
they had “No Right to Employment,” the policy elaborated, “By accepting employment 
at Apple, you have acknowledged that there is no agreement (expressed or implied) be-
tween you and Apple that you will be employed by Apple for any specific period, nor is 
there any agreement for continuing or long-term employment.”268 A hastily sketched car-
toon, drawn by an anonymous Apple worker in the mid-1990s, offers a glimpse of em-
ployee sentiment during this era. Titled, “Have you seen this Endangered Species? ‘The 
Apple Employee?’” the cartoon shows a bedraggled man with numerous captions pointing 
out various aspects of his appearance. One line leads out from his forehead to a text box 
that reads, “Constant Headache/Sleeplessness. Day to day not knowing 
whether…personal belongs now reside on 2nd level of DA 2 Parking Garage—can I still 
make the Beemer Payment?” Another caption indicates his rumpled shirt: “The ‘Apple 
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Sweatshirt.’ One of the leading causes of the current problems—too many shirts, not 
enough Jobs to fill them…” The cartoon also notes that the man is carrying an “Apple 
Briefcase: All packed up and ready to move at a moment’s notice,” as well as a “Pager: 
Even though nobody pages, it looks pretty cool and makes one feel somewhat important, 
and good during an interview.” A caption pointing to his feet reads, “Good Walking 
Shoes: You figure it out!” Finally, a line leading to his spotty five o’clock shadow bears the 
legend, “Stress Factor = Unshaven: With the current situation and attitude, the employee 
here quickly forgets even the simplest things like how to use a razor.”269 
Something was clearly rotten in Apple’s new “social contract” with its employees. 
While John Sculley had sketched lofty visions of an empowered future in which work 
would emphasize the personal growth and self-fulfillment of individual employees, offer-
ing them meaningful opportunities to change society and serving as a form of positive 
civic engagement, Apple had in reality swallowed up countless employees and given them 
little but stress, anguish, and instability in return. The dream that Apple could compete 
ruthlessly, grow at astronomical rates year after year, and court investors with fantastic 
stock values while reinventing labor for the benefit of the common worker was dead. 
 
CODA: A COFOUNDER RETURNS 
There are two stories that can be told about Steve Jobs’s 1997 return to the com-
pany he cofounded. One, which is well known, tells the tale of a brilliant innovator and 
businessman, his skills and intelligence honed by more than a decade traversing “the wil-
derness” of Silicon Valley, who triumphantly revived a nearly fallen corporation with a 
mix of incredible savvy and a slew of groundbreaking products and services: iMac, iPod, 
iTunes, iPhone, and iPad. It is a heroic narrative. “It is not too much of a stretch to say 
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that Steve [Jobs] founded Apple not once but twice,” writes Michael Moritz, “[a]nd the 
second time he was alone.”270 The myth of Jobs’s singular genius is difficult to crack. Wal-
ter Isaacson describes his biography of Jobs as “a book about the roller-coaster life and 
searingly [sic] intense personality of a creative entrepreneur whose passion for perfection 
and ferocious drive revolutionized six industries: personal computers, animated movies, 
music, phones, tablet computing, and digital publishing”—a narrative which valorizes the 
individual while effacing the labor of the people who actually made the things for which 
Jobs tends to receive most of the credit.271 
The other story—the one I’m interested in telling—focuses on what Jobs’s twenty-
first century successes meant for the people who worked at Apple—particularly rank and 
file employees. Just as his exit from Apple in 1985 had been somewhat protracted, Jobs’s 
return was relatively halting. He sold his floundering firm NeXT to Apple at the end of 
1996, which allowed him to come on as a “part-time advisor” to the company.272 Over the 
next several months, Jobs waffled about returning to the company full-time, as he was 
then also serving as CEO of Pixar, but he eventually maneuvered to remove Gil Amelio, a 
former Hewlett-Packard executive who was then serving as Apple’s chief. By the middle of 
1997 Jobs had also eliminated almost the entire board of directors and was the de facto 
ruler of Apple. In the process, Apple was radically pared down. As Isaacson reports, Jobs 
eliminated seventy percent of the company’s product lines, and numerous employees lost 
their positions. “Many of the engineers were infuriated at his slash-and-burn tactics,” 
Isaacson writes, “which resulted in massive layoffs. But Jobs later claimed that the good 
engineers, including some whose projects were killed, were appreciative.”273 
Jobs’s assessment does not quite match the mood suggested by a fake email sent in 
his name to Apple employees on August 13, 1997. Under the subject line “An Even More 
Entrepreneurial Apple,” the email informed employees, “You’ve all become lazy, and only 
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contribute to Apple’s current situation. The only way to save this company is to drive out 
the loyal employees who have not yet realized their inadequacy.”274 Laying out a specific 
set of innovative policies designed to return Apple to greatness, the fake Jobs announced 
that “[i]n lieu of laying people off, we are redeploying unneeded workers as janitorial 
staff. Salaries will be adjusted accordingly.”275 Furthermore, employees learned that it 
would “no longer be possible to call in sick. Any employee who cannot make it into work 
due to illness will need [to] take a vacation day or go without pay.”276 As for salaries, the 
anonymous writer posing as Jobs explained, “Pay checks will now be issued monthly for 
four 30-hour work weeks. However, each employee is required to work diligently on Apple 
business for at least 60 hours each week. Not meeting this requirement is a terminable of-
fense.”277 Finally, gesturing to Jobs’s infamous habit from his days as the Macintosh chief, 
the email proclaimed that only Jobs would “be allowed to park in handicapped spaces.”278 
All others would be towed, but the fake Jobs assured “[p]ersons who are physically dis-
abled” that they would “receive a $5 reimbursement for towing expenses upon convinc-
ing the Executive Team that they are actually disabled.”279 
The fake email hinted at the fact that Jobs’s personality had not changed in his 
time away from Apple. He was still arrogant and inconsiderate, still expected people to 
subsume their entire lives to Apple, and he still demanded that everyone do things exactly 
his way. According to Isaacson, Jobs had no kind words for the employees who had sur-
vived the company’s disastrous 1990s—in Jobs’s eyes, these workers deserved no credit for 
their commitments to the company, but did deserve much of the blame for letting Apple 
deteriorate. Jobs reportedly told one product development group, “You are bright people. 
You shouldn’t be wasting your time on such crappy products,” and he yelled at employees 
the day he ousted Gil Amelio, “The products suck! There’s no sex in them anymore!”280 
Just before the debut of the iMac in May 1998—Apple’s first major product launch after 
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Jobs returned full-time as CEO—he burst into tears when he saw that the new computer’s 
CD drive was a pop-out tray rather than a slot, screaming at the designers, “What the fuck 
is this?!?”281 As Jobs’s behavior had indicated when he was the head of the original Macin-
tosh group in the early 1980s, he had an insatiable need to control everything—and eve-
ryone—around him. 
The company Jobs built in the 2000s well reflected this urge. Where the Apple of 
the 1980s, and to a certain extent, the 1990s, had encouraged employees to think of 
themselves as independent, unconventional, artistic individuals, the Apple of the 2000s 
became frankly militaristic. Adam Lashinsky, a Fortune reporter who interviewed numer-
ous current and former employees for a 2012 book about Apple’s business culture, de-
scribes the company today as a “secret society” where “employees are expected to follow 
orders, not offer opinions,” operating like the cells of “‘a terrorist organization,’” as one 
former hardware executive told him.282 Apple is so secretive and authoritarian, Lashinsky 
elaborates, that “[o]rganization charts, typical fare at most big companies, don’t exist at 
Apple. That is information employees don’t need and outsiders shouldn’t have.”283 The se-
crecy is maintained in part to keep Apple’s products or long-range plans from getting out 
to the public or competitors, and in part to keep employees in the dark so they can focus 
more completely on their assigned tasks. Employees acculturated to this climate of secrecy 
tend to mistrust new hires or additions to their teams, who are typically ostracized and not 
“allowed to sit near the rest of the group for a months-long probation period.”284 It is also 
a workplace where promotions are rare—“many members of Apple’s middle ranks toil for 
years in the same exact role,” and while Jobs himself became a multibillionaire through his 
stock options, “[t]alking about money is frowned upon at Apple,” where most rank and 
file employees make modest salaries.285 Moreover, according to a former employee, Jobs’s 
penchant for abuse has become a companywide value: “The fighting can get personal and 
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ugly,” this anonymous source told Lashinsky. “There’s a mentality that it’s okay to shred 
somebody in the spirit of making the best products.”286 “Almost nobody describes working 
at Apple as being fun,” Lashinsky notes, and his sources tell him that the company “isn’t 
even a particularly nice place to work.”287 
However, despite the unexceptional pay, the lack of symbolic rewards such as be-
ing called an “artist,” the mistrust of fellow workers, assaultive and competitive relation-
ships with colleagues, the absence of job advancement, dictatorial managers, and expecta-
tions that employees will work through holidays and weekends or cut short vacations if 
needed, employees profess a strong attachment to the corporation. As one engineer told 
Lashinsky, “At Apple, people are so committed that they go home at night and don’t 
leave Apple behind them. What they do at Apple is their true religion.”288 Another former 
employee concurred: “Because people are so passionate about Apple, they are aligned with 
the mission of the company.”289 Yet another former worker revealed that employee pas-
sions no longer rest on the underlying belief that Apple’s products will empower consum-
ers or benefit society, but simply that the products are “cool” and phenomenally popular. 
“Sitting in a bar and seeing that 90 percent of the people there are using devices that your 
company made,” he muses, “there is something cool about that, and you can’t put a dollar 
value on it.”290 Lashinsky grants that Apple’s austere treatment of employees might not 
sound terribly appealing to people not personally initiated into the company’s ways, but 
he insists that other corporations should take notice, because “Apple is clearly doing some-
thing right” to have become “the world’s largest company by market capitalization.”291 
Apple’s current culture does appear to be a well-oiled machine—according to Lashinsky’s 
research, employees keep their heads down, do not make much noise, and don’t ask for 
too much pay, yet they are still devoted to the corporation and its products, and are accus-
tomed to working around the clock to bring out products. This apparently voluntary em-
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ployee devotion has doubtlessly contributed to Apple’s phenomenal wealth, which reached 
particularly astounding heights in 2015, when the company’s net value was $700 billion, 
making Apple wealthier than 75 percent of the countries on Earth.292 Despite recent chal-
lenges in some of Apple’s key markets, the company remains one of the most valuable in 
the world today.293 
But is a corporation’s accumulation of private wealth truly of higher value than an 
employee’s ability to have a rich, meaningful, socially or civically engaged life outside of 
work? Steve Wozniak, Apple’s other founder, laid out a distinctly different vision in 
1992. “Apple was founded on the singular vision of empowering the individual,” he 
wrote. “We believed that individuals, not institutions, were the key to the future.”294 Yet 
the history of Apple, from its founding to its near-collapse in 1997 and on into the pre-
sent, reveals a corporation whose leaders have consistently acted in the financial interests 
of their institution, with little regard for the individuals laboring within it. Such are the 
current myths of success in the United States—monetary gain is seemingly valued above 
all else, and in an enduring irony, the increasingly educated and professionalized U.S. 
middle class has become less and less committed to collective worker rights, the egalitarian 
distribution of corporate wealth among executives and employees, or a sense of self be-
yond work. 
The apocryphal employee quoted in the fake 1983 Apple memo mocking Jobs’s 
habit of parking in handicapped spaces perhaps best sums up the combination of em-
ployee faith and managerial abuse that has defined work at the corporation over the course 
of its history: “It’s OK with me. John [Sculley] and Steve [Jobs] explained that it’s an 




A Commitment to Changing the World: The Rhetoric and Realities of 
Apple’s Efforts to Computerize U.S. Schools 
 
The popular mythology of Apple Computer, Inc.’s origins and rise does not often 
detail the corporation’s extensive involvement with education, even though schools were 
some of Apple’s most significant and loyal customers throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
and remain an important market segment for the company to this day. Walter Isaacson’s 
official biography of Steve Jobs, for example, makes no mention of Apple’s lengthy and 
profitable relationships with U.S. schools, despite the fact that Jobs himself publicly cred-
ited “schools buying Apple IIs” as one of the essential factors that underwrote Apple’s 
growth.1 Michael Moritz’s authoritative chronicle of Apple’s early years, Return to the Lit-
tle Kingdom, likewise ignores Apple’s education business, focusing instead on how soft-
ware applications such as VisiCalc helped sell Apple II computers to small businesses.2 
Andy Hertzfeld’s memoir of working for Apple in the late 1970s and early 1980s does 
mention that “the Apple II was very successful in the K–12 education market,” but he 
gives no further information about the size or importance of Apple’s education business.3 
The profound lack of attention paid to Apple’s relationships with U.S. schools is 
difficult to understand, not only because the company sold many billions of dollars of 
computer products to schools in the 1980s and 1990s, but also because no other corpora-
tion wielded greater influence over the course of school computerization in the United 
States. The financial figures alone are impressive. As Gregory Smith, Apple’s first director 
of education marketing, revealed in a 1981 interview, sales to schools then accounted for 
20 to 30 percent of the company’s total revenue, netting the company $80 million that 
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year.4 By 1985, sales to schools grew to more than one third of Apple’s revenues, for a 
yearly total exceeding $600 million.5 In 1996, education sales only represented about 20 
percent of Apple’s net income, but the company’s education business had grown to $2 
billion annually.6 While these sales were obviously a key part of Apple’s business, the 
company’s dominant share of the school market was also remarkable. In 1992, for exam-
ple, fifteen years after the debut of the first Apple II, the federal government estimated 
that there were nearly 2 million Apple II computers in U.S. public schools, which repre-
sented a full 55 percent of the total number of computers in K–12 education, while an 
additional 350,000 Macintosh computers brought Apple’s total market share in U.S. 
schools to 65 percent.7 In 1996, Apple’s own data indicated that almost 60 percent of new 
computer sales to K–12 schools would be Apple products that year, helping the company 
maintain a strong lead over competitors in education.8 Given these facts, it is not surpris-
ing that a 1994 corporate report proclaimed, “Apple, as a company, was built on its com-
mitment to education.”9 
Beyond the obvious financial importance of Apple’s education business, the com-
pany’s involvement with schools also played a key role in corporate ideologies about Ap-
ple’s commitments to public service. In the late 1970s, for example, when Apple execu-
tives first drafted a set of company philosophies and values, they singled out schools as the 
primary area where they could “honor our obligations to society” by “improving the edu-
cational process through the use of small computers,” thereby earning Apple the distinc-
tion of being a good corporate “citizen.”10 Even as Apple’s involvement with schools grew 
into an immensely profitable commercial enterprise, corporate rhetoric vehemently main-
tained that the company had more than a financial interest in education. As a 1985 bro-
chure mailed to teachers phrased it, “Apple is not just out to sell computers. Our goal is to 
help you take a lead in education.”11 The pamphlet elaborated that Apple was interested in 
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forming mutually beneficial partnerships with teachers, because people at the company 
contended that by “[w]orking together, we can promote the benefits of the personal 
computer in educational excellence…and the importance of preparing you and your stu-
dents for an even more productive future.”12 As this brochure suggested, much of Apple’s 
rhetoric about the beneficial impact of educational computing hinged on arguments 
about the need to prepare America’s youth for the emerging information economy. “Our 
educational system today is a legacy of the industrial economy,” read a 1988 teacher cata-
log and information book published by Apple, which further argued that the “transition 
from the industrial age to the information age is straining the resources of traditional edu-
cation.”13 However, the information book continued, “Apple’s role entails more than sim-
ply grafting technology onto the education process,” and the company argued that meet-
ing the needs of the information age required uses of computer technologies that en-
hanced the creative, collaborative, communicative, and analytical skills of individuals, 
such that students could become more effective creators “of new knowledge.”14 
Apple’s stated goals in education therefore extended well beyond integrating 
computers into the teaching and learning process in U.S. schools. In conjunction with 
this technological goal, people at the company hoped to transform some of the primary 
philosophies of education. As Apple CEO John Sculley put it in his Macworld Expo key-
note address in 1988, “Tomorrow’s students will not simply be learners, passively absorb-
ing subject matter, but more like researchers, actively exploring their environment.”15 
From Sculley’s perspective, students needed to spend much less time quietly listening to 
lectures, and a great deal more time working collaboratively on open-ended projects that 
would require independent investigations and creative solutions. “To work in research,” 
he continued, “is to recognize that knowledge does not reside privately in individual 
minds, or textbooks, or journals, or libraries, or laboratories, or databases. Knowledge re-
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sides in a complex web that encompasses all of these.”16 Although Apple’s leaders clearly 
possessed strong ideas about how schools needed to change, the company presented itself 
more as a partner in scholastic change than an antagonistic reformer. “You are the profes-
sionals,” John Sculley told a group of teachers at a national education conference in 1988. 
“We’re just the toolmakers. We try to make the tools that you will need to prepare the 
young people for the information age. But it’s what you do as the guides that makes the 
difference. You are our national treasures and you can change the world.”17 
In an effort to live up to such high-minded rhetoric about partnering with teach-
ers, Apple developed a number of programs designed to support teachers as they tried to 
revamp the educational process to make it more relevant to the shifting social, techno-
logical, and economic realities of the late twentieth century. Chief among these were an 
educational grants program, founded in 1979, and an extended research project called 
Apple Classrooms of Tomorrow (ACOT), which ran from 1985 to 1995 and brought to-
gether teachers, university researchers, and Apple technologists in collaborative partner-
ships at five public schools across the United States. A 1986 company report on Apple’s 
philanthropic activities emphasized that the corporation wanted the “projects it supports 
[to] become models for widespread educational change,” and optimistically highlighted 
the ways that teachers who had participated in some of Apple’s education programs had 
“made presentations to professional educational organizations around the country, shared 
the results of their work through publications produced by Apple and through academic 
journals, and helped formulate in-house teacher training programs in their districts, based 
on the findings of their own projects.”18 These statements suggested that teachers would 
indeed lead the charge on school reform, and that Apple would continue supporting them 
from the background without trying to take control of teachers’ reform efforts. 
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But Apple’s commitments to these altruistic motives were often tempered by more 
aggressive financial goals—while corporate rhetoric paid abundant lip service to the com-
pany’s support for teacher-led school reforms, people at Apple were also determined to en-
sure that these reform efforts included ample use of Apple technologies. Apple’s education 
grants program, for example, required grant applicants to demonstrate that their school 
systems were committed, financially and administratively, to “incorporat[ing] computers 
into long-range technology plans,” thereby indicating that Apple used its granting proc-
ess to stimulate further educational purchases of Apple’s products.19 The company likewise 
capitalized on its strong position in schools to drive consumption in other market sectors. 
Queasily mixing understandings of public service and financial self-interest, a 1994 cor-
porate report proclaimed, “Nowhere is our commitment to changing the world more evi-
dent than in the solutions we create to help children learn faster,” but the same page of 
the document additionally pointed out that Apple’s “strength in education also influences 
other parts of the computer market, most notably home computing, as parents look for 
computers their children use at school and that can run the learning software they want to 
use.”20 Although corporate rhetoric suggests that people at Apple typically failed to see 
conflicts of interest in their simultaneous attempts to reform education and to profit from 
selling computers to schools, the track record of Apple’s efforts to build its education 
business and the outcomes of its philanthropic programs in schools indicates that the 
company’s financial gains from education far outpaced corporate commitments to im-
proving opportunities in U.S. schools. 
This chapter examines Apple’s troubled attempts to balance business interests with 
more altruistic aims in U.S. schools during the 1980s and 1990s. I focus on the company’s 
relationships with public K–12 education, because Apple was most determined to reform 
public primary and secondary schools, and because the company enjoyed such an over-
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whelming share of the computer market in these institutions. The chapter unfolds in two 
sections. In the first section, I situate Apple’s education business within the major educa-
tional policies and trends that helped shape patterns of U.S. school computerization 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. I focus on Apple’s explicit attempts in the early 1980s to 
influence federal and state policies to support the company’s commercial interests in 
schools, and I examine the broader repercussions of lawmakers’ receptivity to Apple’s ar-
guments about the need for school computerization. Specifically, I argue that Apple’s lob-
bying efforts failed to advocate for adequate teacher training, and because lawmakers 
themselves failed to appreciate the difficulties teachers faced in using computer technolo-
gies, major school computerization policies tended to facilitate large purchases of comput-
ers without providing much-needed support for teachers. As a result, Apple’s influence 
over educational policy greatly benefited the company’s commercial interests, but left 
many educators unable to use computers effectively in their teaching. 
While the first section serves as a broad survey of school policy and computeriza-
tion, the second section turns to several smaller case studies of Apple’s two primary phil-
anthropic programs in schools, the company’s education grants program and the Apple 
Classrooms of Tomorrow (ACOT) research project. My examinations of Apple’s involve-
ment with specific teachers and schools indicate that the altruistic aims of these corporate 
programs tended to break down because Apple’s commercial interests ultimately over-
shadowed commitments to meaningful school reforms, but my research additionally 
shows that teachers’ and Apple’s collaborative efforts were further undermined by perva-
sive public school funding problems and increasingly antagonistic relationships between 
policymakers and teachers in the United States. Thus, although I am critical of Apple’s 
conflicted motivations in schools, I also aim to show that problematic trends in public 
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school administration and policy fundamentally shaped the flawed contexts in which the 
corporation interacted with schools during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
APPLE’S ROLE IN SHAPING THE BUSINESS AND POLITICS OF SCHOOL COMPUTERIZATION 
An examination of the critical and scholarly literature on school computerization 
in the United States reveals a curious consensus: despite remarkable political enthusiasm 
for placing computer technologies in schools and hundreds of billions of dollars spent on 
hardware, software, and more recently, Internet connectivity, computers have had little 
impact on educational practice or student outcomes during the past four decades. Indeed, 
many scholars have been particularly critical of the legacy of computers in public educa-
tion, arguing that patterns of school computer procurement and use have increased U.S. 
educational inequalities, drained scarce public resources, and contributed to the privatiza-
tion of key aspects of public education. Before turning to an analysis of Apple’s particu-
larly influential role in educational computerization and school computer use in the U.S., 
I want to review this literature to highlight some of the key arguments from the criticism 
of educational technology. 
In 1986, Larry Cuban, an educator and scholar who has devoted much of his career 
to assessing the impact of computers in schools, carried out a historical analysis of educa-
tional technologies and a sociological study of contemporary school computer use, and 
concluded that the majority of U.S. teachers would resist or ignore computers because 
they lacked access to comprehensive training on how to use the new technology, and be-
cause the use of a technological intermediary in the classroom implied a rearrangement of 
student-teacher relationships that many of the teachers he had observed found threaten-
ing.21 The very next year, Apple’s John Sculley reached a similar conclusion, arguing that 
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“[m]ost of the computers on school desks today are used for simple drills and rote learn-
ing” rather than for the novel uses he believed would better prepare students for employ-
ment in a post-industrial economy.22 A 1988 study published by the congressional Office 
of Technology Assessment concurred that although a number of teachers were “cautiously 
optimistic” that computers could help them adapt their teaching practices to the economic 
and social concerns of the late twentieth century, they lacked adequate support or training 
to do so.23 As a result, the Office of Technology Assessment argued, schools of education 
and federal and state governments needed to commit more resources and energies to 
computer training for teachers to ensure that the growing educational expenditures on 
computers would achieve positive results in U.S. schools. 
As we will see in more detail throughout this section, these criticisms from the 
1980s fell on deaf ears, and by 1996, the journalist Paul Starr would conclude that com-
puters had “generally not lived up to the promises made for them,” but in response to 
President Bill Clinton’s push for connecting schools to the Internet, Starr nevertheless in-
sisted that the “new media are different from the earlier technologies,” and he confidently 
predicted that network connectivity would finally deliver on the long delayed promises of 
a computer revolution in education.24 Yet a comprehensive nationwide study carried out 
by the Office of Technology Assessment in 1995 had warned that teachers were still un-
der-supported in their efforts to use computer technologies, which did not bode well for 
the impact of the Internet on education.25 Indeed, a bevy of subsequent studies indicates 
that computer technologies have yet to produce meaningful, systemic improvements in 
teaching or learning in U.S. schools. In 2000, for example, the investigative journalists 
Alison Armstrong and Charles Casement crisscrossed the United States, interviewing 
hundreds of teachers, school administrators, policymakers, and students about their expe-
riences with educational computing, and their judgment was blunt: “So far,” they wrote, 
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“the most that can be said about computer-based instruction is that vast sums have been 
lavished on a technology whose educational potential has yet to be proven.”26 Another so-
ciological study led by Larry Cuban in 2001 found that the distribution of computers in 
U.S. schools was deeply inequitable, providing a privileged elite with access to advanced 
technologies and expanded educational opportunities, while the majority of school com-
puter use was unimaginative and failed to enhance learning experiences.27 “[T]he quanti-
ties of money and time” expended on school computerization, Cuban argued, “have yet 
to yield even modest returns or to approach what has been promised in academic 
achievement, creative classroom integration of technologies, and transformations in 
teaching and learning.”28 The journalist Todd Oppenheimer’s ambitious, multi-year inves-
tigation of school computer use throughout the U.S., published in 2003, was even bleaker. 
“Computer technology is redefining the continuing inequities in our methods of teaching 
the rich and the poor,” he wrote, as well as “recasting the relationships that schools strike 
with the business community, warping our beliefs about the demands of tomorrow’s 
working world, and reframing our systems for researching, testing, and evaluating 
achievement.”29 Castigating the commercial purveyors of computer technologies as “char-
latans and unscrupulous profiteers,” Oppenheimer insisted that the billions of dollars that 
had been devoted to computer projects was a grave misuse of funds that would have been 
much better spent in more critical areas, such as hiring more teachers or maintaining 
schools’ crumbling physical facilities.30 
A litany of similar criticisms continues to define the literature on U.S. school 
computer use. In a 2005 ethnographic study of technology use in Los Angeles public 
schools, Torin Monahan discovered that district administrators used computer technolo-
gies primarily to surveil and control students and teachers in poorer schools, while his ex-
tensive classroom observations indicated that computer use often made relationships be-
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tween students and teachers more hostile and alienating.31 Moreover, Monahan observed, 
computerized instruction tended to emphasize the acquisition of skills and training that 
would prepare poorer students to enter low-level service jobs, and he therefore argued that 
computer-based education has become part of a larger system of structural inequalities in 
U.S. education that overwhelmingly limits the opportunities of poorer students and stu-
dents of color.32 The sociologist Neil Selwyn, who has devoted his career to studying edu-
cational computing in the Anglophone world, comes to similar conclusions. He argues 
that the great cost of computer technologies has led many educational institutions to give 
over control of school technology projects to private interests, which he contends has 
greatly increased the scope of corporate influence over educational policies and priorities.33 
Moreover, Selwyn continues, these private interests have generally sought to cultivate 
student attitudes and skill-sets “to satisfy the demands of contemporary capitalism,” 
which he insists has “served primarily to increase socially inequitable and exclusive trends 
within education,” as small numbers of mostly wealthier, white students gain exposure to 
the kinds of technological skills that provide access to better jobs and economic opportu-
nities, while poorer students generally fail to gain access to this kind of training.34 Even 
researchers who are more supportive of educational computerization projects struggle to 
find evidence of computers’ positive impact on schools. For example, Bill Ferster, an edu-
cation scholar who holds out hope that mobile computing might finally produce mean-
ingful improvements and reforms in U.S. schools, admits that thus far students and 
teachers typically use computers to “mimic the actions of older practices” rather than find-
ing truly innovative and productive uses for new technologies.35 
The assessments of scholars, journalists, and national federal studies of school 
computerization are therefore remarkably consistent: lofty promises about computers’ 
positive impact on education—proffered by corporations such as Apple—have not trans-
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lated into meaningful results. Indeed, the studies cited here suggest that in many cases 
computers have actually increased educational inequalities or degraded students’ scholastic 
opportunities and experiences. Ironically, however, these repeated and consistent attacks 
on school computerization have had little demonstrable influence on educational policy, 
as schools continue to spend vast amounts of money to procure new technologies, despite 
scant evidence that these new products will achieve better results than their forebears. In 
2016, for example, U.S. schools spent $7.35 billion on mobile computing devices alone, 
even though a recent scandal involving Apple’s sale of $1.3 billion worth of iPads to Los 
Angeles public schools had raised serious concerns that such mobile computing technolo-
gies were extremely difficult to use effectively or maintain in actual classroom settings.36 I 
will have more to say about the L.A. iPad scandal at the conclusion of this chapter, but my 
aim in this section is to trace how Apple’s educational lobbying efforts in the early 1980s 
helped shape policies that have favored commercial purveyors of computer products, but 
which have largely failed to create the teacher support programs or accountability meas-
ures needed to make sure that those commercial products actually benefit teachers and 
students. 
In the extensive literature on U.S. school computerization, Apple has received sur-
prisingly little sustained attention, even though the company unquestionably dominated 
the educational market for computers in the 1980s and 1990s, and worked hard to shape 
educational policy with respect to scholastic computer use. In this section, I focus on Ap-
ple’s educational lobbying efforts in the early 1980s, which consistently saw the company 
place its own financial interests before oft-repeated corporate claims that Apple and its 
products would be of real service to teachers and students. It is a deeply ironic story, given 
that mainstream journalists at the time were incredibly critical of Apple’s efforts to place 
its computers in U.S. schools, and repeatedly opposed legislation that would make it easier 
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for the company to establish a lucrative educational market for its products. Teachers and 
educational professionals, moreover, raised significant public concerns about the lack of 
support and training available for educators to use computers effectively in their teaching. 
However, as this section will show, politicians’ actions in the 1980s and 1990s largely ig-
nored these concerns, and many U.S. school systems moved ahead with buying comput-
ers while teachers continued to struggle to find productive ways to use the new technol-
ogy in the classroom. 
On the surface, it is rather difficult to understand how policymakers have been 
able to disregard the substantive concerns of scholars, journalists, and teachers for some 
four decades, but David Dwyer, a prominent employee in Apple’s education research divi-
sion, suggested in the mid-1990s that the problem reflected fundamental cultural values. 
The American public, he argued, simply did not care enough about education to question 
expenditures on computer technologies or to hold policymakers—or corporations—
accountable when those costly technologies failed to produce meaningful results.37 
Dwyer’s claim is striking, and throughout this section I draw on a variety of sources—
archival documents, congressional hearings, government studies, and media coverage of 
Apple’s lobbying efforts—to argue that Apple’s own aggressive pursuit of profits in 
schools coincided with a broader political failure to ensure that school technology pur-
chases serve the public interest. The general popular and political apathy for public educa-
tion in the latter twentieth century offers one important explanation for why there has 
been little public outcry over Apple’s failures to deliver on its promises to improve educa-
tion, even though my evidence suggests that these corporate failings have been a com-
mon occurrence since the early 1980s. 
Schools quickly became some of the Apple II computer’s most important custom-
ers in the late 1970s, but Apple leapt onto the national educational stage in 1982, when 
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the company promised to donate one complete Apple II personal computer system to 
each of the United States’ 83,000 public K–12 schools, a computer giveaway with an esti-
mated $200 million retail value.38 But there was a catch. Apple would only donate the 
computers if the U.S. Congress passed a law—popularly known as the Apple Bill, which 
the company had co-written with California congressman Fortney H. “Pete” Stark—that 
would allow Apple to claim an expanded tax deduction for every computer given to 
schools. Under the existing tax code, corporations could only write off the manufacturing 
cost of donated computers, but Apple also wanted to be able to write off part of the retail 
value of each machine. As the Washington Post explained the Apple Bill to readers, “If a 
computer costs $1,000 to make and is priced at $2,500 wholesale, for example, the deduc-
tion would be $2,000,” effectively doubling the tax breaks corporations such as Apple 
could claim for school donations.39 
The proposed law was somewhat controversial, as many critics saw it as a special 
interest giveaway, but Apple’s leaders contended that the Apple Bill was necessary to make 
a national computer donation program financially feasible. As Apple cofounder Steve 
Jobs insisted in a hearing before Congress, the legislation was “in no sense a free ride for 
Apple” because he estimated his company would have to pay $8 million over the manu-
facturing cost of the Apple II systems to distribute them to all 83,000 eligible schools.40 
But the Washington Post’s analysis of the Apple Bill indicated that the corporate income 
tax deductions allowed under the law would far exceed this distribution cost. Indeed, the 
Post concluded, Apple’s tax break would be so large under the proposed law that U.S. tax-
payers would effectively pay the company $60 million for its so-called act of charity.41 As 
one anonymous congressional opponent protested, “There’s no element of giving here…. 
We’re buying the things.”42 
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Despite accusations that Apple was seeking to profit under the guise of charity, 
company leaders maintained that schools were woefully behind in their efforts to adopt 
computers, and insisted that the Apple Bill directly served national interests. As Steve Jobs 
later recalled, he had fallen in love with computing at an early age due to a school field 
trip to the nearby headquarters of Hewlett-Packard, but as he looked at school computeri-
zation statistics in the early 1980s, he “realized that a whole generation of kids was going 
to go through…school before they even got their first computer.”43 Given that Jobs and 
his colleagues at Apple believed that access to computers inherently empowered users, and 
given that they believed personal computers would be the source of a new era of economic 
prosperity, Jobs argued that it was imperative for the United States to move quickly to 
place as many computers as possible in its schools—“[T]he kids can’t wait,” he intoned 
emphatically.44 
Nevertheless, Apple’s demands for extravagant tax breaks seemed particularly bra-
zen given that the company was in robust financial health, whereas much of the rest of 
the country was feeling significant economic pain. The U.S. had plunged into a crippling 
recession in mid-1981 and was still languishing when Apple began advocating for tax 
breaks in 1982, while newly elected President Ronald Reagan’s financial policies and re-
sponses to the recession had hit public schools especially hard.45 Although he had greatly 
expanded military budgets, Reagan was determined to reduce federal spending, and his 
main targets were education and social welfare programs.46 Funds from the federal gov-
ernment had only accounted for about 10 percent of total public school spending in the 
U.S. before Reagan took office, but his deep cuts—which reduced the federal budget for 
public education by 20 percent, from $6.9 to $5.5 billion—were nevertheless significant.47 
Most federal money was earmarked to support poor students and schools, but school sys-
tems across the country also relied on federal dollars to staff and run teacher training cen-
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ters and to purchase many school materials.48 While Reagan’s budget slashing therefore 
disproportionately impacted poorer districts and students, many school systems were left 
scrambling to find ways to cover a number of gaps—New York City and the state of Cali-
fornia, for example, had to pick up the cost of vital teacher training centers when 
Reagan’s federal cuts left them without funds.49 
These added expenditures would have been difficult for state and local govern-
ments to absorb under any circumstances, but school funding at state and local levels was 
also under assault in the early 1980s. The voters of California—Reagan’s home state—had 
led the attack on school funding in 1978 when they passed Proposition 13 by a two-to-
one margin. The measure drastically reduced the ability of public schools to raise money 
through property taxes—a primary source of school funding—and in 1979 alone, voters 
and legislatures in eleven other states passed similar laws.50 Squeezed from every direction, 
many public schools across the U.S. were reeling by the early 1980s. 
Apple, by contrast, was a paramount corporate success story. The company was a 
Wall Street darling, and had grown at an exponential rate since its incorporation in 1977. 
Total revenues topped $300 million in 1981, and by the end of 1982, Apple had reached 
$1 billion in annual sales.51 Moreover, despite public schools’ multifarious financial woes, 
Apple had already managed to turn education into an important and lucrative market for 
personal computers. In 1981, one quarter of the machines Apple sold went to U.S. 
schools, and netted the company $80 million that year.52 Apple was also the clear market 
leader in education—a 1981 national survey indicated that 23 percent of the personal 
computers in U.S. schools were Apple products, while competitors Tandy–Radio Shack 
and Commodore trailed at 16 percent and 10 percent, respectively.53 Apple had recently 
seen more competition from cheaper machines such as the Atari 400, which retailed for 
only $600 compared to $2360 for a fully configured Apple II, and the business systems 
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behemoth IBM had jumped into personal computing in 1981 with a high-end $3000 ma-
chine.54 There was, however, no indication that Apple would fail to hold its own in schools 
against these contenders. In fact, Apple had garnered official endorsements from a num-
ber of state educational computing agencies, including Minnesota, Texas, and North 
Carolina, which promoted Apple products to public schools throughout their states.55 
Given that Apple was already profiting handsomely from schools, $8 million in distribu-
tion costs was not an exorbitant price for the company to pay if it truly wanted to give 
back to public education. Indeed, the administrative costs of Apple’s proposed national 
donation would have hardly dented Steve Jobs’s personal wealth—when Apple had gone 
public in 1980, his stock options alone were worth more than $250 million.56  
Apple representatives, moreover, made no secret of they fact that they expected 
their company to profit, directly and indirectly, from the national school donation 
scheme. Although U.S. schools were purchasing personal computers in larger numbers 
every year, in 1982, when the U.S. Congress was considering the Apple Bill, the vast ma-
jority of schools had yet to buy their first computer. One survey published that year, for 
example, estimated that only 20 percent of schools across the U.S. owned at least one per-
sonal computer.57 People at Apple believed that it was essential for their education business 
to make sure as many schools as possible entered the computer age with an Apple product, 
because schools would have good reason to stick with their initial brand of computer. Dur-
ing this era, software purchased for one brand of computer would not run on any com-
petitor’s machines, so schools that began amassing costly software libraries for their first 
computers would be much more likely to continue buying more machines from the same 
company.58 Thus, if Apple was able to place an Apple II in every school in the U.S., there 
was a good chance that many of those schools would become valuable future customers. It 
was on these grounds that the National Education Association, the powerful union that 
 200 
represents teachers nationwide, formally opposed the Apple Bill. Dale Lestina, a spokesper-
son for the union, criticized the law for effectively bypassing teachers’ and school admin-
istrators’ role in assessing different computers’ merits and choosing the best machines for 
their local context, and he worried that the Apple Bill could have particularly troubling 
long-term consequences for schools that did not already have a computerization plan in 
place, saying, “Schools with no computers ‘may get locked into whatever brand they re-
ceive for free, whether it best meets their needs or not.’”59 
In addition to helping Apple lock up a greater share of the education market, peo-
ple at the company also believed that the Apple Bill would help them sell computers in 
other markets. While the corporation had initially believed that home consumers would 
provide a large customer base for the Apple II, early home purchases had fallen far short of 
projections.60 But Apple’s sales force had discovered that parents were much more willing 
to invest in a personal computer if they believed it could help with their children’s educa-
tion, and Apple could hardly obtain a better stamp of scholastic legitimacy than having an 
Apple II in every single U.S. school.61 In the longer term, the company also predicted that 
students whose formative computing experiences had taken place on Apple machines 
would be more inclined to buy Apples in the future. The New York Times cited these 
strategies as the primary motivations behind the Apple Bill, raising concerns that Apple 
was not deeply committed to making sure that its products served actual educational 
needs, but that the company instead merely hoped to use schools as stepping stones to 
more lucrative markets.62 
Thus, while Apple’s leaders presented the Apple Bill as an effective way to stimu-
late the scholastic adoption of computers, which they argued was imperative to secure the 
United States’ future financial interests, it was clear that the law, which was crafted in sub-
stance by Apple’s own legal team, was carefully designed to serve a number of the com-
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pany’s specific business strategies. However—as people at the company were keen to point 
out—Apple was not the only company that could take advantage of the provisions of the 
proposed law. In theory, any computer manufacturer could donate their machines to 
schools and claim the enhanced tax deductions. One observer optimistically predicted that 
if the Apple Bill passed, it would inspire “‘a whole lot of competitive giving from a whole 
(lot) of companies,’” which would effectively nullify Apple’s attempts to lock up schools 
with a tidal wave of Apple IIs.63 However, the Apple Bill did require donated machines to 
meet certain technical benchmarks to qualify for the special tax break, and the Washing-
ton Post pointed out that these requirements marked the “dividing line between the sim-
pler home computers that sell for less than $1,000 and the more elaborate machines like 
Apple’s.”64 In other words, companies such as Radio Shack, Atari, and Commodore, whose 
less powerful yet more affordable machines were starting to make inroads in schools, 
would not qualify for the Apple Bill’s handsome deductions, which lower-end manufac-
turers understandably decried as giving unfair preference to Apple, IBM, and other top-
tier computer makers. Radio Shack was particularly critical of the Apple Bill as an ethically 
suspect piece of legislation, and even though IBM’s computers easily met the law’s techni-
cal requirements, IBM also formally opposed the Apple Bill in an apparent effort to dis-
tance itself from such patently self-interested legislation.65 
The National Education Association, Apple’s competitors, and a critical national 
press had therefore voiced significant concerns that the Apple Bill would give Apple a 
number of direct and indirect financial rewards, suggesting that corporate self-interest far 
outstripped the company’s desires to support public education through charity. There 
were, moreover, legitimate worries that the donated computers would prove useless in the 
classroom. The New York Times, for example, reported that many schools had already 
“stretched their budgets to buy expensive equipment, often under pressure from parents 
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who want their children to become ‘computer literate,’” but in many cases the machines 
went “unused because teachers have not been trained to use them.”66 Teachers’ reticence 
to use computers was understandable. Almost no working teachers in the early 1980s had 
had any meaningful exposure to computer technologies while earning their teaching de-
grees, and inservice training opportunities were scarce. One 1982 survey indicated that 
although teachers were generally intrigued by the possibilities of teaching with computers, 
only about one third of them had access to computer classes through their school systems, 
while the majority of teachers with computer skills reported that they had learned them by 
taking continuing education classes at their own initiative, and often at their own ex-
pense.67 As I indicated above, state and federal budget cuts had targeted teacher training 
centers in a number of locales, so computer education prospects for working teachers ap-
peared unlikely to improve in the short term, and the Apple Bill itself placed no burden 
on computer companies to teach teachers how to use donated machines. Radio Shack was 
particularly critical of this oversight—the company argued that without adequately trained 
staff, it was doubtful whether many schools would be able to use computers effectively.68 
In other words, Apple could end up claiming significant tax deductions for machines that 
might simply sit gathering dust. 
The Washington Post ultimately perceived so many problems with the Apple Bill 
that the newspaper’s editors included it on their list of “must not pass” legislation for the 
1982 congressional session, beseeching lawmakers not to spend taxpayer money “to sub-
sidize Apple for doing something in its own interest.”69 But while a number of journalists, 
educators, and competing computer companies believed the Apple Bill was riddled with 
conflicts of interest, Apple’s own corporate philosophies made it difficult for people at the 
company to separate their understandings of public service from their corporation’s fi-
nancial interests. As I detailed in chapter 1, the official Apple Values first drafted in 1981 
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explicitly framed Apple’s financial success as synonymous with the greater public good. 
“Apple contributes to society by providing the power and usefulness of the computer to 
individual people,” the Values proclaimed, and reasoned that the company’s “profits are 
the result and an important measure of how well we succeed in making this contribu-
tion.”70 Apple’s sense of the importance of personal computers for education was particu-
larly elevated due to Apple leadership’s belief that students would absolutely need com-
puter skills to compete for desirable jobs in the future. “To maintain America’s techno-
logical leadership, we must begin training students—of all grade levels—in today’s com-
puter technology,” Steve Jobs maintained. “If we do not, we risk producing a generation 
of Americans who will be both non-competitive and non-literate in the information soci-
ety now evolving.”71 In a hearing before Congress, Jobs insisted that computer skills were 
becoming as important as core scholastic subjects, and therefore needed to be taught from 
an early age. “Leaving [computer training] to the colleges in today’s environment,” he 
intoned, “is equivalent to leaving the teaching of English grammar and arithmetic to col-
leges.”72 
Although there were many indications that the Apple Bill was written more in the 
interest of expanding Apple’s profitable involvement with public schools than with ex-
panding students’ future opportunities, federal politicians were apparently easily con-
vinced by Jobs’s arguments that computers were the key to the nation’s future prosperity. 
When Jobs arrived in Washington, D.C., in the summer of 1982 to lobby personally for 
the Apple Bill, he was warmly received in elite political circles, despite his lack of experi-
ence dealing with busy lawmakers. As the Washington Post noted, “he tended to flood 
members of Congress with long-winded documents instead of easy-to-read two-page 
summaries,” and the paper quipped that the youthful Jobs “looked more like a summer in-
tern than the head of a $600-million-a-year corporation.”73 Jobs nevertheless quickly won 
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powerful supporters on both sides of the aisle—the Democrat Edward Kennedy of Massa-
chusetts agreed to cosponsor the bill in the Senate, and “gave Jobs a cram course in legisla-
tive strategy and tactics,” while Senator John Danforth, a Republican from Missouri, 
helped Jobs reach out to the education lobby to curry greater support for the bill.74 Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan’s administration even openly endorsed the law, placing a presidential 
aide at Jobs’s disposal to help him gain access to members of Congress.75 With such broad 
political backing, the Apple Bill passed the House on September 22, 1982, by an over-
whelming majority, 323 to 62—a margin of more than five to one.76 
The Apple Bill would have almost certainly passed the Senate, too, if it had not 
been rolled into an omnibus piece of legislation that included numerous unrelated acts. 
Among these were controversial rule changes that would have expanded banks’ abilities to 
write down bad debts, a provision that Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio promised to 
filibuster if the bill came up for a vote.77 It was a case of bureaucratic bungling that still 
rankled with Steve Jobs almost fifteen years later. In a 1995 oral history with the Smith-
sonian, Jobs personally blamed Bob Dole—who, as chair of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, had borne primary responsibility for shepherding the Apple Bill through the Senate—
for failing to get the law passed, saying, “I don’t think Bob Dole even knew what he was 
doing but he really unfortunately screwed up here.”78 Jobs’s apparent expectation that 
Dole should have made passing the Apple Bill his primary priority for the 1982 congres-
sional session well captured Jobs’s arrogant sense of entitlement to deference from the 
U.S. political system, a mentality which New Yorker writer George Packer argues still 
shapes many Silicon Valley leaders’ approaches to politics.79 
Apple’s federal lobbying efforts, however, did produce somewhat unexpected re-
sults in California. Although congressman Pete Stark vowed to reintroduce the Apple Bill 
during the 1983 congressional session, California state lawmakers proved unwilling to 
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wait for the federal government to make up its mind about school computerization. As 
Steve Jobs later recalled, members of the state legislature approached Apple and told the 
company, “You don’t have to do a thing. We’re going to pass a bill that says ‘Since you 
operate in the State of California and pay California Tax, we’re going to pass this bill that 
says that if the federal [Apple Bill] doesn’t pass, then you get the tax break in Califor-
nia.’”80 In addition to offering substantial tax credits to computer corporations for donat-
ing computers to schools, the California legislature passed a contingent of other policies 
designed to support computer education, including the allocation of more than $4 million 
to fund fifteen teacher training centers throughout the state that would focus on com-
puter education.81 It was an intriguing arrangement of policy priorities. Computer com-
panies would get immediate access to California schools and large tax breaks, while the 
state, already struggling to find adequate funds for schools in the wake of Proposition 
13—the voter-approved limitations of school fundraising—would assume all responsibility 
for training teachers and discovering educational uses for the technology. As the policies 
played out in California over the next several years, it became apparent that they had 
helped place many more computers in the state’s schools, but had failed to ensure that 
teachers were well-versed in the educational uses of computers or to verify that the tech-
nology actually enhanced students’ educational experiences. 
California Governor Jerry Brown, who made frequent mention of “my good 
friend Steven Jobs” in his speeches, was one of the primary champions of school comput-
erization in the state.82 Brown publicly worried that the United States “will soon be in 
deep trouble if we don’t quickly improve technical education,” and he explicitly touted 
the computer education programs advanced by his administration “as a way to increase 
productivity and make the economy stronger.”83 Brown’s appeals to computers as a solu-
tion to economic problems, coming in the middle of a serious national recession and 
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amidst the broader upheavals of deindustrialization, tapped into the anxieties of country. 
As the investigative reporter Todd Oppenheimer recounts, by the early 1980s, shifting 
economic realities and technological changes were impacting many parents’ careers, and 
they frequently believed that knowledge of computers could help guarantee their chil-
dren’s future career opportunities. As a result, parents began placing considerable pressure 
upon local schools to buy computers and integrate the technology into the curriculum.84 
Indeed, in communities where parents had some disposable income, many found creative 
ways to pool resources to procure computers when money could not be spared from the 
school budget. Stories abounded of bake sales, silent auctions, skate contests, and similar 
activities designed to raise funds for school computers.85 Not surprisingly, many Califor-
nians greeted Brown’s proposal with enthusiasm, as it would put more than 10,000 com-
puters in California schools in short order. 
Apple exploited the California tax breaks far more effectively than any other com-
puter corporation, and the company’s education business grew exponentially as a result. 
Although Apple had originally aimed to place computers in every U.S. school through the 
passage of the Apple Bill, California was still a significant prize. With more than 9,000 
public schools and 4 million students, California educated nearly 11 percent of the youth 
in the United States.86 And through a program called Kids Can’t Wait, Apple donated an 
estimated 9,250 Apple II computers in response to the tax breaks, reaching nearly every 
school in California.87 The scale of Apple’s donation easily outstripped competitors. Hew-
lett-Packard, for example, gave away a small computer lab of ten personal computers to 
fourteen schools throughout the state, for a total giveaway of 140 computers, while IBM 
spread a donation of 420 computers across 28 high schools in California.88 Although Hew-
lett-Packard and IBM hoped that the concentrated donations would help them gain in-
sights into how teachers and students could best use personal computers, thereby serving 
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longer-term education business strategies, Apple’s tack of maximum exposure paid off for 
several reasons. 
First, in 1983, only an estimated 19,000 schools nationwide owned personal com-
puters, and the total number of machines in schools was just under 100,000.89 Although I 
have not been able to discover how many California schools received their very first per-
sonal computers through Kids Can’t Wait, Apple’s ability to place nearly 10,000 addi-
tional computers in schools significantly expanded the company’s overall footprint in 
education, and by Apple’s own estimation, the donation program was the decisive factor 
that caused many important educational software developers to focus on the Apple II as 
the primary computer for their products.90 More immediately, however, Kids Can’t Wait 
stimulated additional sales of Apple II systems to California schools and families. As sev-
eral Apple dealers who participated in the program reported at the time, “the giveaway has 
generated some sales of Apple IIe computers to schools, as well as substantial sales to par-
ents who noticed the local school was acquiring an Apple.”91 Another Apple dealer agreed 
that participating in Kids Can’t Wait was good for business: “Anything we can do to ac-
quaint users with our equipment is bound to increase sales. There is no guarantee of any 
financial reward, but anyone with any sense can see it has got to be a positive factor.”92 
While Apple gloated that Kids Can’t Wait “set off an avalanche of software development, 
information sharing, and teacher awareness,” all centered around Apple products, and “ul-
timately sold a lot of computers,” it was much less clear whether those computers made 
any meaningful difference in California schools.93 
The key problem was the limited availability of computer training for teachers. 
Steve Jobs insisted that Apple helped provide this essential service, proclaiming, “We 
trained teachers for free and monitored this thing [Kids Can’t Wait] over the next few 
years,” but independent coverage of the program indicated that Apple was actually rela-
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tively hands-off with schools.94 The company relied exclusively on third-party dealers—
that is, computer stores that sold Apple products—to train teachers, and these sessions 
were typically quite limited. One Los Angeles dealer, for example, “gave one hour and 20 
minutes of training,” in which teachers “were told about the uses of word-processing and 
file-management programs” but received little hands-on time with computers, while 
teachers at a store in rural northern California “spent two hours learning how to unload 
and set up an Apple.”95 As an Oakland school administrator argued, “Apple’s training is 
‘just a start to what teachers need,’” and he noted that “a heavy training burden is now 
falling on the schools.”96 Moreover, as Proposition 13 had severely constrained school 
budgets across California, most schools struggled to find the resources to offer their own 
technology training programs. And as the investigative journalists Alison Armstrong and 
Charles Casement later pointed out, the tax credits Apple received for Kids Can’t Wait 
meant that the company was contributing even less to general education funds through 
taxes “at a time when spending on education in California was at its lowest point in more 
than a decade.”97 
The additional technology education funds Governor Jerry Brown had secured—
part of an initiative he dubbed “Investment in People”—were intended to defray the pres-
sures Kids Can’t Wait had placed on schools to train their teachers how to use computers, 
but the true reach of these efforts was somewhat limited. Of the $26 million Investment 
in People initiative, $4 million was allocated for fifteen Teacher Education and Computer 
Centers (TECCs), each of which served a particular geographic region of the state, and 
which formed the backbone of California’s computer training efforts for teachers.98 Most 
of the TECCs had been in existence for some time, but they had historically been semi-
independent centers administered chiefly by teachers and funded by grants from the fed-
eral government. Karen Kent, the director of the Teachers’ Learning Cooperative in 
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Marin County, northeast of San Francisco, admitted that the state funds were welcome at 
a time when “adequate basic funding for local school districts looked bleak” due to Propo-
sition 13, rampant inflation, and federal budget cuts, but she also noted that the state 
money that kept her center open came with a number of strings attached.99 
Before Investment in People, the Teachers’ Learning Cooperative had served a 
relatively small area, and the teachers who administered the center had relatively free rein 
to develop classes and workshops based on the needs of local schools. Now, the center had 
to serve hundreds more schools and was directly beholden to Governor Brown’s emphasis 
on computer education. Specifically, Investment in People stipulated that two-thirds of 
the center’s funds and activities be devoted to computer education and programs in math 
and science. While Kent granted that these were important areas to focus on, she feared 
that the inflexible guidelines would constrain the ability of the TECCs to serve the most 
pressing needs of teachers in their areas, and questioned whether her center would be able 
to “maintain successful operations when the territory is arbitrarily expanded, subject mat-
ter is spelled out from the top down, and new issues of power and control are raised 
among existing establishments.”100 Moreover, Investment in People only provided 
enough funding for the TECCs to employ a single “full-time specialist” devoted to com-
puter training—in other words, Investment in People funded only fifteen individuals to 
serve the entire state of California’s computer education needs, and each center would be 
equipped with only twenty to twenty-five computers.101 As each TECC had to provide 
services to many thousands of teachers working at hundreds of schools spread across 
sprawling geographic regions—and possibly using incompatible brands of computers—the 
TECCs could potentially provide a cursory introduction to computers for a number of 
teachers, but their ability to offer comprehensive guidance on the classroom use of com-
puters in multiple subjects was questionable at best. 
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Despite the obvious difficulties facing California teachers as their schools entered 
the computer age, Jerry Brown was overwhelmingly optimistic in his assessments of the 
California tax breaks for computer companies and the Investment in People initiative, as 
evidenced by the testimony he gave when members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
held a special hearing on school computerization in San Francisco in November 1983. The 
representatives had made the trip to gather testimony for their deliberations on a new fed-
eral version of the Apple Bill, which had been reintroduced to Congress that year. Brown 
was particularly sanguine about the abilities of teachers and students to use personal com-
puters effectively, even in the absence of carefully planned programs of implementation. 
“You will find some that will say, ‘Wait’; you will find people that say, ‘Well, the hardware 
is too complicated, and we have to have more studies,’” Brown testified, “but I don’t be-
lieve that. I believe that the young people of America know how to use computers. If they 
don’t, they learn very quickly, and if the hardware is provided, then good things will fol-
low.”102 These comments suggested that actual technology training needs were minimal, 
as students supposedly possessed an innate ability to use computers. Moreover, Brown 
averred that “teachers are well motivated” to use computers and “will learn to do their 
part” to integrate technology into their curricula, implying that teachers could—and 
should—assume significant personal responsibility for becoming acquainted with new 
technologies.103 At the same time, Brown neglected to provide a single specific example of 
how computers were being used in schools, or even a general overview of how the tech-
nology enhanced learning in particular subjects, but he confidently claimed that “the 
computer really is a significant aid” and predicted that computers would stimulate “a ma-
jor revolutionary development in the organization of American schools.”104 
Where Brown was frustratingly vague about the need for comprehensive teacher 
training or the specific impact of computers on the educational process, he was much 
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more precise about how the state tax credits served technology corporations. “This will 
benefit companies,” Brown remarked, “because people who use the computers [in school] 
may wish to buy them for their own homes.”105 Moreover, the tax breaks had greatly ex-
panded computer companies’ presence in schools—noting that more than 10,000 com-
puters had been donated to schools, chiefly from Apple, Brown said, “we expect that the 
total number of computers in California schools will have more than doubled” by the time 
the tax credits expired in 1984.106 Here, Brown’s comments suggested that his primary aim 
for the California legislation was to quickly place as many computers as possible in state 
schools, rather than to develop clear, measurable goals for what computers should accom-
plish in schools and to form a coherent strategy for meeting those goals. 
Brown did admit that the tax credits ultimately meant that California taxpayers 
paid Apple approximately half the retail value of each donated machine, and given that 
Apple already offered considerable discounts to educational customers, the company’s 
gains through tax credits were not substantially less than if Apple had sold the computers 
outright to schools.107 In publicity materials for Kids Can’t Wait, for example, Apple esti-
mated that each donated Apple II system was worth $2,364, but an education sales man-
ual from several months later indicated that the same system sold to schools for $1,230, or 
about half the full retail price.108 Although Apple had thus effectively managed to sell more 
than 9,000 computers to California schools under the guise of charity, Brown touted the 
program as a “partnership” between “[b]usiness, government, and schools, all combining 
to create a good, solid result” that “will serve the public interest.”109 
While simply getting computers into schools appeared to qualify as a definite edu-
cational success in Brown’s mind, other witnesses at the congressional hearing painted a 
more complex picture of school computerization. Joan Targ, president of the nonprofit 
corporation Interactive Services, which worked directly with schools to find effective edu-
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cational uses for personal computers, raised concerns about both the school computeriza-
tion process in California and the new version of the Apple Bill being considered in Con-
gress. In direct contradistinction to Brown, Targ insisted, “Lack of teacher training, not 
lack of equipment, is the primary bottleneck preventing effective use of computers in the 
schools.”110 Pointing out that there were no official guidelines or plans to help teachers 
implement the technology in their classrooms, Targ highlighted a number of issues with 
which teachers had to grapple. “What are the uses to which [the computers] are going to 
be put?” Targ asked. “Who deals with the complexity of introducing a whole new disci-
pline into the schools in a way that is effective and that also moves with technology as it 
changes?”111 Moreover, she argued, there were “issues dealing with who uses [computers] 
within the school, girls, boys, minority youngsters. How do you see to it that the whole 
spectrum of youngsters within the school have the appropriate introduction to comput-
ers?”112 To deal with these complex and overlapping scholastic, social, and technical di-
lemmas, Targ contended that every school needed a staff member who was intimately 
familiar with educational uses of computers in multiple disciplines and who could there-
fore provide guidance to other teachers on the integration of computers into curricula, 
appropriate uses of computers with different groups, and software purchases. Ideally, Targ 
continued, that person would also possess considerable technical expertise and could assist 
with computer setup and maintenance. Finally, she pointed out, computer technologies 
evolved rapidly, so schools needed someone to follow new developments to ensure that 
instruction involving computers remained relevant.113 
The depth of expertise that Targ believed necessary to guide effective computer use 
in the schools clearly could not be attained through a two-hour introductory session at a 
computer store, or even through a few weekend classes at one of California’s TECCs. She 
was therefore concerned that the Apple Bill before Congress in 1983, just like its predeces-
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sor the previous year, included no provisions or funding for teacher training. “Our strong 
suggestion,” she testified, was for Congress to amend the Apple Bill to support “teacher 
training, whether that be as a percentage of the donation that then goes to the State de-
partments of education or in other ways. It is enormously important.”114 But Targ’s con-
cerns did not stop with the lack of comprehensive plans for computer training in Califor-
nia or at the federal level. She also took issue with Apple’s particular donation scheme, 
which she thought did little to correct an already troubling gap in computer access be-
tween wealthier and poorer students. Acknowledging that many schools across the U.S. 
had been dealing with budget problems, Targ nevertheless noted that “suburban districts 
which serve middle class youngsters have found ways to bring computers into their 
schools, while inner-city and rural schools which serve low-income and minority students 
have far too few.” “Despite the seeming fairness of the ‘one school, one computer’ for-
mula,” she continued, “it hardly seems equitable that an inner-city high school serving 
three thousand youngsters receives its first (and only) computer while a suburban elemen-
tary school of 300 receives its sixth.”115 Instead of scattering computers as widely as possi-
ble, Targ argued, companies and lawmakers should work together to concentrate dona-
tions where they were most needed and could have the biggest impact. 
Targ’s comments indicated that whether or not Apple truly hoped to improve stu-
dent and teacher experiences by donating computers to schools, the Kids Can’t Wait pro-
gram was troublingly disconnected from the strategies that would actually help teachers 
and students benefit from computers in their classrooms. First, the program left teachers 
without meaningful training or support, which placed the primary burden on educators 
and their schools to figure how to use the new technology. Second, educators could not 
simply assume that instructional strategies worked out in one context would translate 
readily to other schools, because diverse student populations from different backgrounds 
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would likely have different educational needs. Finally, Kids Can’t Wait distributed com-
puters in a haphazard fashion, meaning that some schools without a pressing need for 
more technology would receive a surplus machine, while schools that had yet to enter the 
computer age would be left with only a single device to serve the entire teaching staff and 
student body, and the positive impacts that could come from a single school computer, 
Targ suggested, were altogether dubious. 
The testimony of Alwine Fenton, an elementary school teacher in Hayward, Cali-
fornia, reinforced Targ’s contentions about the need for more comprehensive teacher 
training programs and the benefits of having access to multiple computers in a classroom. 
Fenton taught students in the gifted and talented program at her school, and as a teacher 
in that program was given an Apple II computer for classroom use. Unfortunately, she 
continued, the school left sole responsibility for learning how to use the computer in her 
hands. “There I was,” Fenton recalled, “with a beautiful, expensive piece of equipment, 32 
children eagerly looking at me to use it, and I had never touched one before, let alone had 
any training.”116 Fenton recounted her struggles trying to teach herself to use the Apple II 
from the manual, but she pointed out “when the computer stays at school and they lock 
the schools at 4:30 because there is no custodian at night, it is a little hard to have time 
during the school day to teach yourself to operate that computer wisely.”117 Ultimately, 
Fenton took “four different computer classes at a personal cost of about $500” before she 
felt she “was adequately trained to teach the computers.”118 But using the computer in her 
classroom presented further frustrations, as it was nearly impossible for her large class to 
share time effectively on a single machine. She finally found an interim solution to her 
lack of equipment when the principal of a nearby adult education school with a fully 
equipped computer lab allowed Fenton and her class to walk over once a week to have les-
sons in the lab. Fenton’s comments suggested that schools which received their first and 
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only computer through Apple’s Kids Can’t Wait program would likely see little immediate 
benefit from the donation. As Fenton explained, one computer for a class of thirty-two 
students was hardly sufficient to give each child meaningful access to the technology, so 
one computer for a school with many hundreds or even thousands of students would 
clearly make little difference. 
Despite the frustrations and worries that surrounded Fenton’s efforts to make per-
sonal computers an important part of her curriculum, she was understandably proud of 
the work she had undertaken at her own initiative to help her students learn to use a tech-
nology that would doubtlessly impact their lives in numerous ways. “I became part of the 
technological revolution,” she told the panel, and the comments she read from a number 
of her students indicated that computer technologies had already begun to profoundly 
shape their imaginings of future opportunities.119 As one student had written, “I think it is 
good for kids to learn how to program a computer. When he or she reaches adulthood, 
they will find a good occupation very early.”120 Many others offered variations on this 
theme—one student dreamed that she “could someday be a big-time computer program-
mer,” while another worried that “[i]f children don’t use a computer when they are young, 
they will not be as good on computers—when they’re grown [they] will not get…good 
jobs.”121 Yet another student seemed steeped in the Cold War anxieties of competing na-
tion-states. “What can a superpower do,” he mused worriedly, “if its citizens do not know 
how to operate a modern machine that will be used in the future?”122 While Fenton’s own 
comments had focused primarily on the tangible difficulties of using computers effec-
tively in schools, these student statements spoke directly to the economic fears that gave 
lawmakers such as Jerry Brown such a sense of urgency about placing computers in class-
rooms, even if there were as yet few notions of how to use the technology for educational 
purposes. 
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Educators therefore faced a number of tensions and difficulties in their efforts to 
use computers in the classroom. Teachers such as Fenton were excited about the possibili-
ties of integrating computers into their curricula, and national survey data indicated that 
the vast majority of teachers were excited about the potential of the new technology.123 
Moreover, parents were anxious to have their children exposed to a technology that prom-
ised to play a significant role in many future workplaces—as Larry Cuban writes, parents 
in the early 1980s “needed little convincing of technology’s virtues when it came to their 
children working on classroom computers,” because they could readily see the technol-
ogy’s growing impact on the world around them.124 But as Randal Kottwitz argued in the 
popular computing magazine SoftSide in 1982, the public generally failed to appreciate 
the nuances and struggles of adapting an unfamiliar technology to the classroom. Kott-
witz pointed out that parents were putting significant pressure on schools to adopt per-
sonal computers even as many of them “cheer[ed] the government’s deep paring of edu-
cational budgets,” and he argued that schools’ financial woes and the uncertainties they 
faced at the hands of the Reagan administration and “disenchanted” voters was making it 
extraordinarily difficult for educational institutions to take up computing in a thoughtful 
and considered fashion.125 In other words, popular enthusiasm for computerizing schools 
was not paired with a deeper concern for maintaining the health of the public education 
system at large or ensuring that teachers were adequately trained and supported on the 
new technology. In the absence of a public that was committed to funding schools or 
holding policymakers and computer companies accountable to their promises to improve 
education, it became all too easy for politicians to commit tax dollars to school comput-
erization, thereby fulfilling their symbolic duty to modernize U.S. schools, without mak-
ing equal monetary or policy commitments to teacher support. 
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California again offers the illustrative case, where school policy continued to frus-
trate teacher attempts to use computers effectively even as more machines poured into the 
state’s schools. The testimony of Joan Targ and Alwine Fenton revealed that the Califor-
nia TECCs would provide desperately needed services to California educators seeking to 
use computers in their classrooms, even if the centers could not address the full range of 
teacher needs. But even the modestly funded TECCs proved vulnerable to shifting politi-
cal fortunes. Governor Jerry Brown had chosen to make a losing bid for the U.S. Senate 
in 1982 rather than run for reelection, and his successor, George Deukmejian, shared a 
zeal for cutting government spending with Ronald Reagan and California voters. The 
TECCs survived Deukmejian’s first term, but in 1987, he slashed education spending 
across the state, including the $12 million annual operating cost of the TECCs—he argued 
that computer training and a number of other programs on the chopping block were sim-
ply “above and beyond” what was needed to “provide basic educational needs.”126 The 
teacher journal Classroom Computer Learning viewed the cuts as particularly shocking, as 
the state had a $1.1 billion budget surplus for preceding year as well as $900 million in 
emergency reserves, and therefore had no pressing need to reduce spending.127 But both 
Classroom Computer Learning and the journal Electronic Learning suggested that there 
was an unseemly political motivation behind the cuts—Governor Deukmejian’s public re-
sponse to criticisms from Bill Honig, the popular State Superintendent of Education, in-
dicated that Deukmejian feared Honig as a potential opponent in the next gubernatorial 
election, and that he had made the cuts as part of an effort to undermine Honig’s future 
political career.128 
The closure of the TECCs was a definite setback for computer education in the 
state, but in reality, Deukmejian’s cuts were only one symptom of the serious educational 
problems that had been growing in California since the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, 
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which produced immediate and precipitous declines in school funding. In 1977, California 
had been seventh in the United States in per-student spending, but in 1978, as a direct 
result of Proposition 13, California’s per-student spending dropped to fourteenth in the 
nation.129 Under Deukmejian’s leadership during the 1980s, the state largely failed to 
compensate for school budget cuts related to Proposition 13, and by 1990, California’s 
per-student spending had fallen to twenty-ninth in the U.S.130 The Stanford-based educa-
tional historian Larry Cuban shows that these reductions in public school funding led to 
the elimination of counseling and other educational support services, the marked growth 
of class sizes, the deterioration of school facilities, the loss of teacher training programs, 
and general declines in student performance.131 The simple addition of computers to Cali-
fornia’s increasingly troubled schools had always been unlikely to reverse these more fun-
damental issues, but the elimination of the TECCs erased the single most important 
source of technology support for teachers in the state, further hampering teachers’ abilities 
to use computers effectively. However, even though computer training for teachers con-
tinued to languish over the next decade, the state did see extensive investments in educa-
tional technologies. In 1997, for example, California lawmakers allocated $100 million to 
connect state schools to the Internet, but again failed to provide comprehensive training 
to support teachers’ uses the new technology.132 
Although people at Apple were clearly aware of the ongoing funding and training 
problems plaguing computer-using teachers—as evidenced by news clippings covering the 
1987 TECC closure debacle in employee files in the company archives at Stanford—the 
corporation made no public comments about the closures, and did not offer any specific 
aid to California teachers as schools across the state cast about for new computer training 
options.133 Although the company had donated five Apple II systems to every TECC in 
1983 as part of Kids Can’t Wait in an obvious show of support for California’s state-run 
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teacher training programs, Apple’s lack of response to the tumultuous political climate in 
California in 1987 reflected the company’s own shifting approaches to teacher training. 
Specifically, Apple had begun that year to offer incentives for teachers to purchase their 
own Apple computers, arguing that extensive home use of personal computers was the 
best way for teachers to become effective instructors with the technology.134 Previously, 
only schools had qualified for Apple’s education discounts, but under new company pol-
icy, teachers, principals, counselors, and other educators could take advantage of the same 
discounts when they bought Apple products for themselves. Beyond the obvious financial 
rewards of selling more computers directly to educators, this strategy held several addi-
tional advantages for Apple—where independent teacher training centers might offer in-
struction on a variety of machines from different companies, teachers with Apples at 
home would become more dedicated to the brand, and as they built up expertise with Ap-
ple computers would be much more likely to advocate for school purchases of Apple prod-
ucts rather than devices from competitors. 
In the late 1980s, the federal government found that California’s teacher training 
woes were endemic of the national school system, but framed Apple’s new, more self-
interested approach to teacher training as a promising alternative. The 1988 report, pre-
pared by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), discovered that only one third of 
teachers had even ten hours of computer training, and of those teachers with some train-
ing, the majority indicated that their classes had “focused on learning about computers, 
not learning how to teach with computers.”135 In addition, the OTA reported that colleges 
and universities had yet to make computer training an integral component of teacher 
education. Only 29 percent of teachers just entering the profession, the report said, “per-
ceived themselves to be prepared to teach with computers,” and while many politicians 
had publicly called for extensive reforms to the teaching profession, the OTA pointed out 
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that “there is almost no Federal money for the training of new teachers.”136 Despite the 
clear, systemic shortfalls in teacher training, the OTA praised Apple’s educator discounts 
as “very important resources that should be encouraged” to increase teacher familiarity 
with computers.137 In other words, the OTA report suggested, teachers who lacked access to 
comprehensive computer training in their school systems should take personal responsibil-
ity for gaining computer skills by spending their own money on a machine for home use, 
and becoming familiar with the technology in their spare time. 
There were, of course, a number of problems with depending upon teachers to 
handle most of their own computer training needs. As the teacher journal Classroom 
Computer Learning noted, computer technologies rapidly went out of date as newer, more 
sophisticated machines came on the market. As a result, the journal suggested, “computer 
educators will need to relearn and redefine their role in the school—probably every year or 
two.”138 For teachers training themselves at home, this also implied that they would need 
to keep their machines up-to-date, a costly personal expenditure that few public school 
teachers could afford. Moreover, teachers who did make the effort to learn about comput-
ers on their own initiative often found that there were few formal rewards for doing so. 
Although a 1987 survey of computer-using teachers indicated that some teachers received 
modest salary bonuses or fringe perks such as slightly reduced class loads, they were often 
tasked with extensive additional duties, such as setting up and maintaining computer labs 
or offering technical support to other teachers, responsibilities which some teachers said 
added more than ten extra hours to their workweeks.139 Frustrations with such conditions 
led numerous teachers to leave the profession. “Once teachers learn how to use comput-
ers,” another survey reported, “they tend to leave their school system for higher paying 
jobs in private industry.”140 
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Thus, despite initial hopes that teachers could fill in the significant gaps in formal 
computer training by taking advantage of educator discounts offered by Apple and other 
corporations, the OTA’s follow-up report on teachers and technology use in 1995 revealed 
that teachers were still largely unprepared to use computers in sophisticated ways in their 
classrooms. In the opening pages of the report, the OTA was blunt in its assessments of 
teacher training, saying, “perhaps the most valuable…part of the education equation has 
been virtually overlooked: the teachers,” and as a result, “relatively few of the nation’s 2.8 
million teachers use technology in their teaching.”141 This report, just like its 1988 prede-
cessor, was highly critical of the federal government. “Much of the federal support for 
technology-related teacher development is optional in nature and small in amount,” the 
OTA reported, and was moreover “highly variable from year to year, piecemeal in nature, 
and lacking in clear strategy or consistent policy.”142 Criticizing the political uncertainties 
that had largely undermined comprehensive teacher training efforts, the 1995 report con-
cluded that federal efforts had “devot[ed] more attention to promoting the development 
of and access to technology than…to preparing teachers to use technology well.”143 In-
deed, the OTA found that there were almost 6 million computers in U.S. schools in 1995, 
or about one for every nine students.144 Thus, while schools and governments throughout 
the U.S. had spent billions of dollars outfitting classrooms with personal computers, the 
OTA argued that these costly technologies had not appreciably enhanced educational op-
portunities for the majority of students. 
While the national data indicated deep, systemic problems with computer educa-
tion, a closer look at public schools serving wealthy and poor communities disclosed an 
even more troubling situation—teachers in wealthier schools were far more likely to pos-
sess substantial computer training, and were therefore more likely to use computers in ad-
vanced, creative ways in their classrooms. Such disparities had begun to emerge in the 
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early 1980s, due in significant measure to Reagan’s education cuts. His spending reduc-
tions had disproportionately harmed poorer schools, because the majority of federal educa-
tion monies had served as “compensatory” funds intended “to supplement state and local 
revenues for schools serving students from poor families.”145 Classroom Computer News 
found in 1983 that the Reagan cuts particularly “exacerbate[d] the educational disadvan-
tages experienced by the large number of students who attend schools in urban centers,” 
and noted that schools in poorer communities were finding it particularly difficult to pur-
chase computers or to offer training for their teachers.146 “While a privileged minority of 
students in smaller school districts are becoming computer literate,” the journal warned, 
“city schools are struggling to provide their students with a basic education.”147 
Such disparities continued to mount throughout the 1980s. In 1985, for example, 
Antonia Stone, director of the non-profit computer advocacy organization Playing to 
Win, noted that the 12,000 wealthiest schools in the United States were four times as 
likely to have computers as the 12,000 poorest, but that the differences in how the schools 
used their computers were perhaps even more important. “Wealthy schools use computers 
for programming and for applications like data base and word processing software,” she 
explained, whereas “[p]oor schools use computers for drill and practice exercises” little dif-
ferent from simple workbook activities.148 “That worries me,” Stone continued, “because 
drill and practice does not take full advantage of the computer as a tool,” which she argued 
would leave poorer students ill prepared to use computers in truly productive and empow-
ering ways.149 In 1991, Jonathan Kozol, a former teacher and noted education activist, of-
fered a similar assessment. He observed that poorer schools still “characteristically em-
ploy[ed] computers for repetitive and rote activities—a passive and unimaginative use,” 
and he called on educators to provide students with the “intellectual resources to search 
out and master any skills they may later need for jobs that we can’t possibly imagine: the 
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skills to strategize and reason, select, and connect one piece of logic to another.”150 Con-
tending that “[w]e already do this in many suburban schools,” Kozol held out some hope 
if “wisely used, computers may reduce those disparities and push our nation toward the 
goal of genuine equality,” but he likewise recognized that patterns set in the 1980s had 
produced “a time of great disparities between the education offered to the children of the 
rich and poor.”151 
By the 1990s, it was therefore becoming clear to many observers that significant 
problems had plagued school computerization in the United States—the majority of 
teachers still lacked sufficient training to use computers effectively in their classrooms, 
and except for a relatively small number of students in the wealthiest districts, few youth 
appeared to be deriving significant benefit from school computer use. Private corpora-
tions, however, benefited immensely from their access to schools during the 1980s and 
1990s—especially Apple. The company had absolutely dominated educational computing 
in the 1980s, and was still the leading provider of school computers in the 1990s despite 
increasingly fierce competition from personal computers running Microsoft Windows. 
During the 1984–1985 school year, for example, schools nationwide spent $520 million 
on computers, and 70 percent of the computers purchased for education were Apples.152 
Given these substantial sales, Apple estimated that schools accounted for one third of the 
company’s total revenues in 1985.153 In 1990, Apple calculated that annual education sales 
were worth more than $1 billion annually, and a major national survey in 1992 indicated 
that Apple was still dominant in education—there were nearly 2.3 million Apple comput-
ers in U.S. schools, representing 65 percent of the total installed base.154 In 1996, Apple’s 
own data indicated that 86 percent of the public schools in the United States owned Ap-
ples, and that almost 60 percent of new computer sales to K–12 schools would be Apple 
products that year.155 The same company report revealed that Apple’s education business 
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still accounted for 20 percent of total sales, worth more than $2 billion annually.156 De-
spite the broader financial problems Apple faced in the mid-1990s—discussed at length in 
chapter 2—company leaders specifically sought to reassure investors that Apple could re-
cover by highlighting the corporation’s strong position in education. The cover of Apple’s 
1996 report to shareholders, for example, featured a new, affordable laptop computer, 
which the document proclaimed would “extend Apple’s leadership in the education mar-
ket,” while numerous figures inside the front cover highlighted the corporation’s long and 
profitable history of selling computers to schools.157 
As this overview of Apple’s involvement with schools indicates, no single market 
was more consistently profitable or important for Apple’s business during the 1980s and 
1990s than K–12 education. Moreover, the company’s own market research in the mid-
1990s continued to indicate that Apple’s strong presence in schools was the primary driv-
ing force behind the company’s sales of computers to home consumers, a fact which 
greatly extended the significance of education for Apple’s larger corporate strategies.158 
Yet teachers seemed to be increasingly disenchanted with Apple by the 1990s. For exam-
ple, a 1990 editorial in Electronic Learning by an Illinois teacher criticized Apple for 
“milk[ing] education to pay for its foray into the business world.”159 He pointed out that 
Apple had for many years neglected the Apple II line of machines—by far the most popu-
lar computer in U.S. schools—in favor of the Macintosh, which few schools could afford. 
Even worse, this teacher felt that the education press, where Apple spent lavishly on adver-
tising, had become far too cozy with the corporation, and was failing to hold Apple’s “feet 
to the fire whenever it neglects education and then turns around and piously claims the 
contrary.”160 Another teacher editorial in Electronic Learning suggested that Apple’s ongo-
ing dominance in schools stemmed primarily from fears about the costs associated with 
retraining teachers to use a different brand of computer and rebuilding software libraries 
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from scratch—in other words, many schools stuck with Apple mostly out of force of 
habit.161 
Apple’s business strategies had therefore succeeded in securing a dominant market 
share in schools, but the evidence suggested that the company was not living up to its 
loftier promises to serve as a supportive partner for teachers. Indeed, the priorities reflected 
in the federal Apple Bill and the Kids Can’t Wait program in California indicated that 
Apple’s educational business strategies could be profoundly disconnected from corporate 
rhetoric about improving the educational process, as the company demonstrated little 
concern for teachers’ preparedness to use computers in their classrooms. But Apple’s fail-
ure to support teachers mirrored the attitudes of policymakers, who proved eager to buy 
computers for schools, but consistently undermined teacher training programs over the 
course of the 1980s and 1990s. It was something of a perfect storm. Despite the concerns 
raised by teachers, journalists, scholars, and other critical observers, the broader public re-
mained relatively apathetic about problems in public education, making it all too easy for 
Apple’s financial interests to overshadow the corporation’s more altruistic aims to reform 
education. 
To be fair, Apple did carry out more concerted efforts to make a positive differ-
ence in the lives of teachers and students in the 1980s and 1990s, especially through an 
ambitious education grants program and the long-term Apple Classrooms of Tomorrow 
(ACOT) research project, which are the focus of the next section. These programs actually 
produced a number of exciting examples of how computers could be used to enrich educa-
tional opportunities, but caught between Apple’s overarching financial goals and a hostile 
political climate for public education, the teachers and Apple employees who worked to-
gether on these projects often found that corporate superiors, school administrators, and 
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policymakers were not particularly interested in their insights, stultifying the long-term 
impact of Apple’s more altruistic educational aspirations. 
 
CUSTOMERS OR PARTNERS? APPLE’S CONFLICTED RELATIONS WITH TEACHERS 
In this section, I focus on Apple’s two most ambitious school reform initiatives: an 
education grants program, which launched in 1979 and donated tens of millions of dollars 
of computer equipment to schools throughout the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s, and 
the Apple Classrooms of Tomorrow (ACOT), a research partnership between Apple and 
five U.S. public schools that ran from 1985 to 1995 and which aimed to develop sophisti-
cated insights into how computer technologies could best serve the educational process. 
These programs represented Apple’s most concerted attempts to live up to promises that 
the company would be more than just a commercial purveyor of computers to schools, 
and in some instances, teachers used Apple grants and participation in ACOT to do re-
markable and promising things with their students. Yet the hopeful gains Apple observed 
in these specific classrooms proved difficult to translate into larger transformations in 
public education, and the corporation was an inconsistent ally in teachers’ attempts to 
make positive changes in their schools and districts. In many cases, the Apple employees 
who worked most closely with teachers discovered that improving education was not in-
trinsically aligned with Apple’s financial interests, and the company’s involvement with 
schools through ACOT and the grants program, which began with much optimism, 
tended to end in disillusionment for Apple employees and teachers alike. 
Even though ACOT and the education grants initiative were two of Apple’s most 
prominent educational programs, only a handful of commentators have discussed either 
effort, and to my knowledge, there have been no extensive examinations of how these 
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programs fit into Apple’s larger business strategies, how the company used the programs 
to generate publicity and marketing materials, or the frustrations that both teachers and 
Apple employees faced in their efforts to achieve meaningful school reforms. Todd Op-
penheimer, for example, betrays an overarching antagonism for the educators who par-
ticipated in ACOT and the grants program—he argues that the ACOT teachers had too 
much “faith in technology” to offer honest assessments of their experiences working with 
Apple, and criticizes one Apple grant recipient, Paul Reese, for overstating the positive 
educational impacts of technology.162 These cursory dismissals of Apple’s efforts fail to 
recognize that ACOT employees were themselves dubious about the long-term impacts of 
technology and their program, or that Reese was adamant that committed teachers—not 
computers—were the key to reforming schools. Alison Armstrong and Charles Casement 
offer a more nuanced assessment teacher experiences on the Vivarium project, a five-year 
research grant awarded to the Los Angeles Open Charter School in 1987, but again, their 
investigative reporting does not provide a detailed assessment of the corporate motiva-
tions behind the project.163 Although I am generally sympathetic to the critical perspec-
tives offered by Oppenheimer and Armstrong and Casement, their arguments do not al-
ways capture the complexities of school policy and administration, the contradictory im-
pulses that drove Apple’s involvement with schools, nor the doubts and concerns of some 
of Apple’s own employees. By drawing on a broad range of materials—corporate publica-
tions, Apple publicity materials, education sales manuals, grants application instructions, 
Apple philanthropy guidelines, teacher and student accounts of their experiences in Ap-
ple’s education programs, journalistic coverage of the company’s school reform efforts, 
and critical education scholarship—I hope to illustrate the complicated range of factors at 
play in educational technology use and school reform. While I argue that Apple’s pursuit 
of financial interests in schools contributed to the failure of ACOT and Apple education 
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grants to produce meaningful school reforms, I also aim to show how more fundamental 
political problems in the administration of U.S. public education consistently undermined 
teachers’ and Apple employees’ best efforts to enhance students’ educational experiences 
and opportunities. 
Apple’s education grants program began relatively modestly in 1979 as a depart-
ment called the Apple Education Foundation, staffed by just two employees, and repre-
sented the corporation’s first formal philanthropic initiative.164 Apple’s leaders had, since 
the earliest days of the company, maintained that their corporation could “contribute [to 
society] in certain special ways due to the unique nature of our products,” and in their first 
attempts to sketch out a statement of company values, Apple executives had singled out 
schools as a place where computers could make a particularly positive impact.165 In a cata-
log and information booklet the company distributed to teachers in 1981, the company 
likewise assured educators that “Apple Computer, Inc. believes companies have a responsi-
bility to the societies in which they exist,” and elaborated that the company had specifi-
cally chartered “the Education Foundation as one means of meeting this responsibility 
and demonstrating [the company’s] commitment to education.”166 Reflecting the in-
grained corporate philosophy that Apple personal computers possessed a remarkable po-
tential to empower their users, company leaders decided that the Apple Education Foun-
dation would “focus Apple’s philanthropy on grants of computer equipment rather than 
money—in other words, to share the high-technology products [the company] designs 
and produces with sectors of the community promoting social and personal well-being.”167 
While corporate rhetoric emphasized the public service motivations underlying the 
Apple Education Foundation, the program was also intended to serve Apple’s business 
strategies. Personal computers, as a brand new technology, were completely untested in 
schools in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and people at the company hoped that by plac-
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ing machines in actual classrooms they could gain valuable insights for further educational 
product development and marketing purposes. As company documents show, the primary 
criteria the Apple Education Foundation considered when reviewing the first round of 
grants applications in 1979 was whether teachers’ proposals were likely to “further…the 
use of microcomputers in education.”168 Indeed, Apple treated grant sites as valuable re-
search and development opportunities as well as fodder for publicity and marketing cam-
paigns. Yet Apple’s approaches to the education grants program represented a relatively 
complex mixture of corporate self-interest and more altruistic motivations. 
On the one hand, the people administering Apple’s education grants wanted to 
ensure that teachers and students were taking full advantage of personal computers, using 
them for creative and innovative purposes that truly added something to learning experi-
ences. When Barbara Bowen, for example, took over Apple’s education grants program in 
1983, she expressed concern that there were too many “computers in schools these days 
that are being used just for computer literacy and drill and practice programs,” uses which 
she saw as “kind of dead-ended.”169 To address this problem, Bowen sought to foster model 
sites through the grants that could help teachers throughout the national public school sys-
tem “grasp a coherent sense of the possibilities from others who have been thinking about 
creative uses of computers in education.”170 Three years later, Apple proudly reported that 
teachers who had received grants had “made presentations to professional educational or-
ganizations around the country, shared the results of their work through publications pro-
duced by Apple and through academic journals, and helped formulate in-house teacher 
training programs in their districts, based on the findings of their own projects,” which 
the company hoped would help catalyze “widespread educational change.”171 Moreover, 
since the people running Apple’s education grants program began to recognize that cer-
tain groups of students, especially “female and ethnic and linguistic minority students,” 
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tended to have less meaningful access to computers in their schools, the company began 
focusing its grants on projects that would specifically target these groups of students.172 In 
subsequent years, the vast majority of Apple’s education grants did go to schools that pre-
dominantly served low-income youth in places such as the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation 
in South Dakota; Newark, New Jersey; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Harlem, New 
York.173 
The teachers and schools who received these grants did use computers and other 
support from Apple to create intriguing new learning opportunities for their students, 
some of which I will explore momentarily. But Apple also capitalized on grantees’ efforts 
in their larger education sales efforts. A corporate education sales manual from 1988, for 
example, informed employees that the “Education Grants Program helps your sales efforts 
in many ways.”174 On the most basic level, the grants program provided concrete “success 
stories and references sites” that salespeople could cite as evidence of “success in integrat-
ing Apple technology into curriculum areas” when negotiating sales with other school sys-
tems.175 Grant recipients themselves also often provided free publicity by presenting find-
ings from their computer projects at professional conferences, and the sales manual addi-
tionally pointed out that “[g]rantees who are ‘satisfied customers’ generally purchase more 
equipment since they are able to convince the decision-makers that it makes good 
sense/cents to invest in the technology.”176 In other words, initial grants could open the 
door to larger sales in the future, when excited program participants could help convince 
their schools and districts to make more extensive investments in computer technologies. 
And Apple found that many applicants who did not win grants from the company ended 
up purchasing equipment in any case, as the demanding grant-writing process typically 
involved teams of teachers who had spent considerable time and effort drafting plans “in 
which computers would be fundamental in achieving curriculum goals and objectives,” 
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and they were often able to adapt their Apple grants applications to win funding from 
other sources.177 
Corporate rhetoric presented Apple’s capitalization on grantee efforts for sales and 
publicity purposes as an eminently fair bargain. For one thing, company materials framed 
the education grants program as far more than a gambit to sell computers to schools. 
More importantly, the company explicitly hoped to use the grants process to advance a 
progressive school reform agenda centered on interdisciplinary education. “To adapt suc-
cessfully to life’s changing circumstances,” a grants application booklet proclaimed, 
“young people need a range of skills and knowledge. Curriculums that teach subject by 
subject, however, often separate school from life outside its walls—leading many students 
to question the relevance of what they’re learning.”178 The grants program therefore called 
upon teachers to employ computers as just one tool in a broader interdisciplinary pro-
gram. As the grants application instructions suggested, “Interdisciplinary curriculums can 
include lessons drawn from students’ backgrounds, day-to-day lives, and communities—
all rich sources of lesson material and learning experiences.”179 The education grants pro-
gram therefore encouraged teachers to create proposals that included plans for collabora-
tive teaching across discipline areas, activities that would push students to become more 
active in the local community, lessons that would bring in experts from outside the 
school, and projects that would call on students to communicate and collaborate with 
other students in distant locations. 
In addition, Apple’s support of grant recipients went further than the mere provi-
sion of equipment. Grant applicants were expected to develop a three-year plan that 
would employ Apple computers as part of a larger interdisciplinary teaching initiative. 
During the first year of the grant, Apple would provide up to $5,000 in addition to do-
nated computer technologies, which teachers could use to “pay for such critical compo-
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nents as software, peripherals, curriculum materials, inservice training, and outside con-
sultants” to help establish a comprehensive support system for the project.180 Moreover, 
Apple would fly grant recipients to company headquarters in Cupertino, California for an 
intensive summer training session that would include presentations and workshops con-
ducted by former grant recipients. Apple believed that it was absolutely essential to help 
grantees “establish relationships that can provide a network of support for the future,” as 
the company recognized that feelings of isolation were a common complaint among 
teachers trying out new projects and approaches in their classrooms.181 In exchange for 
providing these services, Apple informed grantees that the company “retain[ed] the right 
to publicize any aspect of your grant award,” and insisted that schools be open at all times 
to “periodic visits from our staff or the news media.”182 Finally, at the conclusion of the 
grant period, Apple “expect[ed] to see sustained financial support from the school and dis-
trict to ensure that the program will continue into the future,” and if at all possible, the 
company hoped to see administrators commit the funds to replicate the pilot program 
supported by the grant on a school-wide or even district-wide scale.183 
In Apple’s equation, then, teachers would benefit from seed grants of money and 
computers, as well as training opportunities and inclusion within a broader professional 
network of computer-using teachers. The company, meanwhile, would benefit from posi-
tive publicity, the creation of model sites that could be mined for marketing materials, 
and commitments from teachers and school administrators to advocate for future pur-
chases of more Apple products. Ultimately, people at the company contended, both Apple 
and schools would benefit from the expanded use of computers within creative, interdisci-
plinary educational programs that encouraged such goals as critical thinking and self-
directed learning. And as a result of the grants program, Apple could indeed point to 
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schools where teachers were using computers to support creative new educational initia-
tives. 
One particularly vivid example came from Pine Ridge High School on the Pine 
Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota, which is governed by the Oglala Lakota Na-
tion. Pine Ridge High School, like most reservation schools in the United States, had his-
torically worked to suppress indigenous language and culture. Bryan Brewer, who had 
been a student at the school in the 1960s and later returned to serve as a Native American 
Studies teacher, recalled that “he and his classmates were punished for speaking the Lakota 
language,” and revealed that it was only during the late 1980s and early 1990s that “Na-
tive American culture [began to be] officially incorporated into teaching curricula.”184 In-
terestingly, one major catalyst for teaching Lakota language and history in the school was 
an Apple education grant won by English teacher Tom Gray. Gray’s grant proposal, writ-
ten along with several colleagues, noted that there was a profound disconnect between 
many of his students’ home lives and their experiences at Pine Ridge High School, as the 
school had not made comprehensive attempts to connect the culture and history of Oglala 
Lakota people to the subjects learned in school. By using the multimedia capabilities of 
Apple Macintosh computers, Gray aimed to have his students collect and publish stories, 
myths, and legends from relatives and tribal elders, which he hoped would help students 
and their families begin to see the school “as an integral part of their lives.”185 
Pine Ridge High School won the grant, and teachers and students alike were im-
mediately taken by the possibilities offered by the Apple computers. One student, Elmarla 
Little Spotted Horse, had long been interested in writing stories, and she was particularly 
intrigued by the program HyperCard, which allowed her to turn her stories into interac-
tive, animated texts. She recalled her mounting curiosity as she explored the program, as 
she wondered, “What else do computers have to offer? How can we manipulate them to 
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get what we’re looking for?”186 Among the HyperCard projects Little Spotted Horse 
worked on was an anthology of student poems, stories, and video animations dealing with 
contemporary and historical Lakota life, titled Sparkling Silence. As Little Spotted Horse 
later told Andrea Gooden, Apple’s education grants coordinator, the project had marked 
an important turning point in her life, because she had not in the past thought “much of 
the reservation because of what I saw on TV,” but in the process of researching Sparkling 
Silence, she said, “I learned a lot more about myself as an Oglala Sioux than I knew be-
fore.”187 In addition to helping provide a deeper connection to Lakota culture, Little Spot-
ted Horse’s work with computers opened up other opportunities, giving her an introduc-
tion to the some of skills she needed to pursue a college degree in computing in Colo-
rado.188 
Another student, Seneca DeCory, used video software on the Macintosh to create 
a video analyzing and deconstructing “stereotyped images of Indians” in Hollywood 
films, while yet another student, Jonna Swiftwater, used HyperCard to create a multime-
dia research project exploring contemporary relations between the Oglala Lakota people 
and white Americans.189 Like Little Spotted Horse, both DeCory and Swiftwater hoped to 
continue building on their computer knowledge through further study in college, and 
Swiftwater was committed to continuing to work with Pine Ridge teachers to create “a 
Lakota language and culture project” that she hoped would “help other students grasp the 
richness of their Lakota heritage.”190 As she said in an interview with Apple employees, 
“I’m proud to be living on the reservation…. We’ve had a lot happen to us, and to the 
land, but we’re still living and we’re still functioning in today’s world. We’re strong.”191 
Such comments suggested that the Pine Ridge High School project had delivered on many 
of the goals of the Apple education grants program. Students and teachers had used the 
computers to deepen their connections to their community and heritage, but they had 
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also gained familiarity with technologies that broadened their future opportunities beyond 
the reservation. 
But the nature of the support offered by Apple’s education grants program made it 
difficult to sustain the gains in student excitement and engagement seen immediately af-
ter the introduction of new technologies at Pine Ridge High School. When the school re-
ceived the grant of twenty-four Macintosh computers in the late 1980s, other school ma-
terials and facilities had suffered from years of neglect. As Apple representatives noted 
when they visited the schools, most of the books in the school’s library dated from the 
1930s or earlier, and because economic opportunities on the reservation were scarce, with 
unemployment rates over 70 percent, the school was completely dependent on federal 
funds, which had become increasingly meager under President Reagan’s austerity meas-
ures for public education.192 Thus, while Apple maintained it was the responsibility of 
schools that had received grants to find the money to maintain and expand computer 
programs, Pine Ridge faced unique difficulties in its ability to continue raising funds for 
costly computer supplies, especially given that the cycles of rapid obsolescence that define 
commercial computer products make fundraising an endless process. 
Although I have not been able to track the specific details of what happened to the 
computer education projects at Pine Ridge High School in the years following the Apple 
grant, a 2015 investigative report in the Minneapolis Star Tribune discloses that schools 
across the Pine Ridge reservation have fallen far behind other schools in technology ac-
cess, as well as other fundamental measures of educational opportunity. Indeed, the Star 
Tribune reports that federal funds for reservation schools, distributed through the Bureau 
of Indian Education, have continued to fall during the twenty-first century, leaving 
schools on the Pine Ridge reservation unable even to replace crumbling asbestos tile floor-
ing, which federal officials have told teachers is “fine as long as it’s not disturbed.”193 The 
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nearby Shannon County public schools are a study in contrasts. Middle school students 
have ready access to Apple iPads, while a high school student from Pine Ridge who had 
competed in basketball tournaments in Shannon County remarked that the public schools 
outside the reservation had “fancy floors, new flooring, new design, new curtains,” as well 
as “technology—they had TVs in the hallway to show the student activities. It makes our 
school kind of look sad.”194 Thus, while Apple had confidently predicted in the mid-1990s 
that Tom Gray and other teachers at the Pine Ridge High School would be able to inspire 
schools across the reservation to start their own computer education projects, the broader 
failings of federal support for education on reservations clearly made such efforts a losing 
battle. 
It is not perhaps fair to expect Apple Computer, Inc. to be able to correct the long-
standing legacy of federal antagonism and neglect that has shaped relations with Indian 
reservations since the 1800s, but Apple’s use of the Pine Ridge High School grant as a 
prime example of meaningful educational change was more troubling. The glowing, hap-
pily-ever-after tone of corporate materials publicizing the grant’s impact at the school 
downplayed the pervasive political, social, and economic challenges that students faced on 
the reservation, transforming an opportunity for an honest assessment of deeper prob-
lems with federal educational policies into a photo opportunity for a publicity-hungry 
corporation. It was a maneuver that simply reinforced the lack of critical reflection in of-
ficial discussions about the capacity of computers to solve systemic problems in public 
schools during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1995, for example, President Bill Clinton held up 
the Internet as a technology with seemingly miraculous implications for public education. 
As Clinton laid out a sweeping initiative to connect schools to the web, he proclaimed, “I 
want to emphasize one of the most important aspects of the technological revolution is 
the opportunities being opened to children so many Americans had given up on and 
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schools that too many Americans had given up on.”195 This statement implied that simple 
access to the Internet could somehow reverse many of the inequalities apparent in U.S. 
public schools, but said nothing about the larger budget shortfalls or social problems with 
which many schools had to grapple. Clinton’s vice president, Al Gore (who now sits on 
Apple’s board of directors), likewise intoned that the Internet would “give every Ameri-
can, young and old, the chance for the best education available to anyone, anywhere.”196 
These statements distinctly echoed Apple’s own optimistic assessments of the transforma-
tive capacities of computers, and betrayed a similar tendency to gloss over the deeper 
causes of inequality and lack of opportunities some students faced within public schools. 
To be sure, some of the challenges at Pine Ridge High School were not representa-
tive of U.S. public education at large, but even grant recipients who seemed much more 
likely to achieve long-term successes were frequently frustrated in their efforts to improve 
their schools or districts. The experiences of Paul Reese, a teacher at Ralph Bunche Ele-
mentary School in Harlem, New York, were particularly illustrative of the complex issues 
teachers faced when they tried to spearhead school reform efforts based around technology 
projects. Reese was first approached in 1985 by the Bank Street College of Education, 
where researchers were looking for a school site to study the possible benefits of using 
computer networks to support collaborative learning in elementary science education.197 
Bank Street College, located in Manhattan’s Morningside Heights neighborhood, was just 
a few blocks southwest of Ralph Bunche School, which sits at the edge of West Harlem on 
123rd Street. In partnership with Bank Street College, Reese agreed to lead a project called 
Earth Lab, which ran from 1987 to 1990 and was supported by an Apple education grant 
of twenty Apple II and Macintosh computers.198 The primary goal of Earth Lab was to 
transform the science curriculum at Ralph Bunche from a relatively passive, lecture-based 
mode of instruction to an inquiry- and experiment-based curriculum. The Earth Lab cur-
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riculum focused predominantly on a series of long-term collaborative projects that also 
required students to draw on skill sets from other subject areas, including written com-
munication, history, and geography. Designing Earth Lab therefore required Reese to 
work with teachers in different departments across the school so they could coordinate as-
signments that drew on multiple disciplines at once. 
Thus, while Earth Lab emphasized stimulating students’ interests in science, the 
project fit neatly into a number of aims laid out by Apple’s education grants program. 
First, as Reese noted, most of Ralph Bunche School’s “African-American and Hispanic 
students live in the neighboring public housing,” and the majority of the school’s children 
“meet many of the criteria of low income and/or measures of poverty.”199 Furthermore, 
Reese had seen “many students decide early in their school life that science is not for 
them,” and he cited the fact that “[l]ess than 1% of our students gain admission to New 
York City’s specialized high schools” that offered advanced science and technology train-
ing, which he argued “closes off future career options and narrows the pool from which 
the nation’s scientists and engineers will come.”200 Earth Lab, which would specifically 
serve African-American, Hispanic, and female students from low-income backgrounds, 
and would seek to increase the youths’ future academic and career opportunities, perfectly 
answered Apple’s call for projects that targeted disadvantaged children. Moreover, the col-
laborative teaching plans and multi-subject assignments well reflected Apple’s desire to see 
more interdisciplinary teaching and learning in U.S. public schools. 
According to Reese, the Earth Lab program stimulated a number of new teacher 
and student approaches to learning, due in some measure to the characteristics of the 
computer technologies involved. “The structure and nature of the computer activities 
brought teachers together,” Reese wrote, both because most teachers were unfamiliar with 
computers and because the machines were concentrated in a shared lab.201 “[S]tudents and 
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teachers frequently came to the computer room where they began to depend on each 
other for training and assistance,” Reese continued, and through these collaborative inter-
changes, teachers began to appreciate the benefits of team-based teaching and learning.202 
“These encounters…led teachers to share successful lessons and organizational tech-
niques,” and Reese noted that teachers participating in the program began to gain a more 
holistic view of the educational process, and to come up with lessons that supported learn-
ing across disciplines.203 
Reese and several of his colleagues were so energized by their experiences partici-
pating in the three-year project that they decided to lobby school administrators to let 
them expand their efforts through the creation of a computer mini-school within Ralph 
Bunche. Reese explained that teachers who participated in Earth Lab felt that working 
more closely with their colleagues helped them improve their teaching, especially by help-
ing them overcome the isolation and fragmentation they often experienced in their own 
classrooms. As one teacher explained, many students at Ralph Bunche required remedial 
support in one or more subjects. The school tried to remediate most students through 
pullout programs, which tended to be incredibly disruptive. “You have kids being pulled 
out for reading, pulled out for math, then the whole class is pulled out for science,” she 
complained. “It’s just like a merry-go-round: it never stops.”204 The teacher further ex-
plained that with so much instruction happening outside the classroom with numerous 
other teachers or learning specialists, it became next to impossible to keep track of student 
progress in various areas, which made it especially difficult to compose lesson plans for the 
whole class. In Earth Lab, with its emphasis on integrated instruction across disciplines, 
teachers found that they could work together to identify problem areas and find ways to 
build necessary remediation into larger projects, which gave the teachers more opportuni-
 240 
ties to monitor student progress directly and minimized the disruption of pullout pro-
grams. 
As a result of such insights, Reese recalled, “teachers began to realize the power of 
their collaboration,” so they “met and discussed how they would like to see the school or-
ganized.”205 The mini-school that Reese and his colleagues proposed suggested a number of 
structural changes, chief among them smaller class sizes and permission to craft a fully in-
tegrated curriculum that would allow teachers to work in teams across disciplines. Arguing 
that teachers with fewer charges would be better able to serve their students’ diverse needs 
and to track their performance in multiple subjects, the teachers “offered to surrender 
contractually guaranteed unassigned preparation periods for smaller classes,” and also 
asked that resources be diverted from one pullout program “to reduce class size even 
more.”206 To ensure greater continuity for the students involved and to guarantee that 
they would represent a diverse range of abilities and backgrounds, Reese and his colleagues 
suggested that students should be picked for the mini-school by lottery, and that they 
would remain in the program for their fifth- and sixth-grade years. The school agreed to 
the project, so in 1990, Reese and his colleagues began working closely with each other to 
create a flexible, project-based curriculum, which used a variety of computer tools to en-
courage students to combine scientific data collection, problem solving tactics, and spo-
ken and written communications skills to become better writers, critical thinkers, and col-
laborators in their learning pursuits. Although the mini-school explicitly sought to im-
prove student performance in core subjects, such as math, English, and science, the over-
arching goal for Reese and the other teachers was to “emphasize self-esteem and responsi-
bility,” encouraging students “not to sit idly by and accept what happens to them, but to 
shape the paths that they follow.”207 
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If any one program that grew out of Apple’s education grants seemed likely to 
make a lasting impact on public education, it was the Ralph Bunche computer mini-
school. Reese was a particularly dedicated and charismatic teacher, and the efforts that he 
spearheaded drew significant praise and attention from the press and influential policy-
makers. Between the initiation of Earth Lab in 1987 and the dissolution of the computer 
mini-school in 1999, Reese and mini-school students attended numerous national educa-
tion conferences to give presentations about their work at Ralph Bunche School. Between 
1987 and 1990 alone, Ralph Bunche students participated in seventeen conferences, trav-
eling to locales such as San Francisco, St. Louis, Boston, and, in 1990, Washington, D.C., 
where Reese and his students met and interviewed congressman Charles Rangel, the emi-
nent Army general Colin Powell, and then-chair of the Democratic National Committee 
Ron Brown, who would later visit Ralph Bunche in person when he was serving as Secre-
tary of Commerce under Bill Clinton.208 The mini-school likewise received positive cover-
age in national newspapers, as well as international publications such as the London Fi-
nancial Times, and was even visited by a group of Danish journalists.209 Reese himself was 
named Educator of the Year by the journal Electronic Learning in 1990, and he soon after 
became the official technical adviser for sixteen neighboring schools.210 In addition to the 
initial grant from Apple, the mini-school secured additional funds and resources from 
technology companies including Panasonic and the Boston-based firm Bolt Baranek and 
Newman, as well as a supplementary $100,000 grant of equipment from Apple in 1993, a 
National Science Foundation grant that paid $15,000 annually for school Internet access, 
and another $100,000 grant for computer equipment from the New York City Council in 
1999.211 Reese was also invited to testify before the U.S. House of Representatives in 1997, 
as Congress considered ways to replicate what it considered the most successful examples 
of school technology use.212 Reese likewise contributed to the federal Office of Technology 
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Assessment’s comprehensive studies of school computerization in 1988 and 1995, and the 
Ralph Bunche School was profiled as a model site in the Clinton administration’s prelimi-
nary report on school Internet access in 1996.213 
The excitement that surrounded Earth Lab and the subsequent computer mini-
school at Ralph Bunche is not difficult to understand. Visitors to the school were, first of 
all, typically impressed with the technological skills and confidence exhibited by the stu-
dents they met. Reese had been particularly interested in using computers to help his stu-
dents connect with people outside of their immediate environment, and several years be-
fore most Americans had heard of email or the Internet, children participating in the 
Earth Lab program were exchanging electronic messages and sharing weather and climate 
data with classrooms in London, Australia, Belgium, and Japan.214 One student even man-
aged to strike up a correspondence with a professional biologist in Australia, whose work 
with marsupials fascinated the sixth grader. “You send a message, and people respond,” 
the student happily told a New York Times reporter, “telling you things you never 
knew.”215 The same journalist also witnessed a group of students videoconferencing with 
professors at Cornell University in upstate New York.216 Reese was especially proud of his 
students when a contingent of Danish reporters arrived—because children in the com-
puter mini-school had previously exchanged messages with a school in Denmark, they 
were able to greet the journalists in their own language. Reese happily reported that the 
Danes “had several stereotypes of New York City schools shattered that day as the stu-
dent-hosts helped them” send messages to Denmark using the “local area network and 
went on to explain several of their science projects.”217 The students who first participated 
in the Earth Lab program also made it into the national news in 1989, when they used 
data collected from their rooftop weather station to track Hurricane Hugo, and formed a 
more accurate projection of the storm’s path than the National Weather Service.218 
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The mini-school also produced examples of long-term successes. Several students 
who participated in the mini-school in its early years continued to be closely involved as 
mentors for younger students and technical assistants after they graduated from elemen-
tary school. One, Hamidou Diori, whose family had emigrated from Nigeria in 1989, later 
served as an editorial consultant on the mini-school’s newspaper and helped Reese main-
tain the school’s network. “I always wanted to learn to use computers,” he told the direc-
tor of Apple’s education grants program, and was particularly proud of having worked 
with Reese and an employee from Bolt Baranek and Newman to connect all the school’s 
computers to the Internet in the early 1990s.219 “This was no ordinary network,” he re-
called, as the school “was going to become a node on the Internet,” and Diori explained 
that his job “was to set up all the Macs that had hard drives with MacTCP, then configure 
their IP (Internet protocol) address, then configure the gateway address (the router). Fin-
ished that, no problem.”220 Thanks to Diori’s work with Reese, Ralph Bunche became the 
second public school in the United States to have access to the Internet.221 As a high school 
student, Diori spent every Tuesday at Ralph Bunche to troubleshoot the various technical 
problems that inevitably arose with the school’s numerous computers, and he enthusiasti-
cally described plans for studying computer science in college. Another student, Herbert 
Williams, found that he had learned so much about computer technology and program-
ming in his two years in the computer mini-school that he was already overqualified for all 
but one computer class at his high school. Combining his interest in computers with a de-
sire to give back to the community, Williams helped create and administer a website for a 
children’s rights organization called Kids Meeting Kids, and he frequently returned to 
Ralph Bunche to help younger students. “It’s a lot of fun to see what the people after me 
are doing,” he said, and marveled at the students’ work ethic: “They do a lot of work, even 
the third graders—a lot of work.”222 
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Beyond students’ increased facility with computer technologies and remarkable 
contacts with others around the globe, the major projects that anchored the Ralph Bunche 
computer mini-school curriculum showcased the students’ civic engagement, political 
awareness, and communication skills. One of the longest-running projects was the crea-
tion of a comprehensive journalism program. It included a monthly publication called 
Computer School News, which was published on the school’s website and had a print circu-
lation of 3,000, and a video news segment called KidWitness News.223 The Computer 
School News often dealt with local community issues, including educational policies that 
impacted schools in the students’ neighborhood. For example, in 1997, Rudolph Crew, 
chancellor of the New York City Board of Education, decided to suspend the school board 
in Community District 5, which included Ralph Bunche School. The New York City pub-
lic school system is somewhat decentralized, with many administrative duites falling to 
smaller neighborhood districts, but Crew had intervened in Community District 5 due to 
reports of serious problems throughout the district.224 Responding to this action, a student 
reporter for the Computer School News noted that some schools “didn’t even have text-
books, or reading books,” and vocalized support for Chancellor Crew’s decision. “To have 
so many children below grade level is not good,” the student opined. “This affects their 
future,” the article continued, as underserved students “might not be able to get a good 
job in their life.”225 The student reporter went on to describe PTA efforts to maintain 
Ralph Bunche’s much higher educational standards, and encouraged more parents to be-
come involved with the school. 
In 1996, the Computer School News likewise highlighted the letter-writing cam-
paign undertaken by the mini-school students in Donna Stewart’s fifth grade class, who 
were perturbed by New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s policies toward homeless people. 
The students were particularly upset by a recent city government action to evict a home-
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less community from a long-term settlement in abandoned train tunnels under Manhat-
tan, and the Computer School News published a selection of student letters to Giuliani. 
Student Luisa Nunez had no qualms about telling Giuliani just what she thought. “There 
are lots of homeless people in New York,” she wrote, “and I think you are doing nothing 
about it.” Jessica Green likewise expected more sympathy and civic support for those 
without permanent residences. “I see, almost everyday, signs like this: I have AIDS and 
I’m homeless too!,” Green reported, and she suggested that the mayor “come down here to 
see for yourself” what life was actually like for people living on the streets of New York. 
“Put some of your money and work on these people, they have rights too,” Green con-
cluded. Student Courtney Davis had a few policy recommendations, asking whether the 
mayor was “going to make safer shelters for the homeless and the tunnel people,” and if 
he was going to try and provide “them mental help.” Clearly expressing a sense that Gi-
uliani should acknowledge citizen concerns, Luisa Nunez ended her letter with a request 
for a reply: “I would also like you to write me back and tell me what kind of help you are 
giving the homeless people.”226 Giuliani’s office never did reply to the students, but it was 
obvious that the mini-school’s frequent interactions with a variety of people outside the 
school encouraged students to see themselves as active members of society. 
Student reporters also followed national events, such as the high-profile 1996 law-
suit against Texaco as a result of pervasive racial discrimination in the company’s offices 
and hiring practices. Antony Montero reported that his class had taken the case as an op-
portunity to discuss affirmative action laws and the boycott of Texaco led by Jesse Jack-
son, which Montero supported but felt would not be “enough to change people’s minds.” 
Montero believed that there needed to be larger public protests and discussions to address 
the underlying causes of racism. “It will take a lot of effort on the part of all people,” he 
wrote, “to change negative thinking about other people who have a different culture and 
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skin color.”227 Another student, Courtney Davis, wrote about the conversations she had 
with her mother about the case. Davis’s mother stressed the fact that “black people do not 
always stick together and fight the problem in order to make the white people treat them 
fairly,” and that this case was a good example of the importance of collective action. 
However, Davis’s mother also suggested that mainstream coverage of the case had empha-
sized the financial stakes of the lawsuit against Texaco rather than the more fundamental 
racial problems that continued to plague the U.S. “If we (black people) only fight an issue 
to see how much money we are going to get out of it,” Davis concluded, “then we are not 
fighting for the right reasons and the white people (or anyone else) will always be able to 
keep us oppressed.”228 
This small selection of reports from the Classroom Computer News vividly illus-
trates the ways in which the mini-school curriculum turned contemporary local and na-
tional events into valuable learning experiences, and the newspaper showcased students’ 
confidence and skill as written communicators. Students received complementary lessons 
working on KidWitness News, which was edited and mixed using professional video pro-
duction software on the school’s Macintosh computers, and featured student interviews 
with such figures as Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney, astronaut Mae Jemison, 
and the singer Julio Iglesias, all of whom visited the computer mini-school in person.229 
Students working on KidWitness News also received periodic mentoring and professional 
advice from students in Columbia University’s journalism department, who would give 
pointers on things such as interviewing techniques and camera operation.230 One student 
who worked on the video program commented that her mother wanted her to pursue a 
career in politics, but that she was personally entertaining the idea of becoming a news 
anchor “like Tom Brokaw” as a result of her experiences on KidWitness News.231 
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The mini-school therefore produced a remarkable body of qualitative evidence to 
substantiate teacher contentions that students in the program were using computer tech-
nologies in diverse and exciting ways that would clearly help prepare them for a variety of 
future opportunities. While the student-produced projects would have been impressive in 
any school, news media and politicians were particularly eager to seize on the computer 
mini-school at Ralph Bunche as an unlikely success story given the setting of the school 
and the socioeconomic backgrounds of students. In the New York Times’s rather sensa-
tionalistic description, for example, Ralph Bunche was “surrounded by the problems of 
inner-city life,” such as “guns, gangs and crack,” and the paper reveled in drawing dra-
matic contrasts between the high technology in the school’s classrooms and the urban de-
cay outside.232 But as policymakers looked for ways to replicate the successes of the com-
puter mini-school, Reese was determined to convince them that computer technologies 
were not the key ingredient. “[T]he Ralph Bunche School has become famous for its tech-
nology,” Reese said in testimony before the U.S. Congress, “[b]ut its real fame is unsung, 
and that is the dedication of a corps of seven or eight teachers…who care about the chil-
dren that they work with and hold the children that they teach to the highest level of per-
formance and expectation.” He continued, “It is not the technology that has made the 
students in our school excel. It has supported the process of the teachers in our school, but 
it does not drive that process.”233 
It was a refrain Reese often repeated, even when he was being recognized explicitly 
for his work advancing computer education. When talking with Apple employees during 
a site visit to the mini-school, for example, Reese said, “When you talk about school re-
structuring, it’s not just about the technology. Basically we created a community that’s 
supportive [for teachers and students]—a common approach.”234 And when a journalist 
asked Reese whether technology bore primary responsibility for the visible improvements 
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in teaching and learning at the mini-school, his response was unequivocal. “It’s really not 
about computers,” Reese insisted. “It’s about good teaching, and smaller classes, and the 
kids’ involvement in what they’re learning. They have higher motivation because they 
feel a sense of ownership. Clearly the kids who leave here have an excellent grasp of tech-
nology, but that’s not what accounts for our success.”235 Likewise, in an interview with 
Electronic Learning, Reese maintained that the biggest obstacles to improving education 
were that teachers tended to “feel isolated in their classrooms” and “many of them feel 
overwhelmed by the class size.”236 
It may have seemed ironic that Reese placed more emphasis on giving teachers 
greater control over the curriculum, more opportunities to teach in teams and collaborate 
with colleagues, and smaller class sizes, rather than on extending student access to tech-
nology, considering that computers clearly played a key role in many of the mini-school’s 
most impressive projects. But Reese was well aware of the difficulties of procuring the nec-
essary supplies and support for a computer-intensive curriculum. For one thing, Reese 
noted that the mini-school was able to launch many programs “without spending huge 
amounts of money” because the high visibility of the Ralph Bunche School helped Reese 
win numerous grants, and even inspired some unsolicited donations.237 However, Reese 
acknowledged that the overall funding landscape for technology was immensely competi-
tive, and few schools were likely to receive the level of outside support that the mini-
school had enjoyed. Moreover, it was chiefly due to Reese’s personal dedication, along 
with support from a handful of students, that kept all the technologies in working order. 
“If this were a business application, we’d have at least four full-time techies on staff, for 
repair, software applications, troubleshooting,” Reese told one reporter, but he noted that 
in terms of tech support at Ralph Bunche, “Basically, I’m it!”238 Few technology grants in-
cluded any funds for additional technical support, and Reese had discovered in his role as 
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technology coordinator for the broader community school district that few teachers were 
willing or able to take on the burden of maintaining computers and troubleshooting 
equipment problems. Without technologically dedicated teachers, programs that made in-
tensive uses of technology were unlikely to last long, and the Ralph Bunche computer 
mini-school failed to convince teachers at neighboring schools to take on the technologi-
cal training needed to launch a similar effort.239 
Beyond funding and maintenance problems, there were basic infrastructural limi-
tations to expanding programs such as the computer mini-school. Ralph Bunche School, 
like many schools in New York, was housed in an old building, and outfitting a computer 
lab had required relatively extensive rewiring projects. Due to all of the equipment and re-
duced class sizes, the mini-school was also a space-intensive undertaking—as assistant 
principal John Diopoulos noted, it took three classrooms to service the same number of 
students in the mini-school as could be taught in just two classrooms in the regular school. 
“Right now we’re at a critical stage where I can’t add another classroom,” Diopoulos re-
ported, a problem exacerbated by extensive water damage that had forced the school to 
stop using one classroom, which the assistant principal ruefully noted might take years to 
fix due to bureaucratic unresponsiveness at higher levels in the public school system.240 
Thus, while Ralph Bunche administrators and teachers greatly wanted to expand the mini-
school, and despite the international spotlight focused on the school, they found them-
selves unable to secure the funds or support necessary to revamp physical facilities. Hopes 
for expanding the mini-school at Ralph Bunche languished. 
But while broken windows, a crumbling school roof, and the water-damaged class-
room remained unaddressed for years, the city of New York did prove willing to continue 
investing in technology at the school. Toward the end of the school year in 1999, “Stan-
ley Michels, a member of the New York City Council, came to the Ralph Bunche School 
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to see the progress we have made on our computers,” reported the Computer School News. 
“He picked this school and made arrangements for us to get $100,000 for our new com-
puters,” an impressive endorsement of more than a decade’s hard work by the mini-
school’s teachers and students.241 Although the New York City public school system 
seemed reticent to absorb Reese’s arguments about the importance of smaller classes and 
collaborative teaching arrangements, it at least seemed like the mini-school would con-
tinue to make a difference in its students’ lives for many years to come. Moreover, since 
Ralph Bunche would be using the grant to buy a new suite of Apple products, the com-
pany was finally seeing some direct monetary returns as a result of its long-term invest-
ments in the program. A more twisted fate, however, awaited the computer mini-school at 
Ralph Bunche. 
The demise of the mini-school exemplified both the profound failings of public 
school administration and the distinct limits of Apple’s commitments to achieving lasting 
changes in public education. Apple’s education grants program, journalistic coverage of 
the mini-school, politicians’ praise for computer efforts at Ralph Bunche, and Reese’s and 
his colleagues’ assessments of the mini-school emphasized the overall improvements they 
could observe in the quality of students’ work and behavior. They pointed to the sophisti-
cated writing visible in the Classroom Computer News, students’ impressive mastery of 
scientific concepts through activities such as collecting and analyzing weather data, and 
the clear boosts in student esteem and self-confidence that came through meeting and in-
terviewing politicians and other public figures or presenting their work at national educa-
tion conferences. Nevertheless, due to mounting national concerns about problems in the 
public education system, standardized tests had become increasingly popular during the 
1980s and 1990s amongst lawmakers as a tool to measure school performance, and by the 
late 1990s, these tests exerted a great deal of influence over school policy.242 Although 
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Reese and his colleagues argued that standardized tests provided a far too limited picture of 
student performance, because they typically failed to measure higher-level skills such as 
real-world problem-solving or scientific reasoning, students in Earth Lab and the com-
puter mini-school did consistently perform better than their peers on state-mandated 
standardized tests.243 It therefore came as a surprise when student scores on these tests 
dipped significantly during the 1998–1999 school year. 
Students at the Ralph Bunche mini-school were not the only ones underperform-
ing that year. Many public schools in New York City posted results far below expecta-
tions, and facing significant political pressure and public hostility, top administrators in 
the city’s public school system panicked. They rapidly set in motion a sweeping set of 
educational reforms, causing immense upheaval in schools across the city. The computer 
mini-school was one casualty—Ralph Bunche School was forced to dissolve the program, 
and a number of teachers who had worked in the mini-school were fired or forced into 
early retirement. Reese lost his classroom position, but was retained as the technology co-
ordinator for the community school district. Ralph Bunche was, however, allowed to keep 
the $100,000 grant from the city council to buy new Apple computers—following na-
tional policy trends, it was ironically easier for the city to spend large amounts of money 
on technology than to sustain more comprehensive school reform efforts that had shown 
clear signs of success.244 It was a rather distressing commentary on the volatility of public 
school policy that more than a decade’s worth of impressive results and international at-
tention were not enough to buffer the mini-school through one year of less than stellar 
test scores. But an even crueler irony unfolded in the coming months. Later in the school 
year, the investigative reporter Todd Oppenheimer reveals, “the company that adminis-
tered the tests (CTB/McGraw-Hill) admitted that it had made a massive scoring error,” 
and it “turned out that the New York City students hadn’t done as poorly as everyone 
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thought.”245 In fact, students at the mini-school had continued to exceed expectations on 
standardized tests, meaning the closure of the mini-school had been entirely unjustified. 
Throughout this debacle, Apple and the lawmakers and journalists who had heaped 
attention on the Ralph Bunche computer mini-school for more than ten years were no-
where to be found. Despite extensive efforts to find coverage of the mini-school’s closure, 
I could not discover a single newspaper article mentioning the fate of the program. Apple, 
moreover, made no public or private efforts on behalf of the mini-school when it faced 
closure or after McGraw-Hill’s test scoring mistake came to light. The company thus 
missed an important opportunity to hold lawmakers and school administrators account-
able for truly misguided policy actions, a failing which was a direct betrayal of the com-
pany’s promise to be a true ally of the teachers it supported through its educational pro-
grams. But from a business perspective, Apple’s silence made all too much sense. It was, 
after all, the city of New York, not the Ralph Bunche computer mini-school, which pro-
vided the largest possible customer base for the company, and Apple would still benefit 
from the $100,000 sale of computer equipment to the city’s public school system, even 
though those computers would no longer be going to the mini-school. It would hardly do 
for Apple to publicly criticize a school system that might continue to purchase computers 
in large numbers, especially given Apple’s larger financial struggles in the late 1990s, 
when educational sales were the only bright spot in an otherwise bleak commercial land-
scape for the company.246 Indeed, whereas Apple had seen teachers as important advocates 
and customers throughout the 1980s, by the late 1990s, more than two decades of na-
tional policy had encouraged school computerization, and most school systems left com-
puter-purchasing decisions with top administrators. In 2001, for example, Apple signed an 
$18.5 million contract to lease laptops to an entire school district in Virginia.247 The new 
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economics of school computerization therefore required Apple to cultivate institutional 
customers much more than teacher allies. 
The economics might have made sense, but it was a rather chilling turn for a com-
pany that, as recently as 1995, had publicly proclaimed that was determined to use its 
strong market position in schools “to play a role in how education evolves and improves 
throughout the world.”248 That same year, Michael Spindler, then Apple’s CEO, had like-
wise proclaimed that “[b]y providing Apple technology to the agents of change in soci-
ety,” especially teachers, “we are helping fulfill the vision that still drives the company—
that people learn and work with more impact, creativity, and productivity using the power 
of personal information tools.”249 In the same publication, which highlighted Apple’s phil-
anthropic efforts, the company specifically emphasized its aim to use education grants to 
support teachers in their efforts to “restructure and redesign the educational process.”250 
Yet the company’s track record in the real world belied this promise. Rather than demon-
strating determined commitments to helping teachers make meaningful changes to their 
schools, the company revealed a much stronger determination to secure large, lucrative 
contracts from school administrators, who often appeared profoundly disconnected from 
the educational realities teachers faced on the ground. 
But Apple’s shifting emphasis in education was all the more disturbing given that a 
number of Apple employees had started to question whether computers could truly drive 
meaningful change in schools. This was nowhere clearer than among the employees who 
worked in the high-profile Apple Classrooms of Tomorrow (ACOT) program, which 
paired Apple employees, university researchers, and teachers for a ten-year research project 
carried out at five public schools in California, Minnesota, Ohio, and Tennessee. 
Launched in 1985, part of ACOT’s purpose was to simulate a future in which teachers and 
students would have ready access to computer technologies, so every student and teacher 
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who participated in the program was given one Apple computer to use in school as well as 
one for home use.251 But the overarching aim of ACOT was to change basic teaching prac-
tices, so project leaders pushed teachers to abandon lecture-based instruction, which they 
saw as encouraging passive learning, and to instead adopt a project-based, collaborative 
format for student assignments. Drawing on a number of educational theories, Apple re-
searchers hoped that these changes in teaching practices would help students move beyond 
the simplistic retention and regurgitation of facts by providing “[l]earning environments 
[that] feel more like real workplaces where problems are solved through conversation, in-
quiry, trial and error, and constant comparison of one approximate solution against an-
other.”252 Most participating teachers were enthusiastic, and ACOT facilitated extensive 
collaborations among teachers, Apple employees, and the university professors hired to 
consult on the project. In spite this supportive and energetic atmosphere, however, chang-
ing teacher practice proved much more complicated than the ACOT team predicted. 
First, it took much longer than expected for teachers to become familiar with 
computer technologies and to find effective ways to use them in their classrooms. Early 
on, betraying a high degree of faith in the intuitive usability of Apple products, the com-
pany simply shipped equipment to the sites without providing teachers with much ad-
vance preparation. David Dwyer, the director of ACOT, later recalled that “[v]arious 
forms of chaos ensued” as teachers had to spend “countless hours…sorting, labeling, in-
vestigating, problem solving, and planning” to assemble and install “modems, CPUs, 
monitors, disk drives, printers, software, blank floppies and cables—miles and miles of ca-
bles…. all on top of making sure classes kept progressing and children kept learning.”253 
Even once Apple employees realized that teachers needed more help learning how to use 
computers and started offering more training and technical support, integrating the tech-
nology into the curriculum was still a daunting proposition. One teacher worried that so 
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much time was being devoted to computers that it was detracting from her ability “to 
meet all the objectives and all the things that these children will need.”254 Anxieties about 
meeting certain instructional objectives was particularly pronounced due to the weight of 
standardized tests and the attitudes of other teachers at the schools who were not partici-
pating in ACOT. 
For example, one elementary school teacher participating in ACOT faced inflexi-
ble “[s]tate mandates…to concentrate heavily on basic skills in math and reading” with 
her fifth-graders, and concerns about reprisals for low standardized test scores constantly 
undermined her attempts to pursue more open-ended assignments and lesson plans.255 She 
often felt that collaborative and self-directed assignments were too “noisy and create[d] 
too much excitement,” and although she appreciated that such arrangements could gener-
ate more engagement and enthusiasm from students, she would periodically grow anxious 
that her students were not getting enough practice on basic skills and would rapidly curtail 
classroom freedoms and return to a lecture-based format.256 It was a stressful and difficult 
situation, made all the worse by the hostility of other teachers, who grumbled about “the 
incoming resources from Apple Computer” while failing to recognize “the huge invest-
ment of time and effort” the ACOT teacher had to commit to the project.257 As a result, 
the school principal took away certain resources from the ACOT classroom, such as library 
access, in an effort to appease other teachers. Higher-level district administrators, mean-
while, refused to lighten standardized test demands despite the experimental nature of the 
program and the possibility that it could produce valuable insights into the learning and 
teaching processes. As the only ACOT participant at her school, the teacher felt increas-
ingly isolated and antagonized as she struggled to work through the ups and downs of the 
program, so she decided to stop participating in ACOT after a single year.258 
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It was a scenario ACOT researchers saw repeated at site after site, year after year. 
Other teachers would become jealous of the attention and resources given to ACOT class-
rooms, and principals and school administrators tended to be ambivalent in their support 
of the program, as they typically felt great pressure from local, state, and federal lawmak-
ers to post high scores on standardized tests. As Dwyer observed in many of the ACOT 
sites he visited as director of the program, even when “ACOT students demonstrated new 
learning outcomes such as creative problem solving strategies or heightened abilities to 
play productive and collaborative roles in the performance of their tasks, their teachers 
struggled with the problem of translating these demonstrations into quantitative meas-
ures” that would be appreciated by school administrators.259 As Apple employees with the 
ACOT project became more deeply immersed in the politics of school bureaucracies and 
standardized tests, they became particularly disenchanted with the deleterious effects of 
high-stakes tests on the teaching profession. “When teachers and administrators became 
more accountable for student test scores,” ACOT researchers noted, “they increasingly 
limited instruction to drill and practice of the kinds of skills and disjointed facts that na-
tionally normed tests emphasized,” and as a result, “the classroom demand for higher-
order cognitive performance virtually disappeared.”260 Unfortunately, the ACOT pro-
gram’s emphasis on interdisciplinary learning and complex problem solving rarely spoke 
to the demands of these standardized tests. As a UCLA research team attached to the pro-
ject noted, “Accountability measures used in participating school districts demanded 
teachers’ continued attention to traditional learning goals, regardless of ACOT’s new vi-
sions for student learning.”261 ACOT researchers therefore began to recognize that truly 
changing schools would require more concerted attempts to influence basic school poli-
cies, a complex effort that would require extensive lobbying and outreach at local, state, 
and federal levels. 
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Technology’s role in encouraging new directions for teaching and learning was, 
furthermore, far from clear to ACOT participants. The UCLA research team, for example, 
claimed, “We did not find sweeping evidence across sites that ACOT qua ACOT was hav-
ing positive effects on the quality of instruction, on the depth and breadth of student 
learning, on the attitudes and aspirations of students and parents.”262 Moreover, while the 
UCLA team did see some evidence that teachers had changed their practices according to 
the ACOT project’s goals, their “findings did not reveal a particular role of technology in 
these changes.”263 Rather, the UCLA team concluded, teachers had altered their classroom 
behaviors because of extensive prodding from Apple employees. Perhaps the strongest cri-
tique of ACOT came from Apple’s own Kristina Hooper Woolsey, who was the cofounder 
and director of the Apple Multimedia Lab, a company department that developed many 
educational products. Woolsey’s greatest concern was that “the huge gap between research 
demonstrations [such as ACOT] and practical widespread solutions is terrifying.”264 In 
other words, she came to recognize that the interesting gains made in some of the ACOT 
sites had far less to do with the application of technologies than with the creation of 
teacher communities, which, much like the computer mini-school at Ralph Bunche, helped 
educators collaborate to create new learning experiences and opportunities for their stu-
dents. “Computers are really expensive,” Woolsey concluded, and since Apple had not 
produced “much evidence that significant learning is enhanced with computing systems” 
after ten years of intensive research and experimentation, she argued that other methods 
of supporting teachers would be cheaper and more effective at improving public schools.265 
Yet Apple’s receptivity to these arguments was arguably blunted by the company’s 
financial woes in the mid-1990s.266 In 1996, the very same year that Woolsey published 
her criticisms, the umbrella organization for ACOT at Apple, the Advanced Technology 
Group, had produced an internal newsletter informing researchers with the group that 
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they needed to align their activities more explicitly with Apple’s overarching corporate 
strategies.267 Moreover, while published materials about ACOT detail how the company 
supported teachers in their efforts to develop free teacher-training programs to help other 
educators throughout the country expand on the ACOT program’s successes and insights, 
archival materials reveal that the company simultaneously attempted to create its own, 
monetized classes based on the ACOT teachers’ training initiative, placing Apple in direct 
competition with the teachers it claimed to support.268 Here again was a case where lofty 
corporate rhetoric diverged from self-interested company practice. 
Apple did publish the critical comments and findings of ACOT researchers and 
employees, despite the fact that they directly challenged the need to place more computers 
in schools, and the company maintained copies of all the original ACOT research reports 
on the Apple website until 2010, when the company quietly removed the reports to make 
way for an updated research initiative called ACOT2.269 While offering continual access to 
research that was critical of ACOT gives the semblance of corporate transparency, it is 
equally obvious that criticisms from Apple employees such as Woolsey have had little 
meaningful impact on Apple’s efforts to market computers to schools, despite ongoing 
questions about the actual benefits of student access to computers. In 2013, for example, 
Apple was awarded a $1.3 billion contract, along with software developer Pearson, to pro-
vide iPads to every student in the Los Angeles Unified School District.270 After critics 
questioned the scholastic utility of iPads, which “lack keyboards and other components 
many students find useful—like drives and USB ports,” a formal investigation revealed 
that the district’s superintendent had awarded the contract to Apple and Pearson without 
going through a legally required open bidding process.271 Moreover, much of the Pearson 
software loaded on the iPads was riddled with flaws and failed to work properly.272 In addi-
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tion, Time magazine reported, many schools in the district lacked the appropriate Internet 
infrastructure to allow students to use the devices.273 
While the Los Angeles public schools superintendent lost his job over the debacle, 
the scandal failed to dent Apple’s education business. In 2015, Apple iPads and laptops ac-
counted for 25 percent of the mobile computing devices sold to schools, netting the com-
pany $3.2 billion that year alone.274 Indeed, Apple’s only significant losses in educational 
market share have come through intense competition from the cheaper devices offered by 
Google and computers running Microsoft Windows, which began to cut deeply into Ap-
ple’s school business in 2016, reducing the company’s educational sales to $2.8 billion, a 
loss of some $400 million compared to 2015.275 But with a total of $7.35 billion spent on 
new mobile computing products for schools in 2016, it is clear that the broader commer-
cial market for school computers is robust, while the reign of standardized tests continues 
unabated, and the collaborative teaching arrangements and teacher-led reforms suggested 
by the Ralph Bunche computer mini-school and ACOT remain a rarity.276 Thus, although 
Apple is no longer the clear winner in educational sales of computer products, the priori-
ties first encapsulated in the Apple Bill in 1982 still shape U.S. school computer policy—
buying large amounts of computers to ensure student access to novel technologies is a 
paramount policy goal, but, as the Los Angeles iPad scandal suggests, commitments to 
making sure those technologies are actually useful, or even usable, are often lacking. 
 
THE INTERSECTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS 
Throughout this chapter, I have argued that Apple’s aggressive financial goals out-
paced—and undermined—the corporation’s commitments to improving U.S. schools. I 
have also striven to show, however, that public indifference to more deeply rooted educa-
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tional problems—whether the lack of adequate school funds, troubling federal treatment 
of Indian reservation schools, the maldistribution of educational opportunities among 
wealthy and poor students, or misguided obsessions with punitive standardized testing re-
gimes—strongly informed the course of school computerization in the United States. Due 
in large part to public indifference regarding public education, there was little political will 
in the 1980s or 1990s to hold Apple accountable for its loftier educational promises. In-
stead, Apple and other technology companies were given relatively free rein to let their 
business interests guide their involvement with schools. As I also argued in chapters 1 and 
2, the corporate mentalities that currently define understandings of success in the business 
world—aggressive competition, rapid growth, large profit margins, high stock values, and 
an intensely productive workforce—provide few internal mechanisms to push companies 
to balance their own financial interests with more sophisticated understandings of the 
greater public good. Without a skeptical, vocal, and politically engaged and empowered 
public, there is little reason to expect U.S. corporations such as Apple to perform mean-
ingful public services or to care deeply about the human costs of their business practices 
and labor arrangements. 
The relative absence of such a critically engaged public is one of the most curious 
conundrums of recent U.S. history. In 1973, for example, Daniel Bell opined in his mag-
num opus on deindustrialization, “A feeling has begun to spread in the [United States] 
that corporate performance has made the society uglier, dirtier, trashier, more polluted, 
and noxious. The sense of identity between the self-interest of the corporation and the 
public interest has been replaced by a sense of incongruence.”277 A few years later, in one 
of his most famous addresses to the American people, President Jimmy Carter similarly 
reflected, “we’ve discovered that owning things and consuming things does not satisfy 
our longing for meaning. We’ve learned that piling up material goods cannot fill the 
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emptiness of lives which have no confidence or purpose.”278 Such statements suggested 
that the people of the United States were growing disenchanted with corporate capitalism, 
and were losing faith in the power of consuming commercial products to make them 
happy. Yet these sentiments did not win the day. Rather than reining in the excesses of 
corporate activity, the last forty years have seen businesses greatly expand their expand 
their influence over public life, perhaps best encapsulated in the Supreme Court’s 2010 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision, which granted corporations and 
their wealthy leaders extraordinarily expanded abilities to spend their money to sway the 
political process.279 Meanwhile, Americans remain avid consumers of commercial products 
and devoted fans of vast and inhumanly prosperous firms, even though by almost every 
measure the activities of large corporations have driven U.S. wealth inequality to record 
highs, profoundly reducing the economic security of the majority of Americans.280 
To this day, Apple remains one of the best examples of ardent public enthusiasm 
for a large corporation. Leander Kahney chronicles families who have trekked hundreds of 
miles on weekends just to be present at the opening ceremonies of Apple retail stores, 
while Ian Bogost argues that Apple has conditioned its customers to view luxury-priced 
iPhones as a seasonal purchase, more fashion accessory than technological tool.281 Al-
though I have dug deeply to substantiate my criticisms of the company, it is not terribly 
difficult to pierce the veil of the company’s airy rhetoric about changing the world or im-
proving society. Yet critical reporting on the company—such as the mainstream press’s 
extensive coverage of the Los Angeles iPad scandal—seems incapable of rousing much 
critical debate or resistance among the company’s numerous fans or consumers.282 Perhaps 
the majority of we Americans are not so different from Apple’s own employees—it is 
comforting to see the corporation as an unconventional and thrilling success story, and to 
believe that its products have made our lives better and easier, even when confronted with 
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And Now Let Us Praise Famous Men 
 
In 2015, the Atlantic compared Apple, Inc. to “a small country,” citing the fact 
that the corporation had become wealthier than 75 percent of the nations on Earth.1 Pre-
dictably, the piece cast Apple’s rise to the top of the heap as the surprising triumph of an 
inveterate underdog, quipping that a mere fifteen years earlier, “Apple was perhaps nota-
ble for making colorful iMacs that dotted high-school computer labs, but not much else.”2 
I don’t, however, see much to celebrate in this story. As I dug into Apple’s history while 
researching this project, I discovered that the corporation’s famous leaders were an arro-
gant, self-aggrandizing lot, who made a rather queasy habit of conflating their financial 
self-interest with public service. The likes of Steve Jobs and John Sculley certainly amassed 
impressive personal fortunes, but their rise rested in no small measure on pervasive labor 
abuses, the subversion of worker rights, and unethical dealings with public schools. The 
bulk of my research focused on Apple’s first two decades, but my investigations of more 
recent developments at the corporation suggest that many of the patterns established by 
Jobs, Sculley, and their associates are still in place—the company remains a master of posi-
tive spin when it faces criticism, while people closer to Apple suggest that the reality is of-
ten less rosy.3 Indeed, now that so much wealth rides on the corporation’s stock values, it 
seems reasonable to assume that Apple’s leaders face more pressure than ever to aggres-
sively pursue constant growth and profits—in other words, to put the corporation’s finan-
cial interests before any other concerns. 
So what larger lessons can we draw from Apple’s troubling history? I argued in the 
introduction that many of the corporation’s murkier aspects are endemic to Silicon Valley 
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as a whole. Other firms in the U.S. tech industry may not exhibit precisely the same prob-
lems, but an extensive enough body of anecdotal, journalistic, and scholarly evidence ex-
ists to situate Apple squarely at the heart of Silicon Valley corporate culture. Building on 
the work of others, I have tried to show that much of that culture rests on dissimulation, 
in which tech leaders cast their quests for money and corporate power as means to serve 
the greater public good.4 But the U.S. technology industry’s relative lack of a determined 
set of ethical principles can be deduced from tech leaders’ anxious flip-flopping in the face 
of Donald Trump’s presidency. For example, the New York Times described the mood in 
Silicon Valley as “beyond grim” the day following Trump’s election, with people through-
out high-tech claiming profound political differences with the Trump camp.5 Even so, 
tech industry luminaries choked down their professed bile relatively quickly, and they 
moved rapidly to reach some kind of rapprochement with the new administration. Just a 
month after the election, leaders from tech heavyweights Apple, Amazon, Google, Face-
book, Microsoft, IBM, Tesla, Intel, and a handful of other firms trekked to New York for 
a summit with Trump, during which both the president-elect and the executives discussed 
ways they could help each other achieve financial and economic goals.6 The tenor of the 
meeting overwhelmingly indicated that the heads of these companies were willing to set 
aside their ostensible political qualms about Trump, so long as his policies served their cor-
porate interests. Google, meanwhile, hosted a lavish party at the Smithsonian Arts and 
Industries building in Washington, D.C. to court Republican lawmakers in early January 
2017—a move which the New York Times described as a concerted attempt “to change the 
perception that [Google] is a Democratic stronghold,” given that company leaders and 
employees have donated generously to Democratic candidates in the past, while sending 
only a miniscule amount of money to Republican campaigns.7 
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Yet many tech executives found themselves backpedaling awkwardly after 
Trump’s January 27, 2017 executive order banning citizens of seven Muslim-majority 
countries from entering the U.S., including permanent U.S. residents and visa-holders. A 
week later, the executives at Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, Google, and Uber all signed 
onto a letter condemning the executive order, initially drawing praise from some corners 
of the mainstream press.8 But the Intercept and New York Times both reported that Silicon 
Valley leaders were deeply hesitant to make any public statements against the ban because 
they feared that their profits might be harmed by political reprisals or antagonistic policy 
decisions, and it was primarily due to outcry and activism on the part of rank and file em-
ployees that the executives finally took a formal stand against the executive order.9 
Moreover, the Intercept pointed out, the tech leaders couched their criticisms in decidedly 
economic terms, chiefly complaining that the ban would make it more difficult to draw 
talented, high-performing individuals into the U.S. labor pool.10 High-tech workers, how-
ever, have continued to fight to push their powerful employers to take stronger stands 
against Trump, and there are a few indications that corporate leaders are listening.11 Per-
haps the pressure workers are placing on corporations can be taken as a hopeful sign that 
some critical faculties are awakening, and that employees—and some sectors of the 
broader public—are becoming more determined to hold Silicon Valley firms accountable 
to their airy promises about making the world a better place. These were precisely the sen-
timents that were lacking at Apple in the 1980s and 1990s, which made it far too easy for 
company leaders to abuse employees, run roughshod over worker rights, renege on prom-
ises to schools, and to prioritize corporate profits above all else. 
The political stirrings among Silicon Valley workers are a refreshing departure 
from the anesthetizing tones uttered by the likes of John Sculley in the 1980s, when he 
insisted that simply working on Apple’s commercial products possessed similar social value 
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to civic participation, political activism, or organizing alternative communities.12 Indeed, 
instead of hoping, like Barack Obama, that a new technology will refresh the American 
public’s desire to engage with political issues and social problems, it seems to me that a 
much more promising course of action would be to seize on the current moment’s strains 
of resistance, and search for ways to build collective efforts that can sustain the political 
efforts of different actors who, in isolation, are not likely to accomplish much.13 As this 
dissertation suggests, the history of the technology industry does not offer many strong 
examples of collective action, and the American public will likely need to look to other 
moments and settings in U.S. and global history where large numbers of people worked 
together to demand a more egalitarian, just, and free society. 
Those of us who do not work directly for technology firms, however, should not 
draw too much comfort or satisfaction from our criticisms of Silicon Valley. It is easy to 
take shots at the U.S. technology industry from the sidelines, because the claims floated 
by company leaders and corporate publicity machines often fairly reek of pomposity, 
while Silicon Valley’s failure to live up to those promises can be spectacular. It is much 
more challenging to absorb the lessons of Silicon Valley from a broader labor and business 
history perspective, which indicates that the corporate practices and structural inequalities 
of the tech industry are not aberrant diversions from common experience, but are rather 
emblematic of the larger trends that have remade U.S. work into a much more individual-
ized and precarious enterprise, and which have contributed to the astounding concentra-
tion of wealth and political influence in the hands of a very small class of corporate 
elites.14 In other words, Silicon Valley firms are not the only powerful corporate actors we 
need to question or challenge. As Roland Marchand insisted in his history of corporate 
public relations, “The citizen incessantly addressed as favorite, friend, neighbor, and even 
family member of the corporation had to develop a prickly, discriminatory wariness in or-
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der to resist acquiescence and maintain a realistic sense of conflicting interests.”15 Yet in 
David Foster Wallace’s essay about John McCain’s 2000 presidential campaign, he pro-
vocatively asserted that the problem went far beyond business activity as such. The self-
interested pursuits of “great salesmen and sales pitches and marketing concepts,” he ar-
gued, have all but infected American culture at large, and it has become easy, he contin-
ued, to “start believing deep down that everything is sales and marketing, and that when-
ever somebody seems like they care about you or about some noble idea or cause, that per-
son is a salesman and really ultimately doesn’t give a shit about you or some cause but 
really just wants something for himself.”16 
Wallace granted that this insight could be painful and somewhat paralyzing, but 
his suggestion was to apply something like Marchand’s “prickly, discriminatory wariness” 
to the promises uttered on campaign trails, in TV ads and corporate mission statements, 
or by charismatic public figures—to try, in Wallace’s blunt phrasing, “to stay awake.”17 
What better advice can I offer than to remain skeptical? Skeptical of the numbing pleas-
ures of consumerism. Skeptical of the distance between promises that our work will 
“change the world” and the lack of collective rights and protections we may face as work-
ers. Skeptical of the glossy guarantees that powerful institutions are socially responsible 
entities that care deeply about employees, social problems, or the environment, whether 
those institutions are multinational corporations, Super Pacs, think tanks, influential me-
dia outlets, or great research universities. Skeptical of arguments that unfettered market 
forces can better solve social problems than concerted, collective political debate and ac-
tion. And to look beyond individualized acts of protest, like sarcastic laughter or critical 
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